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Abstract 
Shortly after winning a landslide victory in 2001, the Thai Rak Thai Party introduced 
the 30 baht Healthcare System, also known as the Universal Healthcare (UC) Scheme. 
For the first time, this made modern health services available to every Thai citizen for a 
nominal fee of 30 baht (well under one US dollar). Unsurprisingly, there were 
immediate improvements in healthcare outcomes in Thailand, and the programme was 
one of a number that consolidated the hold of the Thai Rak Thai Party in Thai politics, 
a hold that it and its successor parties continue to have. This research argues that these 
political motivations had a significant impact on the programme’s design, and on the 
problems that emerged with its financial viability.  
This dissertation examines the background of the UC System (the 30 baht Healthcare 
System), and assesses its efficiency in the management of resources, equity of access, 
and service quality, and the long term viability of the UC scheme in terms of financing 
and the continued participation of private sector service providers. It finds that 
secondary data is very hard to access and provides neither a comprehensive picture nor 
satisfactory answers to these questions. The research used a qualitative case study 
approach to shed light on important aspects of the performance of the scheme, without 
aiming at comprehensiveness given the limitations of time and resources. The 
researcher faced significant reluctance from hospitals to reveal internal management 
strategies and costs and the initial goal of six case study hospitals was reduced to two. 
Nevertheless, these two provide very useful insights into important aspects of the 
scheme. The first is B-Care, a private hospital that joined the scheme in its very early 
days but then opted out when the financial arrangements proved to be unviable. The 
second was Baanpaew Hospital, a public hospital. Public hospitals are obliged to 
participate in the scheme but Baanpaew was exceptional in that it devised changes in 
management and specialisation that enabled it to remain financially viable, unlike many 
other public hospitals which face ongoing financial problems. The two case studies 
therefore shed light on the financial stresses to which the scheme led, and the types of 
responses that may be required to ensure the survival of the scheme in the future. 
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Chapter 1. Thailand’s political economy of 30 baht 
Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
1.1 Introduction 
Thailand’s economic development was rapid in the 1980s and 1990s with high 
economic growth and the development of new industrial sectors. The size of its 
manufacturing sector grew rapidly, and agriculture performed well with the country 
enjoying relatively high growth in agricultural exports. Nevertheless, large pockets of 
relative poverty remained and this was regionally concentrated in some areas like the 
North-East of the country and the extreme South (Chamarik, 1999). The simple 
economic theory that growth will eventually trickle down to all has not been effective 
anywhere and was not effective in Thailand. Thai policy-makers historically did not 
pay a lot of attention to anti-poverty programmes or distributive issues 
(Wibulpolprasert, 2000). Although there were a number of programmes aimed at 
welfare, this was not a priority for Thai policy-makers and the regional poverty issues 
persisted. Perhaps it was understandable given that Thailand was still a relatively poor 
country in the 1980s and 1990s. Politicians and policy-makers focused on growth and 
investment, apparently believing that poverty would decline or would at least be easier 
to tackle as the country became more prosperous. Greater prosperity would indeed in 
principle provide more resources to enable the poor to access a larger portion of the 
country’s economic success and this would lead to a reduction in poverty (Siamwalla & 
Jitsuchon, 2007). 
The economic crisis of 1997 dealt a serious blow to the gradualist approach supported 
by the ruling establishment in Thailand. People-oriented policies, which were branded 
as populist by critics, began to emerge in the political arena and soon began to 
dominate. The crisis was attributed by many citizens, particularly in the poorer areas, to 
the liberal laissez-faire policies the country had been following. These resulted in 
speculative investments and asset bubbles that contributed to the financial crisis of 
1997. The crisis was a turning point in Thailand’s politics because the policies that had 
apparently contributed to the crisis had also primarily benefited the rich. This popular 
18 
 
dissatisfaction contributed to the political rise and electoral success of the Thai Rak 
Thai Party led by Thaksin Shinawatra, a process that began in the 2001 general 
elections. The party’s populist platform and the subsequent implementation of large 
parts of this programme marked a transition in Thailand’s economic and political 
development (Siamwalla, 2007).  
This was the political context in which the 30 baht Health Scheme, also known as the 
Universal Healthcare (UC) Scheme, was introduced. This was a radical extension of 
access in the accessible healthcare coverage available in Thailand at that time. The 
message to the poor was very compelling: a visit to a healthcare clinic or hospital 
would incur a charge of 30 baht (one US dollar was around 50 baht in 1998) and this 
would be the only charge for the full course of treatment regardless of the type or cost 
of treatment required. Given the very high market cost of medical treatments for serious 
health problems, it is easy to see why such a policy would be immediately very popular 
with a large segment of the population that had previously had limited or no access to 
modern medical services (Phongpaichit, 2004). According to a study on households’ 
financial and social status conducted by the National Statistics Office, the 30 baht 
scheme was the scheme most accessible to the poor, compared to other populist 
schemes promised or introduced by the Thai Ruk Thai Party (TDRI, 2009). 
The 30 baht Universal Healthcare Scheme represented huge progress in its motivation 
and in the improved access to modern healthcare that it provided to the excluded 
sections of the population. Undoubtedly there was a significant improvement in 
healthcare access as a result of the initiative, and not surprisingly this had positive 
effects on healthcare outcomes in Thailand. On the other hand, the scheme had some 
significant limitations that affected its financial viability and that may well affect its 
future unless policy-makers take steps to address some of the questions about financial 
viability. The fiscal allocations and the rules for allocating funds across hospitals and 
treatments did not reflect the real cost of different types of treatments, and the rules for 
hospitals for deciding between treatments and trade-offs were not clear (TDRI, 2009). 
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1.2 The health insurance programme ‘Just 30 baht for the treatment 
of all illnesses’ 
Thailand adopted the United Nation’s (UN) objective of good health for all, and so 
health insurance for all was introduced with a view to improving public health. Health 
insurance for all represents the guarantee of the accessibility of healthcare services to 
everyone in accordance with his or her needs, and healthcare services are provided to 
everyone on the basis of equality and individual dignity. Access to such healthcare 
services is considered each citizen’s basic right, not a form of patronage given by the 
state to its citizens. This right is derived from the 1997 constitution, which states in 
Article 52 that each person has a right to receive standardised healthcare services and 
the poor have a right to receive medical services free of charge from state-run 
healthcare service units. In addition, Article 82 stipulates that the state has to provide 
standardised and effective healthcare services for the people (Sunthorndham, 2012). 
As illness affects everyone at some time or other, a politician who can offer a strategy 
for making treatment free or cheap in a country with a lot of poverty will immediately 
acquire a lot of support and loyalty. Thaksin, with his skills and experience as a 
marketing strategist, understood this fact well. Not surprisingly, Thaksin recognised 
that a programme for providing healthcare insurance for all would be an important 
platform for consolidating his power base after winning the 2001 election with a 
majority of parliamentary seats. The scheme Thaksin introduced was a healthcare 
insurance programme called in Thai ‘Just 30 baht for the treatment of all illnesses’, also 
often referred to as the Universal Healthcare Scheme. Analysts were immediately 
doubtful about the viability of such a programme because it aimed to provide universal 
coverage for all types of healthcare problems virtually for free, implying very large 
funding requirements. However, Thaksin was entirely serious and as soon as his 
government was formed the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) was instructed to 
implement this programme (Pitayarangsarit, 2004). 
Thaksin’s populism was consistent with the poor’s needs and it provided a solution to 
the problem of insecurity which plagued those outside the formal sector of economic 
activities. The immediate and widespread appeal of the Universal Healthcare Scheme 
can be attributed to three factors (Phongpaichit, 2005). Firstly, a universal healthcare 
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system was to be introduced in Thailand for the first time, providing an unspecified 
level of coverage to everyone. Initially, this set of policies appealed to all, not just one 
specific group of people. The ‘just 30 baht for the treatment of all illnesses’ programme 
could in principle also appeal to the middle and lower middle classes because not all 
the people in these higher income groups were adequately covered by existing schemes. 
The healthcare programme complemented other universal programmes that were part of 
the Thaksin strategy of delivering to his constituency of the excluded. For instance, 
there were other programmes aimed at providing one million baht for every village, 
with the declared intention of freeing every peasant from their debt burden. Whilst 
these programmes were universal, their target was clearly the poor and previously 
excluded. These groups were therefore the most enthusiastic about the introduction of 
these programmes.  
Secondly, Thaksin presented his image to the general public as the people’s friend and 
as one of them, although he was actually one of the richest businessmen in Thailand. 
His gift was his ability to engage in informal conversations with people using local 
dialects and even joke and chat about his sex life. The image of him as an accessible 
leader contributed to his immense popularity as an accessible and progressive leader. 
Thirdly, Thaksin managed to convince the masses that he could turn their wishes into 
effective state policies. He tried to make it appear to the public that the old-fashioned 
politics, which was marked by politicians making promises but failing to deliver, was 
now history. In fact, he did deliver all the promises adopted by his party prior to the 
election and this set him apart from the previous politicians, though the nature of the 
implementation and its viability remains questionable to this day and is one of the 
subjects of this dissertation. However, Thaksin disregarded democratic principles 
concerning legal procedures, the rule of law, and civil rights. He disregarded these 
democratic principles by arguing that his mandate to rule was given to him by a very 
large number of people, which he regarded as approval of his exercising his power in 
an authoritarian manner for the benefit of his supporters. However, exercising his 
power in such a manner led to confrontations with parliamentary members, opposition 
parties, civil society, academics, non-governmental organisations, and agencies created 
by the constitution to deter the abuse of power by authority. Thaksin and his men 
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viewed his authoritarianism as comparable to that of the popular strongman in Thai 
history, Sarit Thanarat (1957-63), who was widely admired for his decisiveness and 
firm actions to achieve his goals.  
Thaksin initially had multiple objectives but circumstances made him turn more 
strongly to the populist part of his policy portfolio. Thaksin originally intended to 
assume the responsibility for the revival of Thai capitalism after its collapse in 1997, 
which would involve working closely with a broad base of Thai capitalists and 
entrepreneurs to work out a programme of economic regeneration. However, he soon 
came under fire from the middle classes for his personal tax and other irregularities 
including the charge of not fully declaring his stockholdings. At this stage, shortly after 
coming to power, Thaksin realised the power of the masses to protect him from these 
criticisms. They came out in force to defend Thaksin from the charge of ‘covering up 
his stockholding’. An embattled Thaksin soon realised that he needed to consolidate his 
power base by delivering to the constituencies that most strongly supported him. In 
summary, Thaksin’s populism and his pro-poor leadership arose out of a political 
strategy based on delivering to the needs of those outside the formal and recognised 
domain of economic activities, but his commitment to these strategies became 
progressively stronger as he realised that this constituency was the only one he could 
rely on to stay in power. These political considerations affected the speed with which 
the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme was rolled out, and this in turn had 
significant implications for the limited preparations made to ensure the viability of the 
financing for the programme and the limited attention given to the details of what was 
to be covered, for whom, and how. 
1.3 The significance of the research 
Like other big schemes, the 30 baht scheme is prone to political intervention both in its 
motivation and in its design. This is only relevant if the political motivations affect the 
sustainability of the programme, or the quality or allocation of services, either 
intentionally or unintentionally. Generally, politicians exert their influence over the 
decision making relating to the operation of the scheme through the appointment of a 
politician to the chairmanship of the National Health Security Committee. Similarly, 
local politicians become involved in the local management of the scheme in a variety of 
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ways. The involvement of politicians in the scheme can be regarded as their attempt at 
rent-seeking, not unlike their involvement in other populist schemes in order to gain 
popularity, the practice adopted by the Tai Ruk Thai party whilst in power. After the 
party came to power they introduced a number of populist projects which were given 
titles that sounded appealing, had a clear message, and were easy to remember. Soon 
these project names became household names. Such phrases included ‘one tambon, one 
product’, ‘one fund for each village’, ‘Thailand as the world’s centre of fashion’, 
‘Thailand as the world’s kitchen’, and ‘Thailand as Asia’s Detroit’, and were highly 
appealing to the general public (Ruangsakul, 2011). 
Such projects was often perceived by critics as serving the purpose of a political agenda 
at the cost of the misuse of public funds that might have an adverse effect on the 
country’s budget. An insufficient supply of finance for the implementation of such 
schemes was likely to result in growing budget deficits that would eventually impose 
all the costs of a debt burden on the general public or result in inflation. In reality, the 
unsuccessful implementation of certain projects was allowed to continue as their 
presence satisfied the poorer classes who were the largest proportion of voters and 
crucial for Thaksin’s hold on power.  
The Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme, adopted as the country’s most important 
policy, was aimed at achieving three main objectives: 1) institutionalising equality in 
terms of access to healthcare services and sharing the financial responsibility for the 
costs of these services; 2) providing standardised healthcare services at a minimum 
level which could keep the majority of the people satisfied; and 3) maintaining 
operational efficiency such that the minimum of resources resulted in the maximum 
benefits in terms of healthcare promotion (Jongudomsuk, 2002). Achieving these three 
objectives involved upgrading the budgetary allocation, financial management, 
accountancy, and service delivery systems in the healthcare system in very quick order. 
As Thailand is a middle income country with a large middle class which would be 
critical of any wasteful use of tax resources, it was necessary for policy makers to 
arrange the allocation of resources in the most efficient way, and equality had to be 
achieved in ways that minimised conflict with the significantly powerful taxpaying 
middle class. It is not unusual during the implementation of a scheme which is very 
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large in scale, such as the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme, for it to be subject to 
questions, criticism and protests as such a policy affects a large number of people and 
can induce profound changes in a country’s healthcare system at the personal and 
organisational level. Those affected by the policy included those standing to benefit 
from it and those who would be deprived of their current advantageous position in 
terms of access to healthcare on a privileged basis or in terms of a low tax burden. The 
question concerning the implementation of such a policy with such a large financial 
requirement relates to the extent of the poor’s access to healthcare service, the source 
and the amount of funds required for implementing the policy, and the mechanism for 
facilitating its efficient operation and resource management. 
1.4  Objectives of the study  
1. To study the political economy of the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
and the impact on policy implementation; 
2. To study the access to the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme in Thailand; 
3. To study the financial management of the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme in Thailand; 
4. To study the implementation of the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
through case studies of particular hospitals. 
The next chapter presents the framework of analysis, elaborated from a literature 
review of political economics and policy analysis. Thereafter the methods of data 
collection will be described. 
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Chapter 2. Research framework and methods 
This chapter develops a policy analysis framework through a review of different 
disciplines relating to political economics and policy, to help explain the Universal 
Healthcare Coverage (UC) Scheme analysis. Thereafter, the study objectives and 
research questions are specified, and finally, it explains the study methods used. 
2.1 Framework of political economy 
The political economy of Thailand’s 30 baht Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
from 2001-2007 refers to a body of analysis and a perspective on UC policy which 
seeks to understand the conditions which shape population health and healthcare within 
the wider macro-economic and political context. The relationships between political 
economic and universal healthcare are complex and can be analysed in terms of a range 
of different linkages. In this chapter, the literature is reviewed to obtain appropriate 
ideas or theories helpful to the formation of research methodology.  
According to Crane and Amawi (1997), ‘political economy’ suggests a focus on 
phenomena that lie at the crossroads of the fields of politics and economics. It seeks to 
explain how political power shapes economic outcomes and how economic forces 
influence political action. Although divergent beliefs are held as to the direction and 
strength of the relationship of politics and economics, exploring their interconnection is 
the basis of political economy. But political economy is not simply an amalgam of the 
two traditional fields; rather, it attempts a new synthesis. Implicit in the endeavour of 
political economy is a critique of the scope and methods of both economic and political 
sciences. To the political economist, ceteris paribus assumptions and numerous 
‘exogenous’ variables rob neoclassical economics of explanatory power. Likewise, 
much of political science pays insufficient attention to how economic processes and 
structures might influence the play of power. By contrast, a theory of political economy 
should be judged precisely by how well it captures the interaction between politics and 
economics (Crane & Amawi, 1997). A political economy approach offers 
multidisciplinary tools for understanding the interrelationships between political and 
economic institutions and process, including the ways the government manages the 
allocation of resources and the economic system, and the behaviour of people affects 
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the form of government and the kind of laws and policies that get made (Drazen, 2001; 
Johnson, 2000). According to Piampongsan (1995), political economy is the study of 
social phenomena with the attention directed to: 
1. The interrelatedness of social, economic, and political structures of society that 
require a holistic approach to study; 
2. The conflict of interests between groups in society; 
3. The dynamics of social phenomena; and 
4. The unrelenting use of a critical approach to probe into social phenomena. 
2.1.1 Political economy of healthcare 
According to Foucault (1982), the political economy of healthcare has its roots in the 
original meaning of political economy of the 18th century, that is, a meaning which 
disengaged the economy from the family and refocused it on the problems of the 
broader population on the assumption that the latter has its own regularities (e.g. 
mortality and morbidity rates, cycle of scarcity, etc.) which statistics demonstrate to be 
not reducible to the family. Moreover, the ultimate purpose of government is pastoral 
concern for the welfare of the population through the increase of its wealth, longevity, 
and health. Herein lies the origin of public healthcare, that is ‘the emergence of the 
health and well-being of the population in general as one of the essential objectives of 
political power’. For the first time ‘health and sickness, as characteristics of a group, a 
population, are problematised…’ including efforts to organise a global, quantifiable 
knowledge of morbidity phenomena. (Foucault, 1982, cited in Cohen, 1989) 
2.2 Politics  
Politics concerns the exercise of power in society or in specific decisions over public 
policy. So politics is about power and influence in society as well as in the processes of 
policymaking within government. It concerns who participates in and who influences 
the decisions that government make and who gains and who lose (Kraft and Furlong, 
2013). 
According to Lindblom (1980), politics can be described as the interactions of groups 
or individuals in their effort to gain legitimacy in controlling the mechanism of 
resource allocation. The interaction may be characterised either by competition or 
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compromise or the combination of both that result in the formation of policy directing 
the way resources are allocated. The implementation of policy is conducted through the 
administrative process and structure. Politics involves any activity or action aimed at 
policy making to achieve a desired allocation of values and resources to the general 
public. Such allocations of values and resources are made through policy, laws and 
orders, and regulation (Lindblom, 1980). When a government has legitimacy, it means 
that its citizens are predisposed to accept the actions of the government, not only when 
they happen to agree with those actions, but also when they disagree. Legitimacy is 
more than a sense of resignation that the government can do whatever it wants. It is a 
sense that the actions of the government, at least most of the time, serves the public 
interest (Bickers and William, 2001).   
2.2.1 The politicians 
Politicians hold their position in the executive and the legislative branch; politicians 
wield influence in shaping policies. Their roles determine budgetary allocations as 
regards the purpose and timing of allocation (Thiratayakinan, 1990). 
Budgetary allocation reflects power relations in society, as it results from the 
interaction of politicians and rested interests. Those with vested interests with greater 
bargaining power stand to reap more benefits from particular allocations. In addition, 
the politicians’ success in achieving budgetary allocations serving their own purposes 
reflects their influence over their fellow politicians.  
Generally speaking, the politicians who exercise their direct influence over budgetary 
allocation are key figures in government and the legislative branch, usually in charge of 
big and important ministries. They work with bureaucrats in analysing budgets and 
resolving conflict in budgetary allocation. 
• The role of the politician  
The conduct of policy making in Thailand is required to go through legislative 
processes resulting in acts, royal decrees, and ministerial rules (Acts, Royal Decrees, 
Royal Enactments, 2009). Acts concern the laws made by the king with the advice and 
consent of the parliament, such as the Anti Money Laundering Act 1999, the National 
Education Act 1999, and the Ministerial Improvement Act 2002. Royal enactments 
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describe the laws made by the king based on administrative power, such as the royal 
enactment on national and public safety, economic security, and disaster prevention, as 
well as the royal enactments on the reform of financial institutions 1997, and the royal 
enactment on the administration of the state under emergency 2005.  
Royal decrees describe the laws made by the king based on constitutional law, acts, or 
royal enactments. Royal decrees are lower in status than acts and are not allowed to 
contradict acts, such as the royal decree on land management 2003, or the royal decree 
on election date 2007. Ministerial rules are determined by ministries to accelerate 
problem resolution such as the ministerial rules on service fees to be shared by medical 
doctors 2002, and the ministerial rules on the opening and closure of entertainment 
outlets 2004. 
Generally, political actors appointed to ministerial positions in ministries assume the 
roles of directing and monitoring policy implementation to achieve the purpose of 
policies. For example, the minister of public health is responsible for directing and 
monitoring the implementation of 30 baht scheme. He or she has to be briefed of the 
performance of policy implementation, appointment of senior officials to the posts, and 
if those officials fail to implement policies, political actors are authorised to remove 
those officials from their posts. 
In the political market, the interaction of people and politicians produces the policy 
‘cycle of the political market’ characterised by four phases (Limmanee, 2002): 1) 
parties formulate campaign strategies for forthcoming elections; 2) the winning party or 
parties constitute the government and formulate and implement policies that serve the 
interests of its supporters; 3) the government, capitalising on being in power, makes 
adjustment in its policies to draw more votes; 4) the people vote for political parties 
with the hope of being satisfied with their needs. 
2.2.2 Interested groups 
• The role of vested interest 
Vested interests describe mainly business interests comprising business persons and the 
associations of entrepreneurs, but they can also refer to well-organised professional 
groups like doctors, lawyers and so on. These groups have the organisational capability 
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and resources to occasionally pressure the government to grant them privileges in terms 
of financial allocations. Their success depends on their organisational capabilities and 
financial resources, which together give them bargaining power. Their moves may 
either be open and direct or secretive (Anderson, 1970). In democratic countries, vested 
interests operate by influencing politicians and political parties, either openly or 
secretly.  
With the diversity of vested interests in industrial societies, no particular vested 
interests can dominate the policy-making process. However, the government is still 
likely to concede to arguments for resources and privilege to business interests and 
professional groups in order to win their co-operation for solving economic and service 
delivery problems. 
In countries with a limited number of vested interests and weak political parties, a few 
well-organised groups can wield more significant influence over policy making, and it 
is more likely that checks and balances may not operate to ensure that these privileges 
do not hurt the public interest. In contrast, in more developed countries with diverse 
and powerful vested interests co-existing with strong political parties, the influence of 
vested interested over policy making is still strong, but the chance of damaging 
outcomes is reduced by the competition between them. 
• The role of bureaucrats 
Although bureaucrats implement policies and act generally as regulators, they too can 
play a role in the initial phase of policy making by providing decision makers with 
information which might shape the views of policy makers, and the way they 
implement policies in line with their own interests can have a significant effect on 
outcomes. These interests can make bureaucrats compete for power within their own 
organisations and to exclude the general public from the process of policy making. To 
be effective, bureaucrats often work closely with the interests of politicians and can  be 
rewarded with promotions to higher positions  
• The role of civic groups 
In theory, civic groups also participate in policy making through the parliamentary 
system, but in practice their impact can be limited in many contexts. They can be 
29 
 
constrained by the absence of adequate information provided by bureaucrats, not to 
mention the difficulty of evaluating the impact of policies due to the complexity of 
most situations. 
However, democratic regimes need to be responsive to ordinary citizens as their power 
is based on being elected by the general public. These considerations set up a complex 
set of forces and interests which collectively affect the policy formulation and 
implementation process. This process will not be described in detail in this thesis, but 
the analysis of the implementation and effects of the 30 baht healthcare scheme is based 
on our reading of the broader political economy of Thailand, which helps to put the 
discussion of the healthcare policy in its social and political context.  
2.2.3 Stakeholders involved in policy making in Thailand 
Based on the discussion earlier, the key stakeholders involved in the policy process in 
Thailand include the following: 
Politicians who win the mandate to rule the country through elections. As they are 
authorised to conduct state affairs, they are in positions of power to affect the formation 
of policies and decide on resource allocation. Politicians wield direct influence over 
budgetary allocations. Opposition politicians also have an influence by organising 
counter mobilisations and groups, and this sets constraints on how a ruling party can 
drive the policy process.  
Bureaucrats mainly act as enforcers of laws, rules and regulations, and are engaged in 
the task of policy implementation. Moreover, in the initial phases of policy formulation, 
they also supply decision makers with information. They can thus shape the views of 
decision makers in critical ways and this gives them considerable strategic power. They 
can serve politicians loyally, or even collude with them against the general interest or in 
violation of the law in a developing country context, and they may be rewarded with 
higher positions and promotions as a result. This is why bureaucrats in the police 
department and armed forces can demand extra funds from the government, often 
without clear accountability, because their support is often critical for the government 
in power. 
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Business interests provide financial support to political parties in exchange for policies 
favourable to their interests. There are many examples in Thai politics of close 
associations between businesses and political parties, For instance, Chartthai party’s 
connection with many industrialists including Boonsong Srifuangfong, the founder of 
Thai Asahi Co. Ltd. is well known, and this resulted in the appointment of Mr. Dej 
Boonlong, Mr. Boonsong’s right hand man, to the position of the deputy secretary to 
the prime minister from 2001 to 2005.  
The general public is very often a passive consumer of policies coming from political 
parties, except in moments of crisis. Political parties produce public goods and services 
for the general public, but do not directly participate in the policy formulation and 
implementation process. Their influence is usually limited to an ex post response to the 
outcomes of these policies, because they have an opportunity to vote a party out of 
power if they are unhappy with particular policy outcomes.  
Thus, the stake holders who play the most active role in policy making are politicians, 
bureaucrats, and business and professional interests, with the general public usually 
being passive customers of political parties, except through the indirect mechanism of 
elections. Professional interests are relatively underdeveloped in Thailand in terms of 
their organisation, so that business interests still play a dominant role in politics. 
2.3 Public policy 
Public policy is a course of government action or inaction in response to public 
problems. It is associated with formally approved policy goals and means, as well as 
the regulations and practices of agencies that implement programmes. Looking at 
public policy this way emphasises the actual behaviour of implementing agencies and 
officials, not merely the formal statement of policy goals and means found in laws and 
other expressions of government policy (Kraft and Furlong, 2013). 
The policy process can be further divided into three stages. The first phase is policy 
formulation, the second is policy implementation, and finally policy evaluation. Policy 
formulation involves submitting problems to cabinet meetings in which the problems 
are considered and their importance and prioritisation determined. This stage involves 
setting a policy agenda. We can expect policy makers to select the problems that most 
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affect their own political interests to be high up on the agenda. Thus those outside 
politics who are pressing for the resolution of particular problem need get their timing 
right in submitting proposals to political policy makers. They have to negotiate with 
other vested interests if they want to influence agenda setting. They also need to keep in 
mind the scope of the agenda, which should not be so large that it impacts on other 
vested interests.  
In Thailand, the problems that impact on the political fortunes of policy makers are 
mainly responses to crises that need to be addressed such as drought problems, 
problems that have a demoralising effect on people like student suicides or pollution 
problems in cities, and problems affecting the state’s territorial integrity like the 
secessionist movement in the deep south. Sometimes, however, a more concerted 
policy formulation processes can be triggered, as in the case of healthcare policy, where 
a number of stakeholders pushed for reform, and it coincides with the political interests 
of key politicians at a particular time (Sajjapunroj, 2007). 
Generally, the policy process of selecting an agenda can be triggered in two different 
ways. Important stakeholders may raise problems and submit them to the government, 
and these problems may either be local or national, or the government may internally 
raise certain reform agendas in pursuit of its own interests. The internal agendas are 
more familiar to policy makers in the government compared to problems raised by 
other stakeholders. The latter therefore requires more compelling reasons to appear on 
the priority list (Anderson, 1970). 
However, external situations can provide opportunities for some problems to be 
selected as part of the agenda. This depends on stakeholders using an opportunity 
presented by a moment of political change or a crisis to bring issues to the table that 
may otherwise not have succeeded in making it onto the agenda. Once on the agenda, 
the political system converts priorities into policies. The policies in turn may prove to 
be effective or may fail. If the policies prove to be failures, the government, the 
legislative branch, and the bureaucracy can make adjustments in order to improve 
policy making and implementation, or the general public can punish the politicians at 
the next election (Easton, 1965). 
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2.3.1 Policy making 
The so-called ‘Process Model’ of policy making spells out the policy-making process 
into five stages (Dye, 1984). The first stage is about the identification of the problems 
or agenda setting. This stage involves determining what the public thinks are problems 
and, if they are politically relevant problems, the category to which the problem 
belongs. Problems such as unemployment or the falling prices of agricultural products 
can be identified as politically relevant and then analysed to determine their causes and 
the level of their severity. The identification of viable responses is also critical, because 
some important problems may have no viable solutions. The problems are then 
subjected to prioritisation. Financial constraints make it necessary to prioritise 
problems, though they seem equally urgent and severe, and prioritisation of problems 
involves politics.  
The second stage concerns a discussion of policy alternatives. After problem 
identification, alternative mechanisms of resolving these problems are identified and 
analysed in terms of political feasibility, cost and benefits, and the effect of each 
alternative on the political objectives of the government.  
The third stage involves policy adoption or approval. This stage is characterised by the 
selection of policy alternatives as suggested by the policy analysis. The selection of 
proper alternatives involves taking into consideration factors such as the feasibility of 
implementation, and support from well-organised interests and the general public. This 
selection clearly involves politics and political judgements. 
The fourth stage involves policy implementation. This involves the assignment of the 
task of policy implementation to selected organisations or agencies. These 
organisations or agencies may be existing ones or be newly set up. The criteria for the 
selection of organisations involves considering their structure, finance, personnel (in 
particular, numbers), locations, and equipment, ultimately to determine financial 
feasibility and effectiveness in delivery.  
The fifth stage involves the ongoing task of policy evaluation. This stage involves the 
conduct of studies to find out whether or not policy implementation is successful. The 
success of policy implementation results in the continuation of policies or in the 
extension of the scope of policies, whilst failure should lead to the improvement or 
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termination of the policy. An important challenge is to ensure that political actors do 
not interfere with policy evaluation to get positive results. 
Policy evaluation can help to identify mistakes. The mistakes may have to do with 
analysis not being thoroughly done, the use of the wrong techniques for data analysis, 
or the absence of components of successful policy implementation. In particular, the 
effectiveness of agencies and the cost of delivering services can often be miscalculated, 
and we will see that this was an important dimension of the problem in the healthcare 
sector reforms studied in this thesis. The correct identification of mistakes is essential 
for their correction as shown in figure 2.1. 
Table 2-1 – The policy process model 
Stage of the Process Means 
Agenda setting How problems are perceived and defined, command attention, and get on to the 
political agenda of governments  
Policy formulation The design and drafting of policy goals and strategies for achieving them  
Policy legitimation The mobilisation of political support for the formal enactment of policies, 
including justification or rationales for the policy action 
Policy implementation Provision of institutional resources for putting the programmes into effect within 
a bureaucracy 
Policy evaluation Measurement and assessment of policy and program effects, including success 
or failure 
Source:  adapted from Kraft M.E. and Furlong S.R.  Public policy, Politics, Analysis, 
and Alternatives, 2012 
2.3.2 UC policy in Thailand 
In 2001, Thailand introduced the UC policy very rapidly after the new Thai Rak Thai 
Part (TRTP) government came to power (Pitayarangsarit, 2004). The 30 baht scheme or 
UCS was initiated by the Thaksin administration, largely for political purposes to 
provide a payoff to his core constituency. Its principle was consistent with the right of 
access to standardised healthcare services and the poor enjoyed healthcare services 
provided free of charge by the state. The introduction of the scheme directly addressed 
the high costs of medical treatment borne by the poor, which the previous welfare 
programmes targeting healthcare for the poor failed to achieve. The finance for the 30 
baht scheme soon accounted for 60% of the total public healthcare expenditure as the 
people covered by the scheme were required to only pay 30 baht for their treatment and 
the rest had to be covered by government subsidies. 
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The basic principle of the scheme was to ensure public participation at all levels to 
guarantee access to quality services for all. Participants in the scheme were allowed to 
choose the primary unit with which they wished to register. The participating service 
units, especially primary care gatekeepers, were subject to quality accreditation. 
Patients were managed across care providers through networking links between 
hospitals even though these were not centrally administered. Relatively effective 
connections were rapidly established between service units in the public and the private 
sectors so that cost containment was actually achieved to a reasonable extent without 
reducing the level of services and without significantly adverse effects on quality and 
accessibility. This is because a professional healthcare system with good management 
infrastructure already existed even if these resources were rapidly overstretched by the 
demands of the additional patients who joined the healthcare system on a formal basis. 
2.3.3 Healthcare policy and politics in other countries 
The decisive factors regarding the success of universal coverage programmes always 
relate to the direct intervention of the governments in the initiation of healthcare 
security programmes for all, the role of healthcare related NGOs, the stability of 
althcare-related bureaucracy, and the efficient way in which the bureaucrats perform 
their duty.  
However, the presence of certain conditions providing fertile ground for the success of 
the implementation of healthcare related programme is required. It relates to peace and 
political stability within countries that helps foster economic development leading to 
improved quality of life in terms of higher income and education, as in Tamil Nadu 
(India), Kerala (India) and Costa Rica (Palafox, 2011). In Costa Rica, steady economic 
growth enabled the country to invest continuously in social welfare and establish the 
Costa Rica Social Security Fund. In Tamil Nadu (India), the improved transportation 
infrastructures greatly helped support the operation of the network of healthcare related 
service units in the countryside (Muraleedharan, Dash, Gilson, 2011).   
In Sri Lanka, the steady growth of the GDP since 1985, together with the government’s 
commitment to social welfare, resulted in massive investment in hospital infrastructure 
contributing to the fact that most Sri Lankans live within three kilometres of a public 
facility (Palafox, 2011). 
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As important as peace is, political stability and economic development are the decisive 
factors contributing to an improvement in the standard of healthcare to the general 
public, as long as this still remains the role of governments, bureaucrats, and the non-
governmental sector. 
In Tamil Nadu, the considerable achievement in maternal and neonatal healthcare 
compared with many of its neighbours in India and elsewhere in Southeast Asia has 
been attributed both to a political commitment to healthcare, and to the fact that the 
successive administration adhered to such commitment (Balabanova, Conteh, Mckee, 
2011).  
Successful interventions regarding healthcare issues in Tamil Nadu have also been 
attributed to the competence of the public healthcare management at the district level 
(which is unique in India) that was granted with sufficient autonomy to perform their 
duties. A large proportion of patients (80% of outpatients and 60% of inpatients in 
Tamil Nadu) used the services provided by the private sector. However, core, maternal 
and child healthcare services are still provided in the public sector. This is indication of 
the prominent role in healthcare of the non-government sector. 
Political vision is the decisive factor in the development of a comprehensive reform 
programme (Manas) that paved the way for subsequent coherent reforms in 
Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the reforms retained support from successive Kyrgyz 
governments (Balabanova, Conteh, McKee, 2011).  
In Ethiopia, the government entered into international and regional partnerships 
regarding healthcare issues, due to their political vision and leadership. In November 
2009, it became the first country in the region to sign a national agreement, or pact with 
development partners, based on a comprehensive health sector development 
programme. In Bangladesh the importance of healthcare was established in the 1972 
constitution. 
The capability, flexibility, and autonomy of bureaucrats is also evident. In Tamil Nadu, 
the Medical Service Corporation, an autonomous body managing drug procurement, 
has been able to bypass bureaucratic procedure to introduce innovative measures that 
improve the availability of essential drugs and promote rational drug use.   
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In Kyrgyzstan, a donor representative report showed a culture of pragmatism in 
deciding whether to reform works or not and taking action where needed. In Ethiopia, 
regional healthcare offices were set up after the country embarked on healthcare 
reforms in the wake of civil war. In Bangladesh, authorities at the district level were 
instrumental in implementing government formulated policies and programmes in the 
delivery of emergency obstetric care (which is the same through sub-districts, or 
‘upazilas’).  Participation of the non-governmental sector, be they private firms or 
healthcare related NGOs, may enhance the efficiency of healthcare services or increase 
out-of-pocket payments that lead to bankruptcy from illness. In Bangladesh, NGOs 
play a major role in healthcare services. One of the world largest NGOs, BRAL, 
estimates that it reaches 110 million people by means of 64,000 village healthcare 
works. These NGOs are autonomous and flexible enough to play an important role in 
improving health, for example by preventing diarrheal deaths in children and by 
reaching out to the marginalised population living in isolated areas or suffering from 
stigma or a lack of resources (Balabanova, Conteh, McKee, 2011).  
However, the negative consequence of the growth of the private sector has grown more 
apparent. In Sri Lanka, the rapidly expanding private sector is attracting healthcare 
workers from the public sectors (Palafox, 2011). Thus, the private and public sector 
being in balance with each other leading to the optimum efficiency of healthcare 
service is lost.  
Among the more developed countries, the United States is the least committed to 
universal healthcare whilst Great Britain and Sweden have completed the establishment 
of genuine universal healthcare. As for Germany and Japan, universal healthcare 
coverage has also been achieved but through the covering of fees by national insurance 
rather than by government subsidy (Theodoulou, 2002).  
The state possesses a large degree of control in Germany, Sweden and Japan, with the 
healthcare infrastructure overseen by a government agency. In Sweden and Japan the 
governments have the power to dictate and enforce all policies. In Germany, Great 
Britain, and the United States, where the policy making process is by a committed 
parliament, no governmental sectors such as medical professionals, hospitals 
professionals, insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, advisory groups and 
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unions are allowed to participate in policy making. In the United States, the national 
government delegates a great deal of authority to individual states and entrusts 
responsibility to private companies. The difficulty in raising funds and maintaining 
costs, however, puts pressure on those countries to let non-governmental and the 
private sector share the healthcare burden.  All of the above have incorporated private 
insurance into the system. 
2.4 Criteria of policy evaluation 
Evaluative criteria are the specific dimensions of policy objectives (what policy 
proposals seek to achieve) that can be used to weight policy options or judge the merits 
of existing policies or programmes. Evaluative criteria can also be regarded as 
justifications or rationales for a policy or government action. It makes sense to choose 
the criteria that fit a given policy and set of circumstances (Kraft and Furlong, 2013).  
The criteria of project evaluation refer to what is being evaluated and how as opposed 
to the process of evaluation. According to Dunn (1981) a number of criteria are 
relevant, but common ones are based on efficiency, effectiveness, adequacy, equity and 
satisfaction. DAC evaluation criteria are based on three different criteria; relevance, 
impact, and sustainability (OECD, 2016). The details will depend on the type of sector 
and policy being evaluated, but the general principles are useful to keep in mind.  
2.4.1 Efficiency 
Efficiency involves maximising outputs whilst using minimal inputs, or in other words 
the ability to extract maximum profits or social benefits from one unit of investment of 
resources. Thus, the measurement of efficiency involves using cost-benefit analysis as 
efficiency implies maximising net benefits, defined in some way. Generally, policies 
where the objectives include improving tangible benefits can be evaluated using 
efficiency-based criteria, such as the policies related to the construction of dams for 
generating electricity, airports, express ways, or aspects of the universal healthcare 
coverage policy. 
2.4.2 Effectiveness 
Effectiveness involves the level of attainment of objectives. Effectiveness thus 
concerns the attainment of objectives of policies. Effectiveness is judged by the degree 
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to which objectives have been attained, not from an estimate of net benefits obtained. In 
some cases, policies can best be judged in terms of effectiveness, for instance social 
policies having nothing to do with the delivery of services or infrastructure, such as 
crime reduction, narcotics policy, corruption suppression policies, and some healthcare 
policies like AIDS prevention policy. 
2.4.3 Adequacy 
Adequacy is measured by the ratio of policy outcomes to the needs of the whole 
society. Adequacy can be judged by contrasting the volume of policy outcomes with 
the needs of the whole society. If the volume of outcomes fail to meet the demand of 
the whole society, adequacy is not achieved. For example, during the second Anand 
Panyarachun administration in Thailand, telephones were in great demand, but the 
government could only provide a very limited number. Similarly, if 100,000 peasants 
need plots of land, and the government can only provide plots of land to 5,000, the 
policy responses can be judged as being inadequate.  
2.4.4 Equity 
Equity refers to the equal distribution of benefits of policy outcomes, particularly to the 
underprivileged in society. The equity-based evaluation involves determining whether 
the underprivileged in society, be they the poor, the disabled, children, the elderly, or 
people in different geographical areas, enjoy the benefits of policy outcomes. The 
policies aimed at promoting equity include land reform policy, public bank policy, and 
universal healthcare coverage policy.  
The definition of equity given above is complemented and elaborated by Culyer’s idea 
of healthcare equity which points out the two aspects of healthcare equity: 1) horizontal 
equity which refers to equal treatment of those with equal initial healthcare, equal need 
and equal expected final healthcare; 2) vertical equity which refers to more favourable 
treatment for those with worse initial healthcare, with greater need and worse expected 
final healthcare (Culyer, 1991). 
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2.4.5 Sustainability  
Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely 
to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be 
environmentally as well as financially sustainable.  When evaluating the sustainability 
of a programme or projects, it is useful to consider the following questions: To what 
extent did the benefits of a programme or project continue after donor funding ceased?  
What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of 
sustainability of the programme or project?  (OECD, 2016). 
2.4.6 Satisfaction 
Satisfaction refers to the contrast between what is expected from policy implementation 
and what policy implementation actually yields. For instance, if 100 units of outcome 
from policy implementation are expected but actually more than 100 units are delivered 
after the implementation of policies, the policy can be said to be satisfactory, and vice 
versa. In 2002, rubber planters in southern Thailand were satisfied with the price 
guarantee policy of the government when they got 40 baht/kilogram for their raw 
rubber, which was higher than they expected. 
It should be noted that efficiency and equity can go hand in hand, lending themselves to 
being achieved simultaneously. Efficiency and equity are achieved simultaneously in 
the way that resource allocation benefits the underprivileged in societies whilst those in 
an already more advantageous position are unaffected by the measure to achieve equity. 
Technically, this can be referred to as achieving a ‘Pareto improvement’.                   
(Tinkeerhadhit, 2002). 
A process model of policy analysis is used to identify separate sets of questions 
relevant to analysing the universal healthcare policy in Thailand. The analysis looks at 
five stages, although equal importance is not given to all stages. 
The application of policy evaluation to the UC (30 baht Healthcare) scheme is 
particularly important because the UC scheme involved: significant political 
considerations of the politicians driving its formulation and implementation; significant 
financing that was initially, at least, not forthcoming; great changes in the country’s 
healthcare security system; a series of conflicts between politicians, bureaucrats and 
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healthcare managers; frequent changes to the scheme; and a large number of diverse 
stakeholders. The criteria used in different parts of our evaluation involved looking at 
considerations of equity, efficiency, and viability. 
2.5 Resource allocation 
Resource allocation is concerned with the extent to which the mechanisms of resource 
allocation achieve efficiency, equity and viability, and helps to pose the research 
questions as well as helping to reform the analysis of research objectives and 
methodology.  
2.5.1 Efficiency 
Efficiency refers to the allocation of limited economic resources to meet the healthcare 
needs of a society and can be categorised into three variants:  
1. Technical efficiency, achieving a specified healthcare gain with the minimum 
expenditure of inputs; 
2. Economic efficiency, achieving a specified healthcare gain at the least cost; and 
3. Allocative efficiency, maximising the healthcare gain from a specified level of 
resources by allocating the available resources in the best way across patients, 
regions, treatments, hospitals and so on. 
The fragmentation of healthcare insurance in Thailand gave rise to inadequacies in 
coverage and efficiency, thereby undermining the equality of opportunity in accessing 
healthcare services. Inefficiency stemmed from a lack of bargaining power on the part 
of the user and the fact that healthcare providers’ performance was not subject to public 
scrutiny. The practice of a ‘fee for service’ resulted in a higher healthcare expenditure 
growth rate compared to the GDP, even during the economic recession (Sri-anan, 
2002). 
Thai citizens are entitled to different benefits offered by different healthcare schemes, 
the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), the Social Security Scheme 
(SSS), and the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme (UCS) (Tangcharoensathien, 
2004). However, these three schemes are under the supervision of three different 
agencies. The CSMBS comes under the comptroller general, whilst the SSS and the UC 
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are supervised by the Social Security Office of the Ministry of Labour Affairs and the 
NHSO. The supervision of these schemes by different agencies has resulted in 
fragmentation of their management and has led to high costs due to overlaps. 
Moreover, there are differences in the benefits offered to participants and the procedure 
for monitoring disbursement, not to mention the systems for complaints which 
contribute further to the complicated management of these schemes 
(Tangcharoensathien, 2004). 
2.5.2 Equity 
Achieving horizontal or vertical equity may involve the re-organisation of services and 
the redistribution of resources. But it is unlikely that allocative efficiency or equity will 
be achieved in a fragmented healthcare system where comparisons cannot be easily 
made between different segments of the healthcare system providing similar services to 
different groups of people, or different services to people with similar healthcare needs 
(Pannarunothai, 2000a). 
In addition to the high management costs of identifying efficient and equitable ways of 
delivering healthcare outcomes, the healthcare system in Thailand is also plagued by 
the problem of inadequate coverage and large variations in the entitlement of benefits 
offered by the various healthcare insurance schemes. The amount of money available to 
cover the costs of treating the same disease varies between the different healthcare 
schemes. Other variations exist in relation to the benefits offered. For example CSMBS 
participants are entitled to be provided with services in all participating hospitals 
throughout the country, whilst the SSS and UC participants can only use the services of 
registered hospitals under these schemes. The SSS participants are required to make a 
monthly payment of 200 baht in order to retain their right to access medical treatment, 
whilst participants of the CSMBS and UC scheme are entitled to receive medical 
treatment without being required to make any payment (Pitayarangsarit, 2004). 
The participants in the SSS and the UC scheme felt that they were provided with 
services of a lower standard, as the cost of their treatments had to be covered by the per 
capita allocation. Hospitals participating in the SSS and UC scheme were thus 
motivated to cut costs. In contrast, the disbursement of money to cover the cost of 
medical treatment as practised in the CSMBS was based on a fee for services and the 
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hospitals joining the CSMBS had free rein in determining the treatments required by a 
particular patient. An attempt was made to eliminate this discrepancy which 
discriminated against patients in the other two schemes by allocating funds to them for 
the treatment of severe and chronic diseases. As a result, the idea of centralising the 
administration of the three schemes in order to reduce the discrepancy in accessibility 
to high quality services and the variation in entitlements was proposed. The efficiency 
of the healthcare system in Thailand would have been improved if it was administered 
by a single agency or ministry. On the one hand, such a merger is likely to be resisted 
by hospitals who prefer to offer expensive treatments if they are unconstrained and also 
by patients in the more generously funded public schemes (Tangcharoensathien, 2004; 
Pitayarangsarit, 2004). 
2.5.3 Viability 
Any healthcare scheme also has to pass the test of viability. The viability of a 
programme can depend on a variety of political economy considerations that determine 
whether the demands made on a programme can be financed given the political 
economy of a society. Thus, viability depends on the political feasibility of sustaining 
the financing for a project, which depends on: local political conditions and the 
willingness to pay of different categories of patients and taxpayers; the existing 
management systems, cost structures, and specialisations of different types of 
healthcare providers into which the new system has to fit; the demands that are likely to 
be made on a particular programme given the healthcare requirements and conditions of 
a particular country; and the broader political acceptability of the programme in the 
particular historical context (Pitayarangsarit, 2004). 
The main objective of the UC scheme in Thailand was to guarantee equal access to 
decent healthcare services. The scheme was built on three principles: 1) financing 
based on general taxation, rendering it a free scheme at the point of service delivery; 2) 
the availability of all types of healthcare services and benefits with an emphasis on 
primary services; and 3) close-end budgeting to particular healthcare providers with the 
provision of predetermined payments to control costs. Mechanism for the protection of 
the rights of patients and healthcare providers, the dissemination of information, 
dealing with complaints, and awarding compensation when mistakes happen were not 
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available at the outset and many of these systems are yet to be created at the time of 
writing. More importantly, a system of hospital accreditation has not yet emerged and 
all hospitals are not required to participate in the UC scheme (Pitayarangsarit, 2004). 
In informal discussions, healthcare professionals recognised a number of critical issues 
that need to be addressed in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
healthcare system in Thailand. These include: 1) an effective separation of buyers of 
services in the public authorities and the service providers who are often public 
hospitals; 2) an enhancement of research and development capabilities based on a 
network of research units involved in research and development to improve the quality 
of services over time; 3) systems for dealing effectively with political pressure and 
insulating hospitals from these pressures; 4) the development of effective systems for 
public participation in discussions of healthcare priorities and the quality of service; 
and 5) systems to control the risk of uncontrolled expenditures (Jongudomsuk, 2002; 
Sunthorndham, 2012)  
A consideration of the problems affecting the healthcare system in Thailand led to the 
formulation of the research questions concerning the UC scheme, to determine some of 
the answers related to the efficiency, equity, and viability of this scheme. These can be 
categorised as follows: 
1. Efficiency: 
a. Was the new scheme properly costed and did the government make 
appropriate plans for providing adequate funding for sustaining the 
scheme? 
b. Does the scheme achieve a specified health gain via a minimum number 
of inputs and at the lowest cost? 
c. Does the scheme maximise a specific healthcare gain from a specified 
level of resources? 
2. Equity 
a. Did the 30 baht scheme achieve a sustained improvement in accessing 
healthcare services for previously excluded groups in Thailand? 
b. Did people receive medical treatment under the UC scheme without 
discrimination? 
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c. Did the treatment arrangements satisfy the needs of all groups of 
people? 
d. Did the UC scheme achieve the objective of keeping people in good 
healthcare? 
3. Viability 
a. What were the sources of problems for maintaining the financial 
viability of the system? 
b. Did the healthcare system have an adequate mechanism for identifying 
care priorities? 
c. What were the problems preventing the identification of healthcare 
priorities? 
d. What were the political drivers behind the adoption of the 30 baht 
scheme, and how did these affect the design and implementation of the 
scheme? 
e. Did the UC scheme achieve sustainably?  
It was not envisaged that a single research project would find comprehensive answers 
to all these questions. However, as these questions are closely interrelated, the answers 
to those questions that were examined more closely provide insights into a range of 
related questions. The research was then organised around a limited range of research 
objectives that were explored in greater detail. 
2.6 Research objectives 
The study had a number of objectives. It does not aim to provide a full evaluation of the 
scheme and its viability, but to provide insights into a number of aspects that may 
contribute to a fuller understanding of the project. The UC project is important enough 
for it to survive in some form or other in Thailand, despite having been subject to 
significant criticism and having made some backward steps, particularly with the opting 
out of most of the private hospitals that initially engaged in the scheme. The insights 
that this research offers at the ground level may be useful for contributing to a thorough 
evaluation of the programme and the directions in which it needs to be reformed to 
enable it to become fully sustainable and contribute to a viable healthcare system in the 
country. The study objectives included: 
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1. To study the political economy of the Universal Health Coverage Scheme and 
the impact on policy implementation; 
2. To study the access to the Universal Health Coverage Scheme in Thailand; 
3. To study the financial management of the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme in Thailand; 
4. To study the implementation of the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
through case studies of particular hospitals.  
To organise several theories and ideas into a lens to investigate UC policy, the study 
uses a framework of policy analysis because it provides a useful device to explore the 
interrelationship of political economy and public policy. It is composed of political 
drive and policy outcome. 
Figure 2-1 - Conceptual framework of the political economy of Thailand’s ‘30 baht’ UC scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 1. NHSO: National Health Security Office 2. MoPH: Ministry of Public Health 3. UC: Universal 
Healthcare Coverage 
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2.7 Scope of the research 
The aim of the research was not to provide a comprehensive answer to these questions 
as that would require a scale of data collection and investigation across regions that 
would be beyond the scope of a single research dissertation. However, as the next 
chapter explains, the aim was to use available data and new data based on case studies 
to shed light on these questions and to inform a more comprehensive debate on the 
healthcare sector reforms in Thailand. These limited objectives were difficult enough to 
achieve. The initial objective was to engage in detailed case studies of six hospitals of 
different types across Thailand. However, it was found that hospitals were very 
reluctant to share financially and politically sensitive data and information on their 
participation in the healthcare programme and the internal responses and cost-saving 
and service delivery mechanisms they adopted in response to the emerging financial 
limitations of the scheme. As a result, though much time was initially spent on all six 
hospitals and trying to collect information on their responses, the study narrowed down 
the case study section to two hospitals. Fortunately, the two hospitals were significant 
in representing two different types of responses. 
The first was a private hospital that was one of the first to opt into the Universal 
Healthcare Coverage Scheme. It tried to adapt its service delivery and financial 
management to the requirements of the healthcare scheme. However, as the financial 
implications of the scheme became more obvious this hospital found that its continuing 
participation in the scheme was resulting in a two-tier healthcare delivery system within 
the hospital that was detrimental to the satisfaction levels perceived both by the 30-baht 
patients as well as the private patients who were paying much higher fees for services. 
As a result, this hospital eventually opted out of the system. As this pattern of opting in 
and eventually opting out was a common feature of many private sector hospitals, this 
example is significant in identifying some of the internal management problems of 
dealing with the financial allocations and expectations of the Universal Healthcare 
Coverage Scheme.  
The second hospital was a public hospital that made great strides in adapting to the 30-
baht programme. Unlike many public hospitals that were put under great strain by the 
programme and struggled to manage workloads on staff and growing financial deficits, 
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our second hospital was one of the few that did rather well but by specialising in 
particular types of treatments and by innovating new internal management routines that 
were particularly good at delivering these specialised services. The second hospital 
therefore represents the types of public sector responses that were viable and that are 
increasingly being adopted by other public sector hospitals.  
The study is limited to an investigation of the UC scheme from 2002-2010. The topics 
of study range from efficiency and sustainability, to the politics of programme 
initiation, the enactment of the National Health Insurance Act, and programme 
operation. It also looks at the different interest groups which stand to gain or lose from 
the existence of the scheme, such as politicians, civil servants, healthcare-related 
professionals, hospitals, patients and NGOs. Within this broad remit, the study limits 
itself to particular aspects of these problems that emerge from discussions with our 
target respondents without aiming at achieving a comprehensive assessment of the 
scheme as a whole in terms of these criteria. 
2.8 Research methodology 
2.8.1 The research process 
The research methodology is largely qualitative, based on an analysis of political 
economy and based on extensive discussions with service providers, administrators and 
politicians. These discussions took place after the researcher conducted his preliminary 
study on the UC scheme and related topics, such as the enactment of the relevant laws, 
the policy making process, the evidence of political pressures and priorities, and the 
problems and difficulties related to policy implementation. The researcher then studied 
the theories available and selected the appropriate ones to be used as a guideline and 
frameworks for conducting the study and data collection process, as shown in 
Appendix 1. The checklist questionnaires are shown in Appendix 2. Data collection 
was performed at the national and provincial levels. Data from the national level mostly 
concerns policies, working procedures, executive decisions, and policy implementation 
at the national level, whilst data from the provincial level is mostly concerned with 
policy implementation and the related problems and difficulties. Other data on the UC 
scheme includes opinions about the scheme and satisfaction with the services offered 
by the scheme, as well as its impact based on questionnaires distributed to case study 
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hospitals. The findings and their interpretation were then subjected to re-evaluation, 
verification, and comparison with the data previously collected. As the UC scheme is 
notable for its sheer size and complexity, its assessment cannot be based on a simple set 
of parameters and measurements. The researcher thus opted for an inductive approach 
characterised by the collection of data in order to propose different hypotheses that 
provide partial assessments and explanations. 
2.8.2 Research ethics 
The data collection and interviews followed the requirements of research ethics 
recommended by SOAS, University of London. At the time the research project 
commenced, there was no requirement from the university to get formal ethical 
approval from the relevant authorities in the country being researched, but there were 
guidelines on the conduct of the research and measures to be followed to protect all 
individuals being interviewed and organizations providing information. These 
guidelines were fully complied with. In particular, the researcher fully informed all 
research participants of the purpose of the research, the methods to be used, the 
possible uses of the research, including public presentation and publication. All names 
of individuals and hospitals that are referred to in the text have the express approval of 
the individuals or responsible officers of the hospitals. Harm to any participant was also 
avoided by making sure that any comments or criticisms that could be attributed to 
interviewees that may have consequences for their welfare or their future access to 
services (however unlikely that may be) were not used, or were used in an anonymised 
form. Moreover, any documents that contained confidential or sensitive information, or 
names or details of patients, were not used. When the researcher accessed and used 
quantitative or qualitative information from parts of such documents, he ensured that 
these documents remained in the custody of hospitals or other responsible agencies at 
all times.  
Preparation for the interviews consisted of the following steps and at each stage ethical 
guidelines were strictly adhered to:  
1. Interview planning: this step was marked by the researcher thoroughly reviewing 
the available empirical and theoretical literature, and formulating questions. The 
questions relevant to the objective of the research fell into four categories.  
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a) Questions about policymaking and financial management. This part of the 
interview questions were concerned with:  
• The steps in policy formulation regarding treatment, as well as the identities of 
those pushing for and against the policy formulation; 
• The legal framework of policy and regulation regarding treatments; 
• The factors contributing to the effectiveness of the policy. 
b) Questions about the problems and difficulties in implementing the UC scheme.  
c) Questions about efficiency, equity and sustainability: 
• How was the efficiency of the management of the scheme measured? 
• Did the scheme result in equity and complete coverage? 
• Is the scheme sustainable and what are the factors contributing to its 
sustainability? 
d) Questions about the appropriate model for the national healthcare system which 
incorporates the principles of efficiency, equity and viability. 
At each stage both the analytical questions and the ethical implications of 
interviewing particular categories of respondents was considered to determined the 
feasibility of particular lines of enquiry. 
2. Arranging the interviews: This step involved the researcher identifying the most 
likely sources, who were both well-informed and most likely to give extensive 
answers to sensitive questions. The interviewees included: 
• National politicians who were members of the House of Representatives and 
local politicians who were representatives of municipalities, administrative 
organisations of the provinces, and the administrative organisation of Tambons 
or sub-districts. 
• The executive committee of the National Health Security commission. 
• Managers of state-run and private hospitals. 
• Users of the services provided by state-run and private hospitals. 
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2.8.3 Research tools 
• In-depth interviews consisting of questions formulated to obtain data from key 
informants, including the executives of the NHSO, the managers of private 
hospitals, and personnel involved in the provision of services. These included 
questions on the background of the scheme, risks involved, guidelines for 
service provision, efficiency, equity, viability, regulations on cost control, the 
results of the implementation of the UC scheme, and an appropriate model for 
the scheme. 
• Reliability and validity assurance. 
The questions used in the in-depth interview were examined by experts from a number 
of agencies, including:  
• The National Health Security commission. 
• Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). 
• National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). 
• The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). 
• The National Health Security Office (NHSO). 
Duration of study: 
The fieldwork was carried out from 1 October 2011 to 31 March 2012. 
2.8.4 Selection of hospitals for the case studies 
The core of the research used a case study approach, which has a number of advantages 
and disadvantages depending on three conditions: the type of research questions; the 
control an investigator has over the design of the questions and following them up with 
further investigations; and whether the phenomenon is so contemporary that statistical 
evidence may be unavailable (Yin, 1994). The case study approach also has the ability 
to answer ‘how and why’ questions concerning a contemporary set of events over 
which the investigator has little control (Yin, 1994). 
The hospitals selected by the researcher initially included six hospitals but it was 
expected that not all of them would proceed to a full case study. The research was 
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finally focused on two in-depth case studies. These were a state-run hospital and a 
private hospital, where the objective was to study the provision of services, policy 
implementation, budgetary allocation, project management, problems and difficulties in 
provision of the service, and the impact of the scheme. The hospitals were selected 
because apart from their obvious differences, they were also similar in that they joined 
the UC scheme at a very early stage of the introduction of the scheme. They were also 
different in that the public sector hospital innovated arrangements that allowed it to stay 
within the scheme whilst the private sector hospital dropped out eventually. The case 
studies were conducted to investigate the responses of the hospitals to the scheme. All 
six hospitals that were initially approached were selected following suggestions from 
three or more qualified personnel who identified the appropriateness of the hospitals in 
terms of relevance for the research questions of the research. The two hospitals that 
were finally selected for the case study are: 
1. Baanpaew Hospital in the province of Samutsakorn – a state run hospital which 
continues to participate in the UC scheme. 
2. B-Care Hospital in the province of Pathumthani in the Greater Bangkok area – a 
private hospital which initially opted in but then opted out of the UC scheme. 
2.8.5 Selection of key informants 
The selection of specific informants to interview was achieved on the basis of 
purposive sampling, and targeting key informants was consistent with the objectives of 
the study. These included academics, experts, and the director of the Office of Policy 
and Planning for the NHSO. 
Key informants were selected for in-depth interviews, and they were divided into two 
groups. The first group included those involved in policy making, such as heads of 
public sector organisations, politicians involved in healthcare related issues, members 
of the National Health Security commission, and executives of the National Health 
Security office. The second group comprised of service providers and patients involved 
in the UC scheme, including the managers of state run and private hospitals and 
patients benefitting from the scheme. 
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For the first group of interviewees, the researcher focused on politicians, members of 
the National Health Security commission, and academics as shown in table 2.2. 
Table 2-2 -Members of the National Health commission 
Type of interviewee Number of interviewees 
National politicians and local politicians 6 
Civil servants 3 
NGOs 3 
Academics 4 
For the second group of interviewees, the researcher opted for purposive sampling in 
order to select key informants that clearly represented this group, as shown in table 2.3. 
Table 2-3 - Group 2 interviewees 
Interviewees 
Hospital Size Number of 
Interviewees 
Total 
Large Medium Small 
Management of the state-run hospital 2 2 2 6 6 
Management of the private hospital 2 2 2 6 6 
Patients 2 2 2 6 6 
Total 18 
The researcher conducted in-depth interviews on topics related to the research 
questions discussed above. The interviews involved introductions, breaking the ice and 
cultivating trust, and recording answers to questions. The times and locations, as well 
as language used, were taken into consideration in the preparation for the interviews. 
Thai professional culture requires an elaborate process of introductions and discussions 
before questions can be asked on specific topics. The researcher is a doctor who has 
been involved in the healthcare system for a long time, and had the advantage of having 
a high level of credibility in asking questions on a research basis. The researcher also 
had considerable prior inside knowledge of the way the Thai medical system works. 
These advantages were critical in procuring credible information from the informants. 
Nevertheless, as has been explained earlier, despite these advantages, many hospitals 
were reluctant to disclose information beyond the general, and the final case studies had 
to be limited to two cases.  
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2.8.6 Textual analysis 
Textual investigations of secondary literature of different types was used extensively, 
including documents, publications, records, minutes, and official proceedings relevant 
for understanding the different ways in which organisations carried out their activities. 
Public opinion polls were also informative to understand whether the public supported 
the policy or not. The text was first treated as a description, as telling the story of what 
has happened. However, a parallel analysis using an inductive approach was also 
carried out to analyse the complex data and documents as it was not unusual for the 
official texts to be overoptimistic in their assessments (Thomas, 2003). 
To fulfil objectives 2 and 3, the methods of data collection and data analysis were as 
follows: 
Data collection at the national level: 
1. Data from the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). 
2. Data from NGOs. 
3. Data from political parties. 
4. Data from the Countryside Doctor Society. 
Data collection at the provincial level. 
Data from targeted provinces. 
Primary data: obtained from those involved in policymaking, workers, directors of 
state-run and private hospitals, and those affected by the UC scheme. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with those involved in the scheme and those standing to 
gain or lose from the existence of the scheme. 
Secondary data: obtained from annual reports, research, articles written in Thai and in 
foreign languages that pertain to the UC scheme, cabinet resolutions concerning the 
scheme, media coverage from 1997 up to the present time, data from the National 
Statistics Office, Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB), the MoPH, project evaluation of the UC 
scheme conducted by various institution, and reports on the operation of the NHSO. 
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2.8.7 Data analysis and verification 
Verification of published data and analysis was based upon data triangulation across 
sources and using our own fieldwork and experiences in the healthcare sector to check 
whether particular sets of data or particular responses were credible or likely to be 
erroneous. With regard to the time factor of verification, the researcher conducted the 
interviews with those involved in the scheme’s operation at different times. Different 
individuals from different agencies involved in the implementation of the UC scheme 
were also interviewed to enable triangulation. After data collection, the researcher 
checked whether the data content was different from that of other interviewees and the 
cause of such discrepancies was investigated and determined as much as possible.  
To ensure that the interviews were conducted smoothly and were not bothersome to the 
interviewees, the researcher extensively reviewed the questions before commencing the 
interviews. Moreover, an informal and open-ended style was used that was appropriate 
in the Thai context, as explained above, with the written questions providing a 
background guide to long conversations. Interviewees were also asked for their 
permission to record the interview and the recorded material was subjected to detailed 
content analysis later on to ensure that nuances were not misinterpreted or overlooked.  
2.9 Limitations of the research 
Direct enquiries on an issue that is highly politicised in Thailand are very difficult due 
to cultural and political sensitivities. Data relating to such matters had to be obtained 
from various sources so that the consistency of the data could be checked as far as 
possible.  
In-depth investigations about what the data means require a great deal of collaboration 
and co-operation on the part of the interviewees. Healthcare professionals are very busy 
and time given to this kind of digging is inevitably very limited. If the respondents were 
able to give much more time possibly the results would have been more nuanced. 
However, the broad results were not significantly distorted by the time limitations 
facing the respondents.  
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Thai has a discursive style of presenting political and economic ideas. Some distortion 
of meaning may arise during the translation from Thai into English. The fact that the 
researcher was also Thai mitigated these problems.  
Certain types of data are kept hidden and sources cannot be identified, especially those 
involving political interests, and some of the internal hospital information about 
economic viability was commercially sensitive. It took a considerable amount of time 
to check data, identify its source, and then access the source. Once again, whilst it was 
not always possible to get hard statistics, the author is very confident about the 
qualitative results.  
The hospital selection is thus by no means fully representative. The sample ignores 
many other important types of hospitals, like large public teaching hospitals or small 
private sector clinics. However, the two hospitals represent some important types of 
responses and can help to identify some of the important implications of the types of 
financing and management systems that are associated with the national financing 
policy that was gradually implemented in association with the universal healthcare 
system. 
2.10 Conclusions 
The methodology of the research on the efficiency, equity, and viability of the UC 
scheme is largely qualitative, based on secondary documents, and primary research 
based on in-depth interviews with selected critical respondents selected in accordance 
with the objectives of the research. Those selected as interviewees within the healthcare 
system were experienced healthcare personnel who had been involved in the healthcare 
insurance system for a long time and consequently they could provide useful data that 
helped to fulfil the research objectives. Politicians and bureaucrats were also 
interviewed to provide other perspectives on the design and implementation of the 
policy. 
Data analysis and verification was based upon triangulation and comparison of 
particular responses and data with the broader data set and overall performance of the 
system. Inductive reasoning was applied to interpret the data obtained from the 
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interviewees and from published sources. The interpretation of this information is the 
substantive contribution of this research. 
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Chapter 3. The development of healthcare in 
Thailand: a historical background 
The UC scheme with its overarching goal of equal entitlement to healthcare among all 
Thais has three defining features: a tax‐financed scheme free at the point of service; a 
comprehensive benefits package with a primary care focus; and a fixed budget and a 
cap on provider payments in order to control costs. Prevention and healthcare 
promotion were included in the benefits package, and a number of mechanisms were 
set up to protect UC scheme beneficiaries, such as an information hotline, a patient 
complaints service, a no‐fault compensation fund, and tougher hospital accreditation 
requirements (HSRI, 2012). 
3.1 Background to health insurance in Thailand 
Health insurance in Thailand has steadily evolved; before the great healthcare reform 
was initiated in 2001, the state had provided healthcare insurance programmes which 
can be grouped into five main categories: 
1. Social welfare for the low income earners and those deemed deserving 
of help from the state; 
2. Voluntary healthcare programmes; 
3. Social welfare in the form of medical services provided to bureaucrats, 
retired bureaucrats living on pension, and employees of state enterprises; 
4. Compulsory healthcare insurance as dictated by the Social Security Act; 
and 
5. Contingency healthcare insurance, exemplified by the law concerning 
danger from automobiles. 
In addition to the healthcare insurance programmes supported and initiated by the state, 
there were also healthcare insurance services provided by insurance companies. Due to 
the existence of these varied healthcare insurance programmes there was a disparity in 
the benefits. The expenses for the healthcare insurance programme for bureaucrats and 
employees of state enterprises dramatically increased, as the programme offered move 
benefits to those covered by the programme. However, the healthcare insurance 
58 
 
programme for bureaucrats and employees of state enterprises was in total subsidised 
eight times more than the healthcare insurance programme for low income earners 
(Tangchareonsathien, 2004). This fragmented healthcare insurance system gave rise to 
an inadequacy in coverage and efficiency, and undermined the equality of opportunity 
in accessing healthcare services. Inefficiency stemmed from a lack of bargaining power 
on the part of the user and the fact that healthcare providers’ performances were not 
subject to public scrutiny. The practice of a ‘fee for service’ resulted in the expenditure 
on healthcare increasing at a greater rate than that of the GDP, even in during the 
economic recession (Sri-anan, 2002). 
The UC scheme or 30 baht scheme was aimed at creating a healthcare insurance system 
marked by proper quality control which was made possible through the separation of 
users and service providers. Previously, the MoPH allocated funds to its subsidiaries 
via supply side financing, which did not reflect the demand of users. However, when 
the focus was shifted to the role and performance of the service providing units 
affiliated to the ministry, as well as their relationships with the users, the allocation of 
funds became responsive to the demands of the units and in fact reflected the demands 
of the users. Budgetary allocation then occurred through demand-side financing. 
Consequently, the MoPH was thus deprived of its power to a certain extent in 
determining the budgetary allocation (HSRI, 2012). 
The state was assigned the duty of lowering healthcare and financial risks through the 
provision of subsidies. In addition, the UC scheme also featured a mechanism which 
was designed control costs through payments in accordance with a closed agreement 
made in advance with the healthcare units, thus limiting the financing in order to 
prevent excess spending (Pitayarangsarit, 2004). 
The stated goal of the UC scheme is to ‘equally entitle all Thai citizens to quality 
healthcare according to their needs, regardless of their socio-economic status.’ This 
goal is based on the universality principle, and the scheme was conceived as a scheme 
for everybody, and not one that targets only the poor, vulnerable, and disadvantaged 
(HSRI, 2012). The strategic objectives of the UC scheme are: 
• To focus on healthcare promotion and prevention as well as curative care. 
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• To emphasise the role of lower-cost primary healthcare and the rational use of 
effective and efficient integrated services. 
• To foster proper referral to hospitals. 
• To ensure subsidies on public healthcare spending are pro-poor, at the same 
time ensuring that all citizens are protected against the financial risks of 
obtaining healthcare. 
The National Health Security Act was enacted in 2002; however, the MoPH initiated 
the 30 baht scheme prior to its enactment. The pilot projects were implemented in two 
stages in 21 provinces: during the first stage, projects were implemented in the six 
provinces of Payao, Yasothorn, Nakorn Suwan, Patumtani, Samutsakorn and Yula from 
1 April – 30 September 2001; the second stage saw project implementation in fifteen 
provinces of Nontaburi, Saraburi, Srakaew, Petchburi, Nakornratchasima, Surin, 
Nongbualumpoo, Ubonratchathani, Amnajcharoen, Sukhothai, Prae, Chiangmai, 
Phuket and Narathiwat from 1 June – 30 September 2001; and finally, the scheme 
became nationwide on 1 April 2002, with Bangkok being the last province covered. 
3.2 Evolution of health insurance in Thailand 
The healthcare insurance system in Thailand has evolved since the establishment of the 
MoPH in 1942. Before this time people had to share the cost of treatment in state-run 
hospitals, but in 1945 a measure to protect people from the financial risk attributed to 
costly treatment was taken for the first time. The poor were informally made exempt 
from paying service fees by the government officials in charge of social welfare, who 
exercised their discretion regarding this matter. The practice of informal exemption 
from the payment of service fees evolved into the practice of granting the right for free 
medical services based upon a consideration of the level of household income through a 
means testing scheme. Cards have been issued every three years since 1981 to those 
households whose income is below the poverty line (Tangcharoensathien, 2002). 
Bureaucrats and employees of the state, whether they were retired or not, were eligible 
for free medical treatment, together with their parents, their spouses, and up to three 
offspring yet to come of age. Workers in the private sector were eligible to claim 
compensation for the cost of medical treatment from the social security fund to which 
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employers and employees paid into through the SSS. The middle income earners who 
were neither bureaucrats nor workers in the private sector could opt for the VHCS 
through the purchase of cards for 500 baht, and this voluntary scheme was subsidised 
by the state. The wealthy who could afford healthcare insurance policies bought these 
from insurance companies. Table 3.1 chronicles the milestones of healthcare insurance 
in Thailand, which include the introduction of healthcare insurance policies by 
insurance companies in 1929, the enactment of the first Social Security Law in 1954, 
and finally the enactment of the National Health Security Act in 2002. 
Table3-1 - The history of healthcare insurance in Thailand 
Year Event SW FB CI VI 
1929 Health insurance policies offered by insurance companies    9 
1954 The first social security law (no enforcement)   9  
1974 Compensation fund for labourers    9  
1975 Free medical services for the poor 9    
1978 The first private firm specialising in healthcare insurance    9 
1980 The medical welfare programme for civil servants  9   
1981 The issuance of cards for the poor 9    
1983 Phase 1 of healthcare card scheme : Fund for mother and child healthcare    9 
1984 Phase 2 of healthcare card scheme : Fund for mother and child healthcare     9 
1990 Social security law imposed on firms with 20 employees or more   9  
1991 Phase 3 of healthcare card scheme marked by the adoption of insurance policy and premium    9 
1992 Free medical services for the elderly 9    
1993 Law protecting the rights of persons involved in road accidents   9  
1994 The extension of the scope of the social security law to include firms with ten employees or more   9  
1994 Phase 4 of the healthcare card scheme marked by the state’s contribution to the scheme and allowing for the use of cards issued in other zones     9 
1994 The inclusion of community leaders and healthcare volunteers in the healthcare card scheme and the full contribution to the scheme by the state  9   
1994 Medical welfare programme for earners of low incomes and the needy 9    
1998 
New regulations linking budgetary allocation to the welfare programme for low-
income earners to provincial population. (the next two sentences are not clear) The 
introduction of reinsurance for costly treatment through the reimbursement method 
based on DRG (Diagnostic Related Groups). Adoption of global budget applied to 
the case of costly treatment 
9    
1998 
Change in the method of reimbursement in the welfare scheme for civil servants 
marked by the introduction of co-payment. The privilege given to civil servants 
becoming restricted to the acquisition of essential drug free of charge. Limitation in a 
person’s use of special room imposed on civil servants 
 9   
2000 Inclusion of pensioners and youths in the Social Security Scheme   9  
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Year Event SW FB CI VI 
2001 Pilots projects as part of the introduction of the UC Scheme were carried out in six provinces 
9    
2002 Nationwide implementation of the Gold Card Scheme. Enactment of the National Health Insurance Act 
9    
Source: Adapted from Tangchareonsathein, 2002, cited in Supachutikul 
SW = Social Welfare, FB = Fringe Benefit, CI = Compulsory Insurance, VI= Voluntary Insurance 
3.3 The different forms of health insurance 
Prior to the introduction of the UC scheme, six forms of healthcare insurance existed 
targeting six different groups of people as shown in Table 4.2 follows. 
Table3-2 -The different healthcare insurance schemes prior to the introduction of the UC scheme 
Scheme Number 
(million) 
Percentage 
Health Insurance Scheme for the poor 16.821 27 
Voluntary healthcare scheme subsidised by the state (500 baht card) 11.214 18 
CSMBS 7.787 12.5 
SSS 5.295 8.5 
Voluntary healthcare insurance scheme 1.246 2 
The uninsured 19.936 32 
Total  62.299 100 
Source: Adapted from MoPH, 2010 (Thai Public Health, 2008-2009) cited in NSO 
The healthcare insurance scheme for the poor was initiated in 1975 and evolved from 
the social welfare scheme for the poor. The scheme was extended to cover the elderly 
in 1989, children up to 12 years old, the disabled, veterans and their families in 1992, 
and community leaders and healthcare volunteers and their families in 1994. Since 
1979 the issuing of cards, formerly at the discretion of the commission, has been based 
on information relating to incomes. However, the scheme only covered 30% of the poor 
in 2001 and its main issue was its inaccessibility for a large number of the poor as a 
result of the failure to achieve a fair distribution of the cards. As a result, the majority 
of the card holders were not actually poor. 
The VHCS, which was supported by the state, was initiated in 1953 for workers outside 
the public and private sectors, such as peasants, freelancers, vendors, and shop owners. 
This scheme evolved from the community healthcare insurance funds set up by the 
MoPH, which promoted the access to basic healthcare services for rural people. Cards 
were sold at a subsidised price, and between 1993 and 2001 a card that was worth 1,000 
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baht was actually sold at 500 baht, and when the value of a card increased to 1,500 
baht, the state bore the increase. These cards were informally referred to as the 500 baht 
card, and treatment was limited to no more than five familial members within the 
period of one year. The benefits offered by the scheme were nearly the same as those 
offered by the MWS for the poor. The scheme covered 23.4% of the population and 
was popular among rural people until its termination in 2001. 
The CSMBS was initiated in 1980 and the entitlement to the benefits offered was also 
granted to spouses, offspring and parents. Individuals covered by the scheme could use 
the healthcare services at state-run hospitals throughout the country, but the use of 
private hospitals was permitted only in the case of accidents with the limit for allowable 
expenses for central and provincial bureaucrats being set by the comptroller general’s 
department. These allowable expenses for local bureaucrats and employees of state 
enterprises were determined by the organisation to which they belonged. Outpatients 
were required to pay the service fee before they were eligible for reimbursement, and 
inpatients were required to present a document signifying the acknowledgement of their 
illness from the organisation to which they belonged. Hospitals then used these 
documents to obtain reimbursement from the comptroller general’s department. In 2005 
people covered by the scheme who suffered from chronic illnesses and who were 
pensioners could have their names registered as prospective users of the services 
provided by hospitals and hospitals were reimbursed by the comptroller general’s 
department on the basis of these lists with patients not being required to pay any service 
fees. This practice was later applied to other bureaucrats who were not suffering from 
chronic illness. As the state provided reimbursement for the actual service fees the 
expenses of the scheme were high. 
The compulsory healthcare insurance scheme initiated by the state was comprised of 
two funds which were managed by the Office of Social Security of the Ministry of 
Labour and the Social Security commission: 
1. The compensation fund for illnesses attributed to working conditions, which 
was set up in 1974; and 
2. The social security fund, which was set up in 1990. 
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These two funds were set up for employees within the private sector. Employers were 
obliged to assume the sole responsibility for contributing to the compensation fund, 
whilst workers, employers, and the state made equal contributions to the social security 
fund. The benefits offered by this scheme were nearly the same as those offered by the 
other healthcare insurance schemes. 
A compulsory healthcare insurance scheme for road accidents was initiated in 1993 and 
owners of automobiles were made responsible for medical treatment expenses and to 
compensate victims of accidents, and therefore were required to purchase insurance 
policies. 
Voluntary healthcare insurance schemes were initiated by the private sector and could 
be accessed through the purchase of insurance policies. These schemes were introduced 
into Thailand around 1910 by multinational insurance companies. Private sector 
healthcare insurance is more attractive to wealthy people, and its scope is undergoing a 
steady expansion. Several home-grown insurance companies are also engaged in this 
business and by the end of 2001, individuals holding such insurance policies accounted 
for 1.2% of the total population. 
Table 3-3 - Features of the healthcare insurance schemes in existence prior to the introduction of 
the UC scheme 
Type MSW Card 
Civil 
Servant 
Medical 
Benefit 
Scheme 
(CSMBS) 
Social 
Security 
Scheme 
(SSS) 
Protection of 
the right of 
the people 
affected in 
road 
accident 
Insurance 
company 
Inception 1974 1975 1978 1990 1993 Around 1910 
Type in 
general 
State welfare State-
sponsored 
voluntary 
scheme 
State welfare 
State-
sponsored 
compulsory 
Scheme 
State-
sponsored 
compulsory 
scheme 
impose on 
automobile 
owners 
Insurance 
company 
Model 
Public/integr
ated model 
Voluntary 
integrated 
model 
Public 
reimburseme
nt model 
Public 
contracted 
model 
Public 
reimburseme
nt model 
Voluntary 
reimburseme
nt model 
Targeted 
groups 
The poor and 
the needy 
The persons 
above 
poverty line 
but uninsured 
Bureaucrats 
employees of 
state 
enterprise 
and their 
familial 
members 
Employees of 
the private 
sector 
The persons 
affected by 
road accident 
Welfare 
people 
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Type MSW Card 
Civil 
Servant 
Medical 
Benefit 
Scheme 
(CSMBS) 
Social 
Security 
Scheme 
(SSS) 
Protection of 
the right of 
the people 
affected in 
road 
accident 
Insurance 
company 
Coverage 
year to which 
this data 
refers 
30% 23.4% 8.5% 7.6% Every body 1.2% 
Finance 
Source of 
Fund 
Budgetary 
allocation by 
the state 
Sponsored by 
the state and 
household 
Budgetary 
allocation by 
the state 
Equal 
contribution 
by employer 
employee and 
the state 
Owners of 
auto mobiles 
households 
Supervisors 
of the funds 
MoPH MoPH The Ministry 
of Finance 
The Social 
Security 
Office 
 Insurance 
Company 
co payment 
None None Patients 
reliant on the 
services 
provided by 
private sector 
Emergency 
service with 
the cost 
exceed the 
limit 
exceeding 
 Exceed the 
limit 
Per capita 
expenses 
(baht) 
>363 + 
subsidies 
534 + 
subsidies 
2,106 1,558 Data 
unavailable 
Data 
unavailable 
Main 
problems 
Not covering 
the poor 
Poor 
distribution 
of risk 
Dramatic and 
continual 
increase of 
expense 
Covers only 
the period of 
employment 
Delayed 
compensation 
Selection of 
risk 
Source: Adapted from MoPH (2008) and Tangcharoensathien (2002) 
3.4 The three current health security schemes and their sources of 
funding and benefits provided to participants 
3.4.1 The healthcare system in Thailand 
There are three types of healthcare security schemes operating in Thailand: the 
CSMBS, SSS, and UC schemes. The first is a fee-for-service type, exemplified by the 
Civil Servant Medical Benefit and State Enterprise Scheme (CSMBS). Hospitals 
providing services to patients covered by the scheme would get fees at specified rates 
for different treatments paid by the government. This is the most generous publicly 
funded scheme because it allows the highest per capita treatment costs. The second is a 
compulsory contribution type of system, exemplified by the Social Security Scheme 
(SSS) which depends on equal contributions to the Social Security Fund by the 
government, employers, and employees. Here the costs of treatments have to be 
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covered by these funds. Finally, the third is a UCS type of universal healthcare 
coverage, which is designed to benefit those not covered by the two other schemes. 
3.4.2 Medical welfare for bureaucrats 
Bureaucrats, pensioners, and employees of bureaucratic organisations are entitled to 
inpatient and outpatients services. According to the Medical Welfare Act of 1980, civil 
servants can use the services provided by all state-run hospitals. The expenses covered 
by the CSMBS are: 
1. Drug, blood, blood components and other chemicals used as substitutes for 
blood, nutrients and others items used in treatment; 
3. Artificial organs, medical equipment, and the cost of their maintenance; 
4. Service fee, examination fee, diagnosis fee, but the fees for nursery and extra 
services are not included; 
5. Room service and food supply during treatment; and 
6. Annual medical examination and an annual examination contributing to the 
public healthcare service. 
The scheme also covers a civil servants’ spouses and familial members who are lawful 
offspring yet to come of age, or have come of age but legally deemed incapable or 
nearly incapable and under the care of their parents who are entitled to the welfare. 
Adopted children or the children adopted by others are not entitled to the benefits. 
Reimbursement is calculated by the number of times they use the services and hospitals 
can directly seek reimbursement from the comptroller general’s department through an 
electronic system when civil servants become inpatients. Payment is made in 
accordance with the diagnosis related group (DRG). Outpatients must show to which 
organisation they belong and hospitals then again directly seek reimbursement for 
them. Payment is based on the rate of service fee set by the hospitals. 
Since 2004 the cost for outpatients has continually increased whilst that for inpatients 
has decreased as the DRG method has been used to calculate expenses. Increased 
expenses are due to: 1) the open-ended allocation of funds which allows excessive 
claims to be made; 2) a large proportion of the scheme are pensioners and their familial 
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members; and 3) payment is based on the number of times services are provided and 
this has resulted in hospitals becoming motivated to seek profits through the 
dispensation of costly drugs, etc. (Health Insurance System Research Office, 2009). 
3.4.3 The Social Security Scheme (SSS) 
The welfare of employees in the private sector is protected by the 1980 Social Security 
Act. The Office of Social Security is responsible for the management of the social 
security fund and is guided by the principles of: 
1. Workers contribute 5% of their earnings to the fund; 
2. The SSS is compulsory in nature; 
3. The fund is for paying out compensation and investment in lucrative businesses; 
4. The right to obtain compensation depends on previous contributions to the fund; 
and 
5. There is a correlation between earnings, contributions to the fund and the 
compensation received. 
Those who contribute to the fund are entitled to compensation for injury or illness, 
child delivery, disability, death, child rearing, ageing and unemployment. Those who 
contribute to the social security fund are entitled to the following medical welfare 
benefits: 
1. The selection of a hospital according to personals preference, either state-run or 
private hospitals joining the SSS. They are also entitled to the services provided 
by the main hospitals which are considered the primary units and the network of 
hospitals which are considered the tertiary units. 
2. Access to all drugs on the list of essential drugs and also those required by 
prescription. Artificial organs and other apparatus are included in the per capita 
allocation for service fees. 
3. Access to anti-HIV drugs and antidotes to drug resistant microbes. 
4. Organ transplantation, bone marrow transplantation, cataract surgery, and 
kidney transplantation. 
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5. Dialysis therapy if afflicted with dysfunctional kidneys. 
6. Access to emergency services in cases of sudden illness or injury provided by 
the nearest units. For sudden illness the service can be used no more than twice 
annually but there is no limitation for injuries. 
7. Pregnancy care and child delivery with the payment of 13,000 baht, limited to 
two occurrences only. 
8. Dentistry services, including tooth removal, lime elimination, and false teeth as 
required by prescription. 
9. Access to the services provided by state-run hospitals for the disabled with full 
support from the social security fund which bears the cost required for treatment 
when disabled individuals are treated as outpatients. When they are inpatients 
then the payment is based on the DRG, as for when services are provided by a 
private hospital. 
10. Claims for the cost of transportation that are not more them 500 baht in cases of 
sudden injury or illness within localities. The 500 baht limit is for the use of 
ambulances provided by hospitals, but when hired vehicles are utilised then the 
limit is 300 baht. If sudden injury or illness occurs in localities in which a 
scheme participant is not registered as a resident, then the claim for 
transportation cost is six baht per kilometre. 
11. Health promotion and disease prevention. 
3.4.4 Universal Healthcare Coverage  
Thais who are not covered by the two schemes described above are entitled to the 
benefits of healthcare services provided by the National Health Insurance Act 2002, 
which required the establishment of a fund to be managed by the National Office of 
Health Insurance under the guidelines outlined by the National commission of Health 
Insurance chaired by the Minister of Public Health. 
The finance for this is derived from the annual budgetary allocation, however there are 
also other sources of finance, such as: 
• Local governments, as required by the act; 
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• Service fees as stipulated in the act; 
• Fines as stipulated by the act; 
• Contributions to the fund by charities; 
• Interests or benefits incurred by the fund; 
• Money and properties acquired by the fund; and 
• Other forms of contribution to the fund as required by the act. 
According to the act, the money and properties belonging to the fund need not be 
delivered to the Ministry of Finance. According to the National Health Security Act 
2002, the costs for the provision of services performed by the service units include: 
1. The costs of healthcare promotion and disease prevention; 
2. The costs of diagnosis; 
3. The costs of examination and care during pregnancy; 
4. The costs of therapy and medical services; 
5. The costs of drugs, artificial organs, and medical equipment; 
6. The cost of child delivery; 
7. The cost of living in service units; 
8. The cost of the care of infants; 
9. The costs of ambulances and other vehicles used in transporting patients; 
10. The cost of transporting injured persons; 
11. The costs of physical and psychological rehabilitation; and 
12. Other necessary costs as stipulated by the act. 
In short, the medical welfare scheme for civil servants covers civil servants and their 
familial members, the provision of welfare to employees of state enterprise is based 
upon the regulations of the organisation to which the employees belong, and the SSS is 
marked by contributions to the social security fund by the state, employers, and 
employees, although some private firms purchase policies from insurance companies 
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for their employees. The UC scheme was therefore created to provide medical welfare 
to Thais who were not covered by any of the other schemes. 
 
Table 3-4 - Differences between the three existing healthcare insurance schemes in Thailand 
Details CSMBS SSS UCS 
Coverage 5 million people (8%) 9.36 million people (15.8%) 47 million people (76%)  
Principle Welfare Social security Basic right 
Sources of 
finance 
Budgetary allocation 
of 32,000 million baht 
in 2011 
Equal contribution by employers 
employee and the state, with the 
expenses of 25,749 million baht in 2009 
2,100 baht in 2010 
Benefits All round including 
special room 
All round compensation for child 
delivery child rearing death and 
disability 
All round compensation as 
stipulated by article 41 
Service 
providers 
All state run hospitals The hospitals under the contract with 
state, private hospitals and their 
networks 
The hospitals under the contract 
with state private hospitals and 
their networks 
Payment Payment for 
outpatient DRG-based 
payment 
Extra payment by cases Capitation for outpatient and 
DRG weighted global budget 
Source: Thammathat-aree (2010) 
After the enactment of the National Health Security Act in 2002, which resulted in the 
implementation of the UC scheme, the number of people who gained access to 
healthcare services dramatically increased. In 2010 the coverage of these three 
healthcare insurance schemes accounted for 99.36% of the total population, or 63.47 
million people out of the total 65.01 million people, as shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3-5 - Number of people covered by the three healthcare security schemes 2003-2010 (million 
people) 
Item Scheme 
Million people 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 The UC scheme  45.35 45.97 47.10 47.34 47.54 46.67 46.95 47.56 47.73 
2 Social Security Scheme (SSS) 7.12 8.09 8.34 8.74 9.20 9.58 9.84 9.62 9.90 
3 
Civil Servant 
Medical Benefit 
Scheme (CSMBS) 
4.05 4.02 4.27 4.15 4.06 5.13 5.00 4.96 4.92 
4 Others (1)    0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.52 
5 
People not covered 
by healthcare 
insurance  4.60 4.37 2.83 2.36 1.36 0.78 0.52 0.33 0.41 
6 People covered by healthcare insurance  61.12 62.45 62.54 62.81 62.39 62.41 62.55 62.70 63.47 
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Item Scheme 
Million people 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
7 
Coverage of the 
health insurance 
schemes (1-4) 
56.52 58.08 59.71 60.45 61.04 61.63 62.02 62.36 63.06 
8 Percentage of coverage 92.47 93.01 95.47 96.25 97.82 98.75 99.16 99.47 99.36 
9 
People whose 
identities need to be 
proved. (2).    0.00 0.45 0.90 1.16 1.44 1.35 
10 Thai expatriates (3) 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 
11 Foreigners    0.26 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.18 
12 
Total number of the 
expatriates and 
foreigners 0.03 0.03 0.32 0.34 0.80 1.25 1.52 1.78 1.54 
13 Total population 61.15 62.48 62.86 63.15 63.19 63.66 64.07 64.47 65.01 
Sources: The data collected during 2002-2010 by the Office of Insurance Information. The data collected during 
2009-2010 by the office of the management of lee fund of the Nation Health Insurance Office. 
Notes:  
1. Veterans, private teachers and people with issues relevant to their status and their rights, and ethnic minorities who 
were yet to be granted Thai nationality. 
2. Dead people, missing persons, problem related to Thai expatriates exercising their rights, erroneous codes on 
identity cards, persons moving to other provinces without informing the authorities, and migrants. 
3. The census data shows a lower number of Thai expatriates than the data collected by The Centre for the Election 
in Foreign Countries and the Immigration Office. 
3.4.5 Comparison of the benefits offered by the three healthcare schemes 
Compared to those covered by the SSS and the UC scheme, those covered by the 
CSMBS enjoy more benefits. They have access to drugs not on the list of essential 
drugs, including expensive imported drugs; are eligible for more benefits when 
undergoing any surgery; can deliver a child through surgery; can opt for surgery 
facilitated by the use of visual equipment; and can access a longer period of 
hospitalisation when suffering from pneumonia, a stroke, or cerebral thrombosis 
(Health Insurance Research Office, 2009). 
There is also a large disparity between the benefits offered under the SSS and those 
under the UC scheme (Pokpermdee, 2010). In 2011 the per capita expenses of the SSS 
was 2,106 baht, which was supplied by contributions from employees, employers, and 
the state. In contrast, the per capita expenses of the UC scheme were 2,546.48 baht 
which was totally funded by the state. For inpatients covered by the SSS, payments 
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were made through capitation, but for those covered by the UC scheme these were 
based upon the DRG. 
The differences in the benefits offered by the SSS and UC scheme include: 
• General service 
The SSS permits the participants in the scheme to choose their hospital, either state-run 
or private hospitals under contract to the scheme. Participants in the UC Scheme have 
their names registered as users of a particular primary unit (hospital). They are also 
required to use the service provided by such units first before being eligible to get 
transferred to other units, although this is not true in the case of accidents. 
• Emergency services 
The SSS allows the participants to use their nearest units no more than twice per year, 
although if they are injured there are no restrictions. In contrast, the UC scheme allows 
its participants unlimited access to their nearest service units. 
• Access to drugs 
The SSS participants have access to all drugs on the list of the essential drugs and also 
to additional drugs. However, members of the UC scheme only have access to the drugs 
on the list of essential drugs and drugs that must be prescribed by medical 
professionals. 
• Health promotion 
The SSS sets aside no funds for healthcare promotion as this is regarded as a 
responsibility of the MoPH, whilst the UC scheme appropriates funds from its budget 
to serve the purpose of healthcare promotion for all Thais, no matter what healthcare 
insurance scheme they are covered by. 
• Transportation costs 
The SSS views general illnesses as the responsibility of the hospitals in which a 
participant of the scheme is registered as a user. If a SSS participant suffers a sudden 
illness or injury within the locality in which they are resident, then they are eligible for 
reimbursement; this is limited to 500 baht for the use of an ambulance and 200 baht for 
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a hired vehicle. If a sudden illness or injury occurs when they are away from their 
residence locality then the repayment is at the rate of six baht per kilometre. Payment 
for UC scheme members is also based on the number of kilometres covered; however, 
payment for the cost of water transportation cannot be more than 35,000 baht and air 
transportation, such as by helicopter, cannot exceed 60,000 baht (The Office of Social 
Security, 2010). 
3.5 Health insurance schemes provided by the private sector 
Private hospitals play a vital role in providing healthcare services, especially in urban 
areas where there is a high density population and an ensuing high demand for medical 
services. Urban residents have substantial purchasing power and private hospitals have 
specialised in targeting medical services to customers in different income ranges. As a 
result, private hospitals tend to be concentrated in urban areas. 
Private firms providing medical services fall into four categories: 
1. Dispensaries, which can be further categorised into: 
• Dispensaries dealing in modern medicine; 
• Dispensaries exclusively dealing in modern medicine already packaged and 
their use requiring no prescription by a medical professional; and 
• Dispensaries dealing in traditional medicine. 
2. Clinics, which are defined as places for treatment but with no beds for overnight 
stays. 
3. Hospitals, which are defined as a place for treatment with the availability of 
beds for overnight stays. 
4. Massage parlours for health and beauty, and health spas, which are defined as 
places for healthcare promotion. 
Private healthcare units play a vital role in providing treatment to the public and of the 
322 private hospitals in Thailand, 96 are located in Bangkok and the remaining 226 are 
in the regions, with most being medium-sized hospitals with 50-100 beds (Table 3.6). 
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Table 3-6 - Private hospitals in 2009 
Healthcare units 
Bangkok Regions 
Total 
Number % Number % 
Clinics 
(no beds for overnight stay)  
3,878 21.9 13,793 78.ja 17,671 
Hospitals 
(with beds for overnight stay) 
96 29.8 226 70.2 322 
Number of beds 13,933 41.7 19,472 58.3 33,405 
 
Figure 3-1 -The turnover of private hospitals with beds for overnight stay, 1994-2009 
 
Between 1998 and 2009 the number of private hospitals closing their doors was larger 
than the number of new hospitals. In 2003 alone, ten private hospitals terminated their 
operations with only 11 new hospitals opening, whilst in 2009, 11 private hospitals 
closed and only three opened (Figure 3.1). 
Health insurance services provided by the private sector take a number of different 
forms: 
1. Individual life insurance policies also covering hospitalisation; 
2. Group life insurance policies that also covers hospitalisation and surgery; 
3. Group life insurance policies that include healthcare and accident insurance; 
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4. Individual healthcare insurance policies offered by an insurance company; and 
5. Group life insurance policies offered by an insurance company. 
A healthcare insurance policy is a contract made by the person who is to be insured and 
the company that is to insure them. The insuring company promises the insured person 
to compensate them for expenses on medical services, including those for surgery, 
diagnosis, care, and others as specified in the contract. The compensation for such 
expenses is impossible without the insured person’s obligation to pay the premiums to 
the insuring company. 
Intense competition in this market has resulted in the evolution of five forms of policy, 
in order to make them more appealing to the prospective customer. The combination of 
healthcare and accident insurance, and healthcare insurance and a saving account in a 
single insurance policy is a common practice. The policies are similar in their 
compensation for medical services expenses but differ in the other benefits offered to 
policy holders, such as the interest rate of saving accounts (Tangcharoensathien, 
Pitayarungsarit & Sahapatana, 2002). 
3.5.1 Benefits offered by health insurance schemes initiated by the private 
sector 
A study conducted in 2000 on the benefits of possessing an insurance policy showed 
that only inpatients received compensation for their medical expenses, including food 
and room service, ICU, general treatment, diagnosis, laboratory tests, consultations, 
emergency services, and surgery. As the compensation reflected the fee for these 
services, its limit was defined. Some insurance companies offered policies that covered 
outpatients, child delivery, and catastrophic illnesses; however, all the insurance 
companies stipulated a limit to the compensation or benefits and the types of patients 
insured and most will not insure people prone to certain diseases or those already 
afflicted with heart disease, cancer, diabetes, epilepsy, and high blood pressure 
(Tangcharoensathien, Pitayarungsarit & Sahapatana, 2002). 
In 2010, 28% of the population of Thailand had some form of private healthcare 
insurance. This insurance sector has expanded steadily, but is still relatively 
underdeveloped compared to Singapore and Malaysia, where respectively 90% and 
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60% of the total population possess policies (The Manager Newspaper, 2011). Most of 
the healthcare insurance policy holders are the well-to-do middle class. In 2009 there 
were 12,913,848 insurance policies, with a total insurance figure of 2,685,907,862 baht 
or 86,642,289 USD. In the same year 1,954,026 individual accident insurance policies 
were sold, as shown in Table 3.7. 
Table 3-7 - The number of insurance policies and their value in 2009 
Ordinary Number of Policies Sum Insured 
Whole life 4,421,405 815,355,240 
Endowment 7,630,975 1,480,074,308 
Term 861,199 390,346,577 
Others 269 131,737 
Total 12,913,848 2,685,907,862 
Source: Office for the Promotion of Insurance Business 2010 
Note:  By 2009 the number of personal accident insurance policies was 1,954,026, with the value of the sum 
insured equal to 1,167,111,310 million baht (1 USD is approximately 31 baht). 
In 2006 there were 429 privately owned hospitals and healthcare units throughout the 
country, and the number of patients using these privately owned healthcare units was 
48 million. Most of these were as outpatients, accounting for 94.5% or 45.3 million 
patients, with the remaining 2.6 million patients accounting for 5.5% as inpatients. 
Bangkok had the largest number of private hospitals as, according to the statistics, 130 
were located there in 2006, and these attracted the largest number of patients using 
private facilities. In 2006 private hospitals in Bangkok attracted 23.3 million patients, 
accounting for 48.6% of the total number of patients using the services provided by 
private hospitals. Meanwhile, the private hospitals in the central region attracted 15.3 
million patients accounting for 31.8%, and those in the northern and north-eastern 
regions attracted 3.7 and 3.3 million patients accounting for 7.7% and 6.8% 
respectively. The private hospitals in the southern region attracted the smallest number 
of patients with the patients using the services provided numbering 2.4 million and 
accounting for 5.1% of the total number of patients using services provided by private 
hospitals. 
The average number of patients nationwide using the services provided by private 
hospitals was 111,795 per hospital, with the average number of outpatients and 
inpatients at 105,669 and 6,126, respectively. Private hospitals in Bangkok have the 
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largest average number of patients per hospitals at 179,191, whilst the average number 
of patients per private hospital in the central, northern, north-eastern, and southern 
regions was 106,671, 66,132, 57,514 and 56,502, respectively (Table 3.8). 
3.6 The growth in health tourism 
The economic recession in 1997 meant it was necessary for healthcare unit in the public 
and private sector to come up with new strategies to contribute to their survival. High-
end private hospitals faced an acute problem of vacant beds and a number began to 
adopt measures to attract customers with high purchasing power from Japan, Europe, 
and the Middle East. Concurrently, the Department of Export Promotion of the 
Ministry of Commerce began to be interested in the idea of obtaining revenues from the 
provision of medical services to foreigners. Thai medical services had a good 
reputation within the Asian and Southeast Asian regions and had already attracted 
customers from neighbouring South Asian countries and even from the Middle East. 
The plan was now to attract customers from developed countries, as well as to attract 
pensioners from developed countries to come and live in Thailand. 
The strategy for the promotion of Thailand as the centre of healthcare services in Asia 
was formulated in May 2003 by working groups from the MoPH, the Ministry of 
Tourism and Sports Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Commerce, as 
well as from private hospitals and other businesses. The MoPH was instrumental in 
formulating a five-year strategy (2004-2008) which was divided into three operational 
plans: the improvement of healthcare services and products; the improvement of their 
management; and marketing co-ordination and public relations (MoPH, 2003). The 
introduction of such a strategy was based upon the idea that the presence of the UC 
scheme which had resulted in the nationwide distribution of medical services paved the 
way for private hospitals with a surplus capacity to improve their services and facilities 
to non-resident customers. Non-resident medical services customers were viewed by 
policymakers as a new source of national income with a good growth potential (MoPH, 
2003). A fund of 564.5 million baht was therefore allocated to finance the operational 
plans to improve the medical services, healthcare services, and herbal and healthcare-
related products.  
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Table 3-8 - The number of patients attending private hospitals 
Regions Total IP OP The average number of 
patient per private 
hospital 
The average number 
of patients per 
population 
number 
(1,000) 
% number 
(1,000) 
% number 
(1,000) 
% total IP OP number 
(1,000) 
IP OP 
Nationwide 47,959.0 100 2,628.0 5.5 45,331.0 94.5 111,795 6,126 105,669 62,828.70 0.04 0.72 
Bangkok 23,294.4 100 923.4 4.0 22,371.0 96.0 179,191 7,103 172,088 5,695.95 0.16 3.92 
Central  15,253.6 100 761.6 5.0 14,492.0 95.0 106,671 5,326 101,345 15,264.73 0.05 0.94 
Northern  3,703.4 100 308.4 8.3 3,395.1 91.7 66,132 5,505 60,628 11,890.75 0.02 0.29 
North-
eastern 
3,278.2 100 368.4 11.
2 
2,909.8 88.8 57,514 6,464 51,050 21,376.83 0.02 0.14 
Southern  2,429.6 100 266.4 11.
0 
2,163.2 89.0 56,502 6,195 50,307 8,600.43 0.03 0.25 
Source: Adapted from National Statistical Office 2007 
Notes: IP – Inpatients 
OP – Outpatients 
Private hospitals had the capacity to accommodate foreign patients and Table 3.9 
illustrates how the number of foreign patients hospitalised in Thailand grew 
dramatically during 2001-2005. This is especially notable in 2003, which was the year 
of the government’s strategy to make Thailand the hub for medical services in Asia, 
and the number of foreign patients hospitalised in Thailand increased by 50%. 
Table 3-9 - The number of foreign patients hospitalised in Thailand 2001-2007 
Nationality 
The number of foreign patients 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Japan 118,170 131,584 162,909 247,238 185,616 n/a 233,389 1,078,906 
USA 49,253 59,402 85,292 118,771 132,239 n/a 136,248 581,205 
South Asia 34,857 47,555 69,574 107,627 98,303 n/a 85,412 443,328 
U.K. 36,778 41,599 74,856 95,941 108,156 n/a 110,286 467,616 
Middle East  n/a 20,004 34,704 71,051 98,451 n/a 169,091 393,301 
Asian n/a n/a 36,708 93,516 74,178 n/a 115,561 319,963 
Taipei/China 26,893 27,438 46,624 57,051 57,279 n/a 29,783 245,068 
Germany 19,057 18,923 37,055 40,180 42,798 n/a 41,313 199,326 
Austria 14,265 16,479 24,228 35,092 40,161 n/a 42,688 172,913 
France 16,102 17,679 25,582 32,409 36,175 n/a 37,251 165,198 
South Korea 14,419 14,877 19,588 31,303 26,571 n/a 26,259 133,017 
Scandinavia n/a n/a 19,851 20,990 22,921 n/a 49,817 113,579 
Canada n/a n/a 12,909 18,144 18,177 n/a 22,907 72,137 
Eastern Europe  n/a n/a 8,634 6,728 6,120 n/a 9,413 30,895 
Others 220,367 234,460 315,018 127,054 302,834 n/a 264,389 1,464,122 
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Nationality 
The number of foreign patients 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Total 550,161 630,000 973,532 1,103,095 1,249,948 1,330,000 1,373,807 7,210,543 
Rate of increase  
(% a year)  
14.55 54.53 13.31 13.32 6.40 3.29 16.48 
Source: The Office for the Promotion of Service Businesses affiliated to the Department of Export Promotion of the 
Ministry of Commerce 
Note:  1. The data is incomplete because it was collected from only 55 private hospitals in 2007. 
 2. It was probable that the data collected since 2003 included return cases. 
Medical services for foreign patients represented an important source of national 
income with the potential for growth evident in the steady increase in the revenues 
obtained from the provision of medical services to foreigners from 36,000 million baht 
in 2006 to 106,640 million baht in 2007, and in 201 the revenues were expected to be 
up to 107,419 million baht. The growth in the revenues obtained from the provision of 
services to foreigners was due to their high purchasing power which resulted in a higher 
average cost per capita than that of domestic patients. Factors contributing to the 
expansion of the medical treatment businesses catering to foreigners were: 
1. A wide variety of medical services of high quality. 
2. The cost of treatments was lower than in Singapore, the regional medical hub. 
3. The location of Thailand in the Southeast Asian region was close to countries 
with less developed medical facilities. 
4. The country’s reputation as a major tourism destination. 
5. The country’s reputation for providing high quality services. 
However, there were constraints that emerged due to the supply of personnel and their 
poor skills in communicating in foreign languages (The Thai Farmer Bank Research 
Centre, 2010). 
3.7 Health expenditure 
It was found during a comparative study that healthcare expenditure increases in 
proportion to the level of economic development. In 2007, healthcare expenditure in 
wealthy countries accounted for 11.2% of their GDP, whilst healthcare-related 
spending in middle income countries was around 4.3-6.4% of their GDP. In Thailand, 
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the information gleaned from the national accounts related to healthcare expenditure 
showed that this accounted for 3.5-3.7% of the GDP for the years 2002-2007 and it 
increased to 4.2% in 2008, with a dramatic increase coming from the public sector. The 
public sector’s healthcare expenditure increased from 45% of total healthcare 
expenditure in 1994 to 46% in 2001, and increased further to 71-72% during 2007-
2008. 
Before the introduction of the UC scheme, healthcare expenditure accounted for 15% 
of the public sector’s total expenditure; however, after its introduction healthcare 
expenditure accounted for 20% of the public sectors total’s expenditure. In 2008 
healthcare expenditure accounted for 22% of the public sector’s total expenditure, 
which was considered to be high, and a sharp increase in the public sector’s healthcare 
expenditure occurred during 2001-2002, when the UC scheme was introduced. 
In general, the proportion of healthcare-related expenses as a fraction of GDP has been 
stable; between 3.5-4.3% of the GDP (Figure 3.2). However, there has been a change in 
the proportion of the public sector’s healthcare expenses compared to that of the private 
sector. Health expenses for the public sector have increased rapidly since 2001 
following the introduction of the UC scheme. In 2009, public sector healthcare-related 
expenses accounted for 75.8% of the total expenditure on healthcare, as shown in 
Figure 3.3. This reflects the crucial role of the public sector in sustaining healthcare-
related programmes in Thailand. The proportion of healthcare-related expenditures, 
4.3% of GDP in 2009, was small, compared to that of developed countries such as the 
United States, where it was 16.2% of GDP, the United Kingdom with 9.3% of its GDP, 
and Japan with 8.3% of its GDP. However, when compared to south-east Asian 
countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia, the proportion of healthcare related 
expenditures in Thailand differed by only a small amount. It is worth noting that the 
proportion of expenditure on the UC scheme within the national budget has 
dramatically increased. 
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Figure 3-2  The proportion of healthcare-related expenditure as a percentage of GDP 1995-2009 
 
 
Figure 3-3  Health expenditure for the public and the private sectors as proportion of the country’s 
total expenditure on healthcare 
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Figure 3-4 - A comparison of the proportion of healthcare-related expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP between countries 1998-2009 
 
 
 
Health expenditure by the government increased from 84.5 billion baht in 2001 to 
110.6 billion baht in 2001 and then to 240.8 billion baht in 2008, an increase of 76% 
from 2002. During the same period, the expenditure on the SSS remained constant, 
whilst the households’ expenditure decreased from 33% of the total healthcare 
expenditure in 2001 to 15% in 2008, which was nearly the same as the average figure 
for countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). As Thailand’s GDP continued to grow, the proportion of 
healthcare expenditure in terms of GDP has remained at 3-4%, as shown in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3-5 - Total healthcare expenditure by source and as percentage of GDP, 1994-2008, current 
year price 
 
Source: HSRI, 2012, An independent assessment of the first 10 years (2001-2010) 
Increased government expenditure has contributed to a great improvement in the UC 
scheme, resulting in more benefits related to medical treatment and healthcare 
promotion, contracts with the healthcare units participating in the Scheme, the 
allocation of funds per capita for outpatients, and the close-end allocation of funds 
based on DRG for inpatients, in addition to the requirement for patients to register with 
the hospital located in the area in which they are regarded as domiciled. It was thus 
obvious that the UC scheme has provided standardised services to users, and not simply 
low-quality services to the poor. 
3.7.1 Macro financing of the Universal Healthcare Coverage scheme 
In 2001, expenditure on healthcare accounted for 3.3% of the GDP as shown in Figure 
4.4, which increased to 4.3% in 2009, an increase of 1% following the introduction of 
the UC scheme in 2001. In total, state expenditure on healthcare accounted for 56.38% 
of the total expenditure on healthcare, comprising 1.6% of the GDP. In 2009, the 
percentage of the public sector’s healthcare expenses increased to 75.85%, as shown in 
Figure 3.5 whilst that of the private sector decreased to 24.15%. The increase of 1% in 
the proportion of the total expenses on healthcare in terms of GDP was thus due to the 
increase in the public sector’s expenses after the introduction of the UC scheme, which  
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Figure 3-6 - Health expenditure compared to GDP, 1995 - 2009 
 
could be attributed to it subsidising the private sector’s healthcare units that participated 
in the UC scheme. 
 
Figure 3-7 - Comparison of private and public healthcare expenditure, 1995 - 2009 
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The proportion of the budget allocated to the UC scheme within the government’s total 
expenditure grew slightly from 5.6% in 2003 to 6.94% in 2009, as shown in Figure 4.4 
 
Figure 3-8 - The expenses of the UC scheme, 2003 – 2010 
 
3.8 The Health Insurance Act and the change in Thailand’s health 
insurance practice 
In Thailand, universal healthcare coverage has long been a concern among academics 
and researchers, particularly those in the MoPH. The vision to achieve universal 
healthcare coverage was discussed at the healthcare financing conference in 1993, 
organised by the MoPH and the World Bank. By that time, 50% of the population had 
insurance coverage. The proportion of population with healthcare insurance protection 
has been gradually increased since then, and many healthcare insurance schemes have 
been developed independently at different times. However, until 2000, the healthcare 
system was far from able to ensure universal access of healthcare to all Thai citizens. 
Although the new constitution promulgated on 11 October 1997 made equity in 
healthcare mandatory, as it is the right of Thai citizens, and the UCS as also one of the 
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goals in the 8th national Social and Economic Development Plan (1997), there was 
insufficient interest among policy makers to implement the UC policy. 
Health insurance schemes in various forms had existed in Thailand for a long time and 
there were five broad areas of coverage: 
1. Support was available for low income earners and other vulnerable groups 
such as the old, the disabled, and children. 
2. State-provided healthcare insurance was also available based upon a 
person’s willingness to join the healthcare insurance scheme organised by 
the state. This scheme was characterised by the sharing of the premium 
costs between the state and the people participating in the scheme, and was 
informally known as the ‘500 baht card programme’. 
3. Free healthcare services were available to bureaucrats and employees of 
state enterprises, as well as their children. 
4. Compulsory healthcare insurance was available for workers in the formal 
sector consisting of a compensation fund and a social security fund to which 
they contributed. 
5. Private healthcare insurance was widely provided by the private sector 
whereby individuals could purchase a healthcare insurance policy from an 
insurance firm. 
These five forms of healthcare insurance covered 70% of the country’s total population, 
but the remaining 30%, equivalent to 19 million people, were left without any form of 
healthcare insurance (NESDB, 2002). The excluded groups were mainly the poor in the 
informal and agricultural sectors as we have already discussed earlier. 
Before the enactment of the National Health Insurance for All Act in 2002, the state 
assumed responsibility for the expenses of the medical services provided to bureaucrats 
and their families, whilst workers in the private sector were entitled to reimbursement 
from a compensation fund and social security fund to which they were required to 
contribute on a monthly basis. Those not covered by the previous two schemes were 
entitled to medical services free of charge if they could not afford to pay due to 
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poverty, or if they could afford it, they could purchase low priced healthcare insurance 
policies for 500 baht for themselves and their families on a monthly basis. 
After the introduction of the National Health Insurance for All Act, financial reforms 
were instituted within the MoPH. These reforms, regarded as primarily affecting 
hospitals and healthcare personnel, involved the introduction of a budgetary allocation 
according to the size of the local population in response to the financial implications of 
the new Act. This method of budgetary allocation was applied to three quarters of the 
MoPH’s financial resources and was expected not only to create equal access 
opportunities to healthcare services, but also to increase the purchasing power of the 
hospitals located in heavily populated areas currently lacking the resources necessary 
for the operation of their healthcare programmes. The reforms were also expected to 
encourage the fair distribution of healthcare related personnel and resources. 
The government’s budgetary allocation for healthcare was crucial for the effective 
performance of the programme. From 2002 to the time of writing in 2015, three 
governments have been formed in Thailand and all have perceived the importance of 
supporting the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme, and so the finances available 
for the healthcare programme have been steadily increasing. Existing healthcare related 
services and facilities have been improved and renovated, and new facilities built. The 
private sector has also been encouraged to take part in the universal healthcare 
programme and initially many private hospitals participated in the programme 
believing that it would turn out to be a financially viable programme. 
3.9 Administrative structure of the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme 
The National Health Security Act required the establishment of a commission 
responsible for the administration of the healthcare security system. The commission, 
consisting of national politicians, local politicians, civil servants, NGOs and experts, 
numbered 30 people in total. The variety of stakeholders in the commission was 
undertaken to ensure the inclusion of all those with different interests who had a stake 
in the UC scheme. 
The Minister of Public Health was the chairman of the commission and one of the key 
national politicians represented within the commission. Civil servants included the 
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permanent secretary of the MoPH, the permanent secretary of the ministry of finance, 
the permanent secretary of the ministry of commerce, the permanent secretary of the 
ministry of the interior (or home ministry), the permanent secretary of the ministry of 
labour and social welfare, the permanent secretary of the MoPH, the permanent 
secretary of the ministry of education, and the director of the budgetary bureau. Local 
politicians included representatives of municipalities, provincial administrative 
organisations, Tambon (sub-district) administrative organisations, and other forms of 
local government. Each form of local government had one representative within the 
commission. NGOs had five seats, and covered children and youths, women, the 
elderly, the disabled, the mentally ill, HIV patients, the chronically ill, workers, slum 
dwellers, peasants, and ethnic minorities. Five medical professionals were represented 
by members of the doctors’ council, the nurses’ council, the pharmacists’ council and 
representatives of the private hospitals association. These five medicals professionals 
were included to set the standard of professional practice for their members and the 
organisations elected their own delegates to represent them in the National Health 
Security commission. Seven experts were appointed by the cabinet, including 
specialists in the field of healthcare insurance, medicine and public healthcare, Thai 
traditional medicine, alternative medicine, finance, law, and social sciences. 
The act also established the NHSO which is a state agency with the status of a legal 
entity under the supervision of the MoPH. The NHSO acts as the secretariat or 
executive office charged with the implementation of the decisions of the commission 
and any sub-committees established by the commission. The secretary general of the 
NHSO acts as the secretary of the commission and as the director of the national 
security office. 
3.10 A network of health care units connected to the 30 baht Scheme 
The healthcare units identified as service delivery points for the 30 baht scheme were 
hospitals, health stations, and clinics. The National Health Insurance Act of 2002 
required all state-run healthcare units to become part of the UC scheme, whilst 
participation in the scheme by private healthcare units was voluntary and they were 
subject to quality tests before admission. Health care units joining the UC scheme can 
therefore be categorised as: 
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1. State-run healthcare units affiliated to the MoPH. 
2. State-run healthcare units not affiliated to the MoPH – these are instead mostly 
affiliated to the Ministry of Education and most are associated with medical 
schools or affiliated to the Ministry of Defence, such as army, naval and air 
force hospitals, there are also state-run hospitals affiliated to the Ministry of the 
Interior, such as those run by local governments and the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration. 
3. Private healthcare units. 
4. Healthcare units run by the local government. 
Health care units affiliated to the MoPH are ranked in accordance with the level of 
complexity or sophistication of treatment of which they are capable: 
1. Health stations or health service centres currently converted into hospitals for 
health promotion in ‘Tambons’ or villages. 
2. Community healthcare centres or primary cure units (PCU) arising out of the 
implementation of the UC scheme. They were designed to act as hospitals 
within community neighbourhoods. 
3. Community hospitals providing medical services in ‘Ampurs’ or districts, with 
10-150 beds, covering 10,000 or more people. 
4. General hospitals located in the capitals of provinces or in large Ampurs 
(districts), with 200-500 beds. 
5. The main hospitals located in the provincial capitals, with 500 or more beds and 
medical professionals in all fields of medical science. 
The number of state-run healthcare units who have joined the 30 baht scheme is shown 
in Table 3-10. 
Table 3-10 - Public healthcare units participating in the UC Scheme 2004-2010 
Units and their affiliation 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
The MoPH 821 828 830 834 849 839 844 
Hospitals 818 825 826 830 836 830 831 
Health stations/community clinics 3 3 4 4 13 9 13 
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Units and their affiliation 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
State-run healthcare units not affiliated to 
the MoPH 114 114 148 153 155 83 81 
Hospitals 74 74 72 73 75 72 75 
Community clinics 40 40 76 80 80 11 6 
Local governments - - - - - 10 12 
Hospitals      10 2 
Community clinics      - 10 
Total 935 942 978 982 1,004 932 937 
Source: Adapted from the annual report, NHSO, 2010 
The number of private hospitals joining the UC scheme decreased from 71 in 2004 to 
49 in 2010, but the number of private community clinics joining the scheme increased 
from 89 in 2004 to 169 in 2010 as shown in Table 3.11. Community clinics are small 
primary units operating as a subsidiary of a private hospital, a medical service franchise 
or an autonomous clinic found by a proprietor. 
Table 3-11  - Private healthcare units participating in the UC scheme 2004-2010 
Units 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Hospitals 71 63 61 60 55 50 49 
Private community clinics 89 105 116 152 150 167 169 
Total 160 168 177 212 205 217 218 
Source: Adapted from the annual report, NHSO, 2010 
Funds were allocated per capita to community clinics according to the size of the UC 
scheme population under their care, and their services were exclusively for outpatients, 
as there were no beds to accommodate inpatients. These clinics were responsible for the 
cost of transferring outpatients and the NHSO was responsible for the cost of 
transferring any inpatients. This approach to organising the entire network of service 
units facilitated the participation of the private sector in the UC scheme as the cost of 
investing in community clinics was not high in terms of personnel and equipment. 
The operation of the hospitals joining the UC scheme gradually improved in terms of 
those achieving the hospital accredited (HA) standard, and the number of accredited 
hospitals steadily increased from 6.1% in 2003 to 23.5% in 2010. The number of 
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hospitals classified as being in a development phase and at the first level of acceptance 
has steadily decreased. 
In 2010, the number of accredited hospital was 232, accounting for 23.5% of the total, 
with 185 affiliated to the MoPH and four private hospitals out of the 49 that joined the 
UC scheme. The number of hospitals gaining the second level of accreditation were 
648, accounting for 65.6% (Table 3.12). 
Table 3-12 - Number of the hospitals participating in the UC scheme at the different development 
stages of the hospital accredited standard 2003-2010 
Stages of development 
The number of the hospitals 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Developing 538 
(55.8) 
488 
(50.6) 
170 
(17.6) 
83 
(8.6) 
56 
(5.8) 
37 
(3.8) 
27 
(2.7) 
9 
(0.9) 
First level of acceptance 213 
(22.1) 
255 
(26.5) 
615 
(63.6) 
526 
(54.7) 
416 
(42.9) 
250 
(25.4) 
143 
(14.4) 
99 
(10.0) 
Second level of acceptance 154 
(16.0) 
156 
(16.2) 
48 
(5.0) 
200 
(20.8) 
304 
(31.3) 
474 
(48.2) 
556 
(56.7) 
648 
(65.6) 
Fulfilment of the requirement of HA 
standard 
59 
(6.1) 
65 
(6.7) 
134 
(13.9) 
152 
(15.8) 
194 
(20.0) 
222 
(22.6) 
264 
(26.7) 
232 
(23.5) 
Total 964 
(100) 
964 
(100) 
967 
(100) 
961 
(100) 
970 
(100) 
983 
(100) 
990 
(100) 
988 
(100) 
Source: The Institute for the Development of Health Care Units 2010, analysed by the Office of Improving Service 
Standard of the NHSO, 2010 
3.11 Service units joining the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
According to the National Health Security Act, it is obligatory for all healthcare related 
facilities in the public sector to join the UC scheme. Health related facilities in the 
public sector include those affiliated to the MoPH and those who are not affiliated, such 
as military hospitals, hospitals operated by medical schools affiliated to the Ministry of 
Education, and hospitals affiliated to local governments. Participation in the UC 
scheme by private sector healthcare-related facilities is voluntary. The majority of 
public sector service units are affiliated to the MoPH, numbering 844 in 2010 (831 
hospital 13 clinics) out of a total number of 1,155, and accounting for 73% of the total 
number of the healthcare-related facilities joining the UC scheme. Public sector 
facilities not affiliated to the MoPH numbered 81 (75 hospitals and 6 clinics), with 12 
affiliated to local governments (2 hospitals and 10 clinics), and all joined the UC 
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scheme. Privately owned healthcare-related facilities numbered 218 (49 hospitals, and 
169 clinics).  
3.12 Coverage 
3.12.1 Access to health insurance for the poor 
Before the emergence of state-sponsored healthcare insurance programmes, state-run 
hospitals and some private hospitals, affiliated to particular religions in most cases, set 
aside funds for providing services to the poor. However, how the funds were allocated 
and used depended on the discretion of the management of the hospitals (TDRI, 2004). 
The Thai government has financed social welfare programmes for the poor since 1975, 
but rules and regulations regarding this issue constantly undergo adjustments to reflect 
the changing situation and to match new policies, although until the UC scheme 
healthcare insurance had yet to achieve mass coverage. People covered by the MWS, 
which targeted the poor, the disabled, and those deemed deserving of state help, 
accounted for 30% of the country’s population in 2001, those joining the VHCS 
accounted for 23.4%, whilst the participants in the CSMBS, which also covered 
employees of state enterprises, accounted for 8.5%, and the SSS, which covered a 
number of people, accounted for only 7.6%. Only 1.2% of the population were covered 
by a healthcare insurance policy offered by insurance companies. Therefore, in total, 
30% of the population did not have access to healthcare insurance (MoPH, 2007). 
Poverty has been frequently identified in Thai academic studies as an obstacle to 
accessing healthcare services, and in many cases, those suffering from illnesses do not 
seek treatment because they are without healthcare insurance. Many of this section of 
the population were therefore afflicted by worsening healthcare conditions and some 
became disabled due to delayed treatment (Siamwalla, 2001). The accessibility of 
healthcare insurance before the implementation of the UC scheme can be accessed via 
the inpatient statistics for 1996, as those without healthcare insurance were the least 
likely to attend a hospital. (Table 3-13). The average frequency of this latter group for 
attending a hospital was 1.5 times per year, which was more than three times that of 
those without healthcare insurance (Pittayarangsarit, 2004). 
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Table 3-13  - Admission rates for people covered by the six healthcare insurance programmes in 
1996 
Scheme Admission rate 
Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS) 0.10 
Voluntary Health Card Scheme (VHCS) 0.08 
Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) 0.08 
State Enterprise (CSMBS) 0.06 
Social Security Scheme (SSS) 0.05 
Private insurance 0.15 
Uninsured 0.04 
Total 0.56 
Source: Adapted from National Statistic Office 1996, cited in Pitayarangsarit, 2004 
Note: The admission rate is the proportion of inpatients supported by each scheme. 
Before 2002, the government helped to finance the MWS, which provided targeted 
medical assistance to low income earners. In 1979, the government allocated 300 
million baht to the MWS, accounting for 7-8% of the finances allocated by the state for 
public healthcare (TDRI, 2004). The government later contributed more funds to the 
MWS and by 2000, the fund per capita was 403 baht per year. However, the amount 
received by healthcare units was reduced by 2.5% and the deducted amount was 
allocated to a fund for more costly treatments which was used to finance hospitals 
which provided these services. The salary costs, which accounted for half of the total 
costs, were not included in the MWS budgetary allocation. The total expenses of the 
MWS, which included other costs incurred from the implementation of the scheme, 
were 800 baht per capita per year less than the expenses of other healthcare insurance 
programmes, such as the SSS which had operational costs of 1,606 baht per capita per 
year and the CSMBS which had operational costs of 5,000 baht per capita per year 
(TDRI, 2004). 
As the budgetary allocation for the MWS for the poor was limited and did not reflect 
the real workloads and operational costs, the personnel of healthcare units viewed the 
poor as an unnecessary burden and therefore limited their access to healthcare services 
in terms of treatment and drug dispensing (TDRI, 2004). The shift in the budgetary 
process to a per capita allocation system improved the situation as primary healthcare 
units received more finance as a result of the per capita allocation based on the size of 
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the population under the responsibility of the unit. Formerly, the allocation of funds 
was based on the size of a hospital, and so primary healthcare units, which were smaller 
in size, received less funding than larger hospitals. 
The UC scheme incorporated the MWS and the VHCS. The poor, who were already 
covered by the MWS and thus benefited from free medical services, were exempt from 
the payment of the 30 baht fee when they joined the UC scheme. Those covered by the 
VHCS who could afford the 500 baht gold card had to pay the 30 baht fee. In the 2006 
fiscal year 24.97 million people were eligible for exemption from fee payment, whilst 
the remaining 22.57 million people who were also poor had to pay the fee. Less than 
half of all the poor therefore had to pay any fees and whilst the remainder paid only a 
nominal fee. 
In late 2006 the 30 baht charge was entirely removed, thus making the entire UC 
scheme a free service. Government compensation of 24.11 baht per capita was 
calculated as a required additional payment for hospitals as a result of the termination 
of the fee, and this raised the per capita allocation to hospitals under the scheme to 
1,899.69 baht. 
3.12.2 Obstacles faced by low income earners 
Before the introduction of the UC scheme, the government issued MWS cards which 
facilitated the poor’s access to healthcare services. There were, however, a number of 
poor individuals who were beyond the reach of the surveys through which the cards 
were allocated and thus had no access to healthcare. This problem was periodically 
investigated: a study jointly conducted by the MoPH and Mahidol University in 1988 
found that only 28% of the poor held the cards, whilst a study conducted by the 
National Institute of Developmental Administration (NIDA) on the issuing of card in 
14 provinces during 1990 – 1993 found 73% of the poor held cards, however only 54% 
of cardholders were deemed to actually be poor. The poor were finally accessing 
healthcare services but nearly half of the cards went to people who did not qualify for 
them (TDRI, 2004). 
In 2000 the Bureau of Policy and Strategy of the MoPH conducted the sixth two year 
study (1998-2000) on the issue of coverage and targeting of MWS cards within 12 
provinces (Table 3-14). The study found that the nationwide coverage was 16-17% on 
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average, which was considered to be very low and indicated that only a sixth of the 
poor held cards. With regards to the issue of targeting, the study found that only 28% of 
cardholders were actually poor and only 35% of the households holding the cards were 
actually poor according to the survey results on household incomes. This indicated that 
the majority of cardholders were not impoverished. Mistakes in targeting frequently 
occurred in the municipal areas, but there were no areas where the percentage of correct 
targeting was above 40%. This reflected the problem of correct targeting which was 
attributed to the difficulty in determining those who were really poor, not to mention 
the tremendous costs involved in surveying. As a result, a shift from a poverty targeting 
scheme to universal healthcare coverage was promoted (TDRI, 2004). 
Table 3-14  - Coverage and targeting of medical welfare scheme cards, 1998-2000 
 Nationwide Municipal areas 
Outside 
municipal 
areas 
Central 
region 
Northern 
region 
North-
eastern 
region 
Southern 
region 
Coverage 
(% households) 
17 20 16 11 39 19 10 
Right targeting 
(% households) 35 20 39 32 20 40 17 
Coverage on 
average(% 
population) 
16 22 15 11 17 18 11 
Right targeting 
(% population) 
28 14 32 29 28 31 15 
Source: Bureau of Policy and Strategy and Bureau of Provincial Public Health 12 provinces, 2000 
Note: row 1 denotes the number of poor households holding cards/the total number of 
poor households; row 2 denotes the number of poor households holding cards/the total 
number of households holding cards; row 3 denotes the number of poor holding 
cards/the total number of poor; and row 4 denotes the number of poor holding cards/all 
persons holding cards 
3.12.3 The coverage of the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
Between 1991 and 2010 healthcare insurance coverage in Thailand steadily increased 
from 33.50% to 99.36%, resulting from the implementation of the MWS, VHCS, 
CSMBS, and SSS. The introduction of the UC scheme brought about a step change that 
included the previously uninsured group which accounted for 29% of the population in 
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2001. The UC scheme enabled this previously uninsured group to gain access to the 
healthcare system 
Table 3-15  - Allocation per capita to hospitals participating in the UC scheme 2003 
Services Allocation 
per capita 
1. Outpatients 574 
2. Inpatients 303 
3. Health promotion and prevention 175 
4. Costly treatments 32 
5. Medical emergency services 10 
6. Investment costs for the acquisition of new equipment 83.4 
Total 1,202.4 
Source: NHSO, 2003 
When the financing for the UC scheme was set up, a portion of the fund was set aside 
for use in healthcare promotions which were aimed at benefitting all Thais, regardless 
of which healthcare related schemes they belonged to. This same portion was also used 
in the provision of emergency services for all Thais, again regardless of which 
healthcare related schemes they belonged to. After the enactment of the Medical 
Emergency Act, this funding allocation was incorporated into the National Institute of 
Medical Emergency, although the budgetary allocation for the UC scheme was not 
reduced. 
The National Health Security Act of 2002 requires the inclusion of the wages and 
salaries of relevant healthcare service personnel into the expenses of the UC scheme, 
with the amount to be deducted determined by the Budgetary Bureau and the 
government agencies involved. State-run healthcare units are eligible to claim the 
deducted amount from the comptroller general’s department in accordance with the 
annual Budget Act. 
The finance for the UC scheme included wages and salaries for the relevant healthcare 
service personnel in the state-run healthcare units, including those employed in the 
state-run hospitals affiliated to the MoPH and to other ministries. Wages and salaries 
were fixed costs deducted from the overall finance of the UC scheme by the 
comptroller general’s department in accordance with the agreement between the MoPH 
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and the NHSO. The remaining portion of the finance was allocated to various funds for 
the provision of medical services to the people covered by the UC scheme. 
3.12.4 Public access to treatment and disease prevention services 
Those covered by the UC scheme had easier access to treatment services as well as 
disease prevention services, as they could notify the authorities at their district office or 
hospitals in their neighbourhood that they were registered as participants in the scheme 
of their intention to exercise their right to access medical services. Participants were 
allowed to change their healthcare units where they sought treatment no more than 
twice per year. In case of an emergency, they were eligible for hospitalisation in the 
nearest hospital, which might either be state-run or private before being transferred to 
another hospital accredited to the UC scheme. The NHSO was responsible for the 
payment of all service fees. 
The fund for healthcare promotion and disease prevention was allocated through the 
UC scheme to hospitals and local governments for the benefit of all Thais regardless of 
which healthcare insurance scheme they participated in, be it the MWS, CSMBS, SSS, 
or the UC scheme. 
• Treatment 
The number of inpatients and outpatients who used the UC scheme rose rapidly. In the 
early years, many of those who were eligible did not understand their entitlements and 
did not use the system. However, as time progressed the number of users for treatments 
and of services increased steadily; the outpatients rate of use of hospitals increased 
from 2.41 to 3.28 times per year between 2004 and 2010, whilst the inpatients rate of 
use of hospitals grew from 0.089 to 0.116 times per year (Table 3-16). 
Table 3-16  - Frequency of service use by those covered by the UC scheme 2004-1010 
Topic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Out- 
Patients 
Number (million) 112.49 111.62 114.76 119.29 128.76 147.60 153.41 
Average number of 
hospital visits 2.41 2.37 2.42 2.55 2.75 2.99 3.28 
In- 
Patients 
Number (million) 4.16 4.34 4.73 4.88 5.17 5.29 5.57 
Average number of 
hospital visits 0.089 0.092 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.112 0.116 
Source: Adapted from the annual report NHSO, 2010 
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Inpatients enjoyed easier access to specific treatments and the admission rate of 
hospitals specialising in cardiovascular increased from 198.32/100,000 in 2005 to 
269.60/100,000. The percentage of patients afflicted with heart circulatory problems at 
the level of St-elevation (STEMI) who received drugs used to dissolve congealed blood 
rose from 0.49 in 2005 to 9.88, 17.41 and 32.15 in 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively 
(NHSO, 2010). The access to treatment for other diseases is shown in Table 3-17. 
Table 3-17  - Treatment of specific diseases 2006-2010 
Diseases 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Kidney Target na na 400 7,727 9,521 
 output na na 972 10,875 16,509 
 % na na 243 140.74 173.39 
HIV AIDS 
First line drugs Target na 100,000 120,000 120,000 134,000 
 output na 74,130 103,800 111,196 134,382 
 % na 74.13 86.5 92.66 100.28 
Second line drugs 
(after treatment failure) 
Target na 8,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 
 output na na na 5,186 8,682 
 % na na na 103.72 217.05 
Tuberculosis (TB) Target na na na 60,000 60,000 
 output na na na 30,178 44,150 
 % na na na 50.30 73.58 
Cataract Target 17,800 80,000 33,000 35,000 50,000 
 output 73,210 105,139 97,563 98,236 114,933 
 % 411.29 131.42 97.56 98.24 114.93 
Haemophilia Target 1,500 700 576 620 926 
 output 483 718 889 927 1,039 
 % 32.20 102.57 134.70 149.52 112.02 
Leukaemia/Lymphoma Target na na na 1,326 1,457 
 output 1,079 1,831 1,448 1,466 1,252 
 %    110,56 85.93 
Diabetes (new patient) Target na na na 2,379,150 1,379,954 
 output na na na 1,363,375 1,363,375 
 % na na na 57.31 58.00 
Hypertension (new patient) Target na na na 1,939,003 2,107,741 
 output na na na 7,387,812 7,387,812 
 % na na na 26.25 28.53 
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Source: Adapted from the annual report NHSO, 2010 
Notes: na – not available 
• Targeting of people prone to specific diseases 
Metabolic diseases such as diabetes, high blood pressure, and obesity, stem from 
improper healthcare-related behaviour. These diseases tend to be chronic and thus pose 
a long-term healthcare problem for the country. Therefore, the National Health Security 
commission assigned the NHSO with the task of targeting all Thais aged over 15 years 
who were prone to these diseases with preventing them from developing. Between 
2008 and 2010 30,350,085 people out of the total number of 51,808,062 (58.58%) 
identified as being prone to metabolic diseases were specifically targeted (Table 3-18). 
The fund for supporting this task was derived from a portion of the per capital 
allocation used for healthcare promotion and disease prevention. This funding portion 
has steadily increased, and in 2011, the portion used in healthcare promotion and 
disease prevention was planned to increase to no less than 14% of the whole per capita 
allocation (NHSO, 2010). 
Table 3-18  - Number of people targeted as prone to metabolic diseases 2008-2010 
Topics 2008 2009 2010 
1. The number of people aged 15 or over belonging to all 
healthcare security schemes (CSMBS, SSS, UC) 50,900,905 51,054,752 51,808,062 
2. The number of those further screened 8,461,063 10,620,879 12,190,681 
3. Percentage of those further screened 16.62 20.80 23.53 
Source: NHSO, 2010 
The number of people prone to specific diseases increased between 2008 and 2010: 
those prone to diabetes increased from 6.43% to 14.3%; to cerebral thrombosis 
increased from 28.46% to 36.43%; whilst those prone to high blood pressure decreased 
from 45.31% to 43.09%; and to obesity from 40.06% to 30.25%. More details are 
provided in Table 3-19. 
Table 3-19 - The number of people targeted for metabolic diseases 2008-2010 
Fiscal 
years 
The Number 
of people 
targeted 
People prone to diseases 
Diabetes High blood pressure 
Cerebral 
thrombosis Obesity 
People % People % People % People % 
2008 8,584,900 551,985 6.43 3,890,032 45.31 2,433,130 28.46 3,439,018 40.06 
2009 10,620,879 671,931 6.33 3,936,258 37.06 2,413,857 22.73 5,195,769 48.92 
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Fiscal 
years 
The Number 
of people 
targeted 
People prone to diseases 
Diabetes High blood pressure 
Cerebral 
thrombosis Obesity 
People % People % People % People % 
2010 12,190,681 1,754,055 14.39 5,253,422 43.09 4,441,428 36.43 3,688,248 30.25 
Source: NHSO, 2010 
A systematic approach to data collection has contributed to the more accurate targeting 
of women prone to specific diseases. Table 3-20 shows the number of women prone to 
cervical and breast cancers during 2004-2009. 
Table 3-20  - Number of women targeted for cervical and breast cancers 2004 – 2009 
Targeting 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Cervical Cancer 1,333,748 1,656,705 1,841,173 1,801,371 1,903,368 1,793,464 
Breast Cancer 3,690,017 6,623,294 7,254,948 7,508,514 9,460,820 7,675,945 
Source: NHSO, 2010 
• The increase in benefits resulting from the 30 baht Scheme 
Successive governments have recognised the importance of improving the scheme’s 
coverage and service delivery. An important feature of this has been to enhance the 
accessibility of costly treatments. The National Health Security commission acts as the 
board of the NHSO, which in turn collects and analyses the data for use in decision 
making in order to increase the benefits of the scheme. 
The committee of 1March 2006 made the entire treatment of leukaemia and lymphatic 
cancer available, including all the stages from the filtering of patients to their treatment 
and rehabilitation after treatment. If the healthcare unit to which a patients is admitted 
is unable to provide the treatment then patients are to be transferred to other healthcare 
units with the capability to treat cancer. The treatment is patient-centred and the NHSO 
monitors the progress of the treatment to its conclusion and subsequent patient 
rehabilitation. In 2006, a network of tertiary Centres of Excellence were set up as 
centres to which appropriate patients could be transferred and 21 heart centres, 29 
cancer centres and 28 emergency accident centres have been established (NHSO, 
2010). 
Additional funding has also been provided for critical areas, in particular for services to 
AIDS patients, which has included the provision of drugs since 2006. The fund for the 
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treatment of AIDS was separated from the aggregate per capita allocation in 2007 and a 
cabinet resolution of 30 October 2007 also approved in principle the provision of 
services to patients with dysfunctional kidneys. The National Health Insurance 
commission, acting as the board of the National Institute of Health Insurance, proposed 
a resolution to commence the provision of a kidney transplantation service free of 
charge to old and new patients who were in a critical condition from 1 January 2008. A 
small allowance was also provided for treatments using Thai traditional medicines, and 
the per capita allocation for Thai traditional medicine services increased from 1 baht in 
2006 to 2 baht in 2010 and 6 baht in 2011. In 2009 the National Health Insurance 
commission also approved the use of the drugs Risperidone and Setraline for patients 
suffering from mental illnesses (NHSO, 2011). 
In 2009, the government sought to facilitate public access to healthcare services by 
introducing the use of a single card, and the original gold card was replaced by an all-
purpose identity card. The Ministry of the Interior was assigned to create smart cards 
containing not only basic information on individuals, but also their healthcare insurance 
scheme (NHSO, 2010). 
Between 2005 and 2010 the types of treatments covered by the UC scheme were 
expanded to include more expensive treatments such as those for heart disease and 
cancer, and also brain surgery (NHSO, 2010). The number of patients receiving heart 
surgery, brain surgery, a CT scan, physical therapy and rehabilitation has increased. 
The percentage of patients undergoing heart surgery due to ischaemic heart disease has 
increased from 3.81 in 2005 to 10.29 in 2010, whilst the percentage of stroke patients 
receiving CT scans has increased from 27.73 in 2005 to 64.78 in 2010 (NHSO, 2010). 
The number of cancer patients having access to treatment has increased from 150.15 
per 100,000 people in 2005 to 193.85 per 100,000 people in 2010. Outpatients 
receiving chemotherapy has increased from 6,047 to 25,214, an increase of 316.97%, 
and the number of times patients underwent chemotherapy increased from 21,846 in 
2005 to 105,275 in 2010, an increase of 381.90%. 
• Increased access to necessary healthcare services 
A survey of households conducted by the National Statistical Office and the 
International Health Planning and Policy Organisation (IHPP) in 2010 found that Thais 
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whose healthcare needs were unmet were small in number. However, the UC 
population was more likely to face difficulty in accessing basic healthcare services than 
those individuals covered by the CSMBS and SSS. It was reported that the needs of 
0.4% of outpatients and 1.4% of inpatients were unmet needs due to them having no 
time to see doctors, being unconfident regarding treatment, and facing travelling 
difficulties, as shown in Table 3-21. 
Table 3-21  - Unmet needs for inpatient and outpatient care, 2010 
Prevalence of unmet need, national average 
Inpatient (%) Outpatient (%) 
1.44 0.40 
CSMBS 0.80 0.26 
SSS 0.98 0.20 
UCS 1.61 0.45 
Reason for unmet need   
Too far to travel 13.6 17.4 
No time to seek care 24.3 17.2 
Cannot afford to pay for treatment 1.3 16.7 
No one to accompany them to hospital 3.5 9.6 
Not sure there is effective treatment 16.3 5.6 
No confidence, having bad impression of providers 5.3 2.3 
Cannot afford transportation fee 1.3 0.0 
Other reasons 34.4 31.3 
Total 100 100 
Source: Health System Research Institute (HSRI), 2012, cited from the analysis of the 4th wave of panel SES, 2010 
The percentages of outpatients and inpatients whose access to services was blocked due 
to their inability to afford services were 1.3 and 16.7 respectively, which was 
considered low in comparison to the figures obtained from the OECD countries. 
• The poor’s access to medical services 
The National Statistics Office reported an increased outpatient use of UC scheme 
services from 66% in 2006 to 80% in 2009, with in the north-east region population 
being more dependent on UC scheme services than their counterparts in other regions, 
whilst the UC scheme population in Bangkok was the least dependent. The use of 
inpatients UC scheme services rose from 18.4% in 2006 to 91% in 2009, and the 
population in the north and north-eastern regions were most dependent on these 
services, whilst those in Bangkok were the least dependent (Table 3-22). 
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Table 3-22  - The use of UC scheme services by region 2006-2007 and 2009 
Region 
2006 2007 2009 
Outpatient 
(%) 
Inpatient 
(%) 
Outpatient 
(%) 
Inpatient 
(%) 
Outpatient 
(%) 
Inpatient 
(%) 
Bangkok 40 44 57 61 64 76 
Central 58 79 58 85 78 91 
Northeast 72 88 68 94 84 92 
North 67 89 60 91 78 92 
South 60 82 57 85 80 91 
Total 66 84 62 90 80 91 
Source: Adapted from Health System of Thailand 2012, HRSI 2012 
Between 2004 and 2010 the number of users increased steadily, both for outpatients 
and inpatients. The rate of service use by an outpatient in 2004 was 2.41 but in 2010 the 
figure was 3.22. Similarly, the rate of service use by an inpatient was 0.089 times per 
year in 2004 and increased to 0.111 in 2011 (Table 3-23). 
Table 3-23 - Service use of participants in the UC scheme 2004-2011 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Out 
patients 
The number of times of 
service using (million) 112.49 111.62 114.76 119.29 128.76 147.60 153.41 153.81 
Rate 2.41 2.37 2.42 2.55 2.75 2.99 3.22 3.23 
In 
patients 
The number of times of 
service using (million) 4.16 4.34 4.73 4.88 5.17 5.29 5.57 5.34 
Rate 0.089 0.092 0.100 0.105 0.1104 0.112 0.116 0.111 
Source: NHSO, 2011 
Compliance rates of the use of UC scheme services during 2003-2007 and 2009 were 
also found to be higher. The figures for outpatients went up from 75.95 in 2003 to 
79.56 in 2009, (Table 3-24) whilst the figures for in patients went up from 79.81 to 
90.63 in the same period (Table 3-25), with the use of services provided by hospitals 
run by medical schools, state-run hospitals not affiliated to the MoPH, and private 
clinics and hospitals.   
Table 3-24  - Compliance rates of use of UC scheme services by outpatients 2003-2007 and 2009 
Year Health stations 
Community 
hospitals 
Central and 
General 
hospitals 
Hospitals 
run by 
medical 
schools 
State-run 
hospitals not 
affiliated to 
the MoPH 
Private 
clinics 
Private 
hospitals Others Average 
2003 98.09 98.33 93.05 51.51 66.83 1.76 36.34 25.84 75.95 
2004 96.22 97.06 92.64 29.57 71.57 0.84 31.54 14.91 71.36 
2005 98.47 98.27 93.78 60.93 78.28 1.48 32.54 6.38 74.80 
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2006 98.85 97.61 93.32 56.72 62.67 0.86 20.63 1.62 65.56 
2007 98.43 98.33 95.84 51.98 86.99 1.44 29.32 2.25 61.87 
2009 96.59 98.20 92.22 76.03 94.59 4.36 37.16 19.86 79.56 
Source: NHSO, 2010 
Note: The rates were calculated from the number of time outpatients who comprised UC population used 
the UC services at the healthcare units participating in the UC scheme 
Table 3-25  - Compliance rates of use of UC scheme services by inpatients 2003-2007 and 2009 
Year Community hospitals 
Central and 
General 
hospitals 
Hospitals run 
by medical 
schools 
State-run 
hospitals not 
affiliated to 
the MoPH 
Private clinics Private hospitals Others Average 
2003 93.84 84.03 35.68 69.50 7.69 17.04 23.33 79.81 
2004 92.22 89.62 61.96 60.17 16.05 13.08 83.84 82.33 
2005 92.52 90.10 59.62 67.05 10.97 14.84 30.86 83.28 
2006 93.45 89.69 75.00 76.64 27.07 19.45 13.13 84.02 
2007 96.66 95.46 81.25 86.49 16.55 32.28 - 89.71 
2009 97.56 95.19 86.92 93.17 45.34 70.23 - 90.63 
Source: NHSO, 2010 
 
3.13 Impact of the UC Scheme 
3.13.1 Lessening of poverty 
After the introduction of the UC scheme in 2002, the healthcare expenses of households 
steadily decreased. Although the UC scheme was similar to the welfare scheme for the 
poor in terms of benefits, it received much more finance from the state. This support by 
the state contributed to the decrease in households’ healthcare expenses. Health 
spending of the poorest households (Quintile 1) decreased from 6.8% of their total 
spending in 1996 to 2.9% in 2009, whilst healthcare spending in middle-income 
households (Quintile 5) as show in figure 3-9 also decreased from 6.1% of their total 
spending to 4.7%. Thus, it can be said that the introduction of the UC scheme brought 
about a decreased in the number of households going bankrupt because their high 
expenditure on healthcare exceeded 10% of their total expenditure calculated to have 
prevented 291,840 households from healthcare impoverishment during 2004-2009 as 
shown in Figure 3-10 
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Figure 3-9 - Incidence of catastrophic healthcare expenditure by wealth quintile, 1996-2009 
Source: HSRI, 2012 An independent assessment of the first 10 years (2001-2010) 
Note: Catastrophic healthcare expenditure refers to household spending on healthcare >10% of the total household 
consumption expenditure. 
 
More benefits have been added to the UC scheme: since 2003 anti-HIV drugs have 
been made available, and since 2008 kidney treatment services have been provided, 
including haemodialysis, peritoneal dialysis, and kidney transplantation. Entitlement to 
such services offered by the UC scheme has played a vital role in decreasing the 
number of households falling below the poverty line because of their healthcare 
expenses (Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien and Prakongsai, 2011).  
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Figure 3-10 - Number of households prevented from healthcare impoverishment 1996 - 2009 
 
Source: HSRI, 2012 An independent assessment of the first 10 years (2001-2010) 
The number of households suffering from bankruptcy which is attributable to 
healthcare expenses decreased from 5.97% in 1996 to 3.29% in 2009, especially in the 
poorest north-eastern region of the country, where the number of households suffering 
from healthcare impoverishment decreased from 3.4% in 1996 to 2.3-2.4% in 2002 and 
to 0.8% in 2009 (HSRI, 2012). 
3.14 Conclusions 
This chapter has described the evolution of the Thai healthcare systems, from a 
collection of six schemes to the current three, CSMBS, SSA and the UC scheme. At the 
same time, healthcare coverage under these schemes has increased from around 75% to 
99% of the total population. However, there are disparities in the benefits offered by 
these schemes, with the CSMBS offering the most and the SSS the least, even though 
the three schemes share the same healthcare-related resources and personnel. Many 
hospitals participate in multiple schemes, and it is highly probable that the same doctors 
and nurses have alternately worked for the three schemes. In private hospitals the same 
staff may also share the treatment of private fee paying and insurance patients. 
Most of the poor depend on the services of local healthcare stations, whilst most of the 
rich use the services of private hospitals which are much better equipped. Meanwhile, a 
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proportion of the healthcare-related resources is diverted to foreign patients, who fulfil 
the purpose of the policy aimed at making Thailand the medical hub of Asia. The 
presence of the UC scheme enhances the poor’s access to healthcare services, lowers 
their expenses on healthcare and thus renders them less prone to the risk of bankruptcy 
due to high spending on healthcare, although problems of increased workload, shortage 
of doctors, and the private hospitals’ opting out of the scheme have arisen. 
Insufficiency in the budgetary allocation has stemmed from increased hospitalisation 
and as a result of the allocation of funds on the service fee rates of 1996, especially in 
the case of inpatients. 
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Chapter 4. Politics and the 30 baht Health Care 
Scheme 
This chapter features the background of the political economy and healthcare system in 
Thailand and the role of political actors in pressuring for the formulation and 
implementation of the 30 baht scheme, as well as the impacts of the scheme’s 
implementation. 
4.1 The political climate 
4.1.1 Social, economic, and political context 
Thailand is a democratised country, with a constitutional monarchy. Its population was 
estimated in 2001 to be 62 million, of which 35% lived in urban areas. Thailand is 
considered a lower middle-income country. The Thai political system was transformed 
from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy in 1932, and democratisation 
of the country came after the demise of military dictatorship during the 1970s and 
1980s. There are three main groups which have dominated the political elite, namely 
the aristocrats, bureaucrats, and the army, and they relied on businessman for their 
financial support. 
After the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand was mostly under the rule 
of military junta until 1973 when a popular uprising brought down the military junta. 
From 1973 business interests gradually took control of government. Elections held 
consecutively helped business interests tighten their grips on the government and they 
finally gained domination over the bureaucrats and the military. However, their corrupt 
behaviour provided the pretext for the military to stage a coup d’état in 1991 with the 
support of the middle class. Later, the middle class realised that their prosperity was 
adversely affected by the coup, and made their successful move to overthrow the 
military junta in May 1992. 
After the 1992 uprising, the whole society reached the unanimous agreement on great 
reform. The committee overseeing the reform effort was set up in 1995. The result of 
the operation of the committee was the 1997 constitution which sought to establish a 
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strong government in Thailand and to empower the general public and civil society. 
These made their move to introduce universal healthcare coverage into Thailand. 
In the wake of 1997 economic crisis caused by monetary liberalisation policy, 
nationalist fervour arose among the middle-class opposed to the privatisation of state 
enterprise vital to public interests, and Thaksin capitalised on such nationalist fervour 
to increase his popularity. 
The economic condition prior to the rise of populism that spurred the introduction of 
the UC scheme into Thailand was summarised by Pitayaransarit and Jongudomsuk 
(2004): 
‘Thailand’s economy has developed from an agrarian economy to an industrial-
based economy. It grew by leaps and bounds after 1985, with Thailand opening 
its door to welcome foreign investments. The economic growth brought with it 
increased demands for healthcare services, and more private hospitals were built 
in response to the market support policy of the Bureau of Investment (BOI). 
However, with the economic burst in 1997, the Thai economy contracted by 
10.5% in 1998. The major causes of the economic crisis were attributed to 
short-term foreign debts, private-sector investment in non-productive business 
like in the real estate inefficient production structures, foreign-capital 
dependency, monetary liberalisation policy without an effective monitoring and 
inspection system, and insufficiency of public sector management. To maintain 
its overall economic stability, Thailand adopted a manage-float-currency-
exchange system in 1997 and requested financial and technical assistance from 
the International Monetary Fund on 14 August 1997. The economic crisis had 
immense social repercussion on unemployment, under-employment, household 
income contraction, changing expenditure patterns, and child abandonment. The 
crisis reduced about one million people to poverty, with 54% of these people 
being ultra-poor. Household healthcare expenditure reduced by 24% in real 
time. Self-medication as preferred to institutional healthcare, especially in 
poorer households, private hospitals were in debt as their services were 
obviously not much needed’. 
The government in 1995 appointed a committee to consider political reform, and this 
sparked the process of constitution-drafting, a series of public hearings, and the 
promulgation of 1997 constitution, which was accelerated by the economic crisis in 
July 1997. The 1997 constitution or the ‘People’s Constitution’ reduced the king’s 
parliamentary control over the appointment of the senate, created direct election of 
members of the senate, and increased political parties’ power over parliament by 
election of members of parliament on a party-list basis. The electoral rules were also 
changed to prevent ‘vote buying’ and other irregularities. Moreover, the duty of 
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inspecting political parties was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to an 
independent election commission. 
By doing away with the bureaucratic monopoly on policy making, the 1997 
constitution also increased civilian power or public participation in decision-making in 
matters relating to human rights. The constitution therefore encouraged a subsequent 
movement within civil society to propose new healthcare laws (Phongpaichit, 2004). 
Although the 1991 constitution had addressed the right of citizens to access healthcare 
and the poor to free healthcare services, the 1997 constitution affirmed the right by 
adding the principle of equity in healthcare access together with defining the role of 
both private and public sectors in providing healthcare services (Section 52 of the 
constitution). The access to healthcare services for all as also started in the 8th National 
Socio-economic Development Plan (1997-2001). Due to the economic downturn and 
lack of political support, however, there was no follow-up with an action plan 
(Pitayaransasarit, 2004). 
Following the crisis, Thailand began to implement measures for reform of the financial 
sector, corporate governance, security of national and international borrowing, and 
policies to motivate banks and other business firms to move towards their competitive 
frontiers. The resilience of the Thai economy facilitated its quick economic recovery 
and its poverty began to improve. After contracting by 10.5% in 1998, Thailand’s 
economy grew by 4.4% in 1999 and 4.6% in 2000, and remained positive at 1.9% in 
2001 in spite of the global economic slowdown. As a reaction to the crisis and spurred 
by the international reform trend, Thailand carried out many reforms in the public 
sector before 2001, including changes recommended by donor countries. 
4.1.2 The economic crisis and Thaksin’s ascendancy 
The economic crisis of 1997 was a turning point in modern Thai history. Those in the 
agricultural sector and outside the formal sector of economic activities, though not 
responsible for the crisis, were nevertheless severely and adversely affected by it as 
they were either laid off or compelled to accept lower wages. Their resulting frustration 
turned to political anger and led to a wave of demonstrations demanding that the 
government address the debt problem. At the height of this widespread dissatisfaction, 
Thaksin Shinawatra formed his political party and planned to attain the premiership, 
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hoping to exploit the prevailing public sentiment to realise his ambition. During the five 
years of his first tenure, he relied on his strong leadership and charisma, whilst 
promoting his populist political platform. Thaksin declared a war against poverty which 
was immediately extremely popular in the dire economic circumstances of the time. A 
number of welfarist and populist projects were initiated, such as the universal 
healthcare insurance scheme, which was known as ‘30 baht cures all illnesses’, housing 
projects for the poor, as well as schemes aimed at providing funding for villages and 
computers in all communities. These schemes brought hope to a large number of 
people, especially those in the large informal sector in Thailand, outside the formal 
domain of registered economic activities, and he understood the importance of these 
people in contributing to the consolidation of his political power. This awareness was 
gained after successfully pleading for their support in his defence against the various 
legal accusations that began to emerge very early on in his premiership, such as 
covering up his stockholdings. Thaksin was acquitted on the grounds that his misdeed 
was committed due to his unintended carelessness. Far from damaging him, his appeal 
to the poor, and the successful outcome that was achieved, led to a further surge in his 
popularity rating, which rose from 30% to 70%. His soaring popularity in turn allowed 
him to take a leading role in instituting populist schemes within Thailand that would 
further consolidate his power (Phongphaichit, 2004). 
4.1.3 Economic crisis and the change in the balance of political power in 
Thailand 
The 1997 economic crisis and the advent of the popularly approved constitution in the 
same year were significant milestones in Thailand’s political economy as these events 
eventually led to a change in the balance of political power within the country. The 
paradox was that on the one hand there was a shift towards a more people-oriented and 
populist set of strategies, but at the same time a narrower range of business interests 
gained control over the state compared to the earlier period in the country’s history. 
One of Thailand’s biggest businessmen, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was once one of 
many businessmen receiving the patronage of the state, became prime minister and 
gained direct control over the state. Thaksin’s political strategy was to consolidate his 
power by offering a wide range of benefits to the large constituency of the relatively 
poor, and using the political power he thus acquired to capture a growing range of 
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benefits for his own business interests. Thaksin’s strategy conspicuously weakened the 
bureaucracy and other established political interests as the rule of law was manipulated 
to achieve his political and economic goals. 
An important result of this strategy was to alienate a broad alliance of the urban middle 
classes and business interests, whilst consolidating a coalition of the lower middle 
classes and the poor in support of the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT). The latter emerged as 
a virtually undefeatable coalition of interests in several subsequent elections. This 
resulted in the lasting political standoff between the ‘Reds’ (the supporters of Thaksin’s 
Thai Rak Thai Party) and the ‘Yellows’ (the broad coalition of the middle classes and 
business interests appealing to traditional values and the king) who opposed Thaksin in 
increasingly confrontational politics in the 2000s (Phongphaichit, 2003). 
The 1997 constitution contributed to the crisis by allowing a centralisation of power in 
the hands of the prime minister. Article 180 of the 1997 constitution prohibited the 
legislature from taking part in budgetary allocations, but a prohibition of the same 
nature was not applied to the executive, and as a result budgetary allocation passed 
entirely into the hands of the executive. This gave those who controlled the executive 
an advantage over other political and bureaucratic interests. It also made it easier for 
the executive to make bureaucrats compliant to their demands as the executive 
controlled political resources. Compared to the power that Thai bureaucrats had 
traditionally wielded in making decisions about public resource allocation, bureaucrats 
under Thaksin had to be either highly compliant with the agenda of the executive or 
risk becoming individually redundant. 
Academics have highlighted that the economic depression of 1997 contributed to 
Thaksin Shinawatra’s rise to power as people expected him to resolve in a drastic and 
effective manner the economic problems that the previous administration had failed to 
deal with. The landslide victory for the party in the general election held on 6 January 
2001 reflected Thaksin’s immense popularity and helped consolidate his power base 
during the period marked by the abatement of the economic crisis. Thaksin’s landslide 
victory was unprecedented in Thai history, and it was the first time that a political party 
formed ostensibly by big business interests won the majority of parliamentary seats in 
the country. However, Thaksin was no ordinary businessmen. His financial power came 
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from his telecommunication firm which had been granted concessions by the state. This 
was a large, highly valued firm, which possessed huge growth potential. However, the 
ethos of the firm was not on providing reasonably priced services with good quality, 
but rather on accumulating huge profits using its monopoly power (Phongpaichit and 
Baker, 2004). 
Thaksin proved by his subsequent actions that he was not even interested in 
maintaining his stake in the high-profit telecommunication business. Rather, he sought 
to make quick profits even if it meant selling his shares and leveraging the money to 
acquire more political power. Whilst Thailand was used to businessmen acquiring and 
using political power to further their business interests, Thaksin was a new type of 
businessmen who used his businesses to acquire political power for its own sake. The 
political power was then used to raise more money through ‘business’ ventures that 
were often opportunistic and speculative rather than productive, but the aim was always 
to consolidate his hold on power (Khan, 2012). This strategy proved not only to be 
extremely successful as a political strategy, it also effectively locked out Thailand’s 
traditional elites in business and the bureaucracy because they were not able to come up 
with any counter political strategy that could defeat Thaksin’s party in elections. The 
universal healthcare plan was thus not just a highly desirable welfare programme that 
served a genuine need in society, it was also an important part of a political strategy of 
a politician who played a problematic part in Thailand’s history at the critical juncture 
after the financial crisis of 1997. This dual character of the strategy, and the difference 
between its political motivation and its welfarist content, is important to understand 
because it had an impact on the care taken in its design and the steps taken to ensure its 
financial viability.  
The coincidence of Thaksin’s rise to power and his immense popularity with the 
executive being granted further powers by the constitution placed Thaksin in a position 
which enabled him to come up with policies, rules, and regulations which were 
favourable for the protection and consolidation of his political and financial power 
whilst meeting with minimal resistance. Political economists in Thailand described the 
behaviour of politicians who exercised their financial ‘clout’ to seize control of the 
state in order to serve their purpose of profit seeking as ‘money politics’. The profits of 
such politicians are derived from their position which authorises them to control and 
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distribute an ‘economic rent’, which may be in the form of a concession, subsidy or 
special privilege, and their control of this ‘economic rent’ is more profitable than their 
involvement in productive activities in a competitive market (Phongpaichit, 2005). 
4.1.4 The people in the informal sector: major voters 
The people employed in the non-industrial sectors account for most of Thailand’s 
employment. However, the incomes or wages in the industrial sector are generally 
higher than those in agriculture and most services, and many poor people find industrial 
employment relatively attractive. However, employment growth in the industrial sector 
is limited as Thailand is a middle income country and has already moved rapidly 
towards the mechanisation and computerisation of its industrial sector. As a result, the 
industrial sector has not been able to absorb the surplus labour from the agricultural 
sector and this is one of the primary causes of persistent poverty in some important 
parts of the country. The surplus population in agriculture has instead moved to urban 
areas and become involved in a variety of unregistered informal economic activities, 
such as street vendors, employees of small unregistered enterprises, garbage collectors, 
and domestic servants, not to mention their employment in illegal businesses, and this 
group of the informally employed accounts for 26% of the country’s total workforce 
(Phongpaichit, 2003). Thus, the pockets of poverty in agriculture and in some segments 
of the low-paid informal service sector activities in the cities are deeply connected. 
Moreover, workers in agriculture and the informal service sector are often 
interchangeable and there is a lot of seasonal movement from one sector to another. 
On the positive side, the incomes that poor people can earn in informal service sector 
activities in urban areas helps to support many families remaining in the agricultural 
sector who would otherwise have been more impoverished. On the negative side, this 
pattern of economic activity means that the poor are often difficult to identify, they 
move between locations, and their places of employment are not registered, making the 
delivery of healthcare and other services to the poor much more difficult. In particular 
the two sectors in which the poor are concentrated are beyond the jurisdiction of the 
formal regulations covering economic activities and labour affairs, and they fail to 
benefit from the laws on labour protection and social welfare. In total, this group 
constitutes two thirds of the country’s entire workforce (Phongphaichit, 2005), and to a 
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political strategist, their presence has a large political significance, as they comprise the 
largest number of voters yet enjoy the least protection from the state in terms of their 
welfare. 
4.2 Formulation of the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
The proposition to consider the introduction of a universal healthcare insurance in 
Thailand was first mooted more than 10 years before the enactment of the National 
Health Insurance Act in 2002. The motivation originally was not political, but rather 
based on the idea of healthcare insurance for all as a way of enhancing social justice. 
All the seminars organised by the Institute for Public Health Research and their project 
on healthcare service reforms held during 1999 and 2000 featured a discussion on 
healthcare insurance. Whilst the National Health Insurance Act was being drafted in 
2000, the Office of Health System Reform asked Prof. Dr Ammar Siamwalla to oversee 
the preparation of a report entitled A Proposal for a Health Insurance for All. The 
working committee chaired by Prof. Dr Siamwalla completed a draft of the report in 
early 2001 and the Minister of Public Health, who acted as the supervisor of the project 
during its first year, always referred to the draft as the ‘bible for the 30 baht 
programme’ (TDRI, 2002). 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) proposed their own version of the National 
Health Insurance Act shortly before the government’s version of the Act was issued. 
The draft proposed by NGOs was for an act by the people and for the people. 
Unfortunately, an examination of the identity of the people signing their names to this 
proposal (apparently for authentication) was undertaken for eight months but was never 
completed (Nitayarumphong, 2003). Whilst this alternative version of the act was being 
proposed by the NGOs, Thaksin seized the opportunity to introduce the government 
version of the act to complete the legislative process allowing it to be enacted quickly 
and enabling him to use the act to enhance his popularity. During the earlier stages of 
the programme’s implementation, and in accordance with the act, the government 
launched a public relations campaign in order to increase public understanding of the 
programme. The programme was heavily publicised and then informally renamed as 
the ‘Just 30 baht for the treatment of all illnesses programme’ to increase public 
awareness. During the first stage of its implementation, pilot projects were organised to 
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cover six provinces, the second stage of the programme implementation saw the 
extension of the operational sphere to include more than 15 provinces, and the 
programme was introduced in all provinces during the third stage of its implementation. 
Bangkok was the last province to be included in the programme’s operational sphere 
but from beginning to end it took only one year for the government to achieve the 
nationwide implementation of the programme. 
Although the programme in its broad principles was a highly desirable shift in the Thai 
healthcare system, the early stages of its implementation proved daunting. The 
implementation and management of the programme faced a number of difficulties, and 
the initial results were very mixed. Nevertheless, the intrinsic improvements in public 
welfare that were achieved ensured that despite the financial and implementation 
difficulties, the programme became more and more institutionalised over time, even 
when the financial problems were only being addressed on an ad hoc basis. Its 
implementation was also prioritised by successive governments formed over the next 
ten years, as surveys of ordinary people consistently showed that the majority were 
highly satisfied with the project and the benefits they were getting (NESDB, 2007). 
Detractors of the programme argued that its design was highly political in nature and 
that the ruling politicians had initiated the programme largely to achieve political 
popularity and retain power rather than for the welfarist purpose of guaranteeing the 
welfare of the masses through access to almost free healthcare services. The latter 
would be the case if the government had undertaken a proper estimation of the 
financing costs and designed the programme to stay within these limits. The relatively 
vague guidelines with which the programme was initiated were also viewed as 
detrimental to the country’s budget, as the funds set aside for the programme were not 
sufficient to meet the demands of its implementation. Ad hoc transfers from sources 
such as the Social Security Fund and the Medicare Fund for bureaucrats were perceived 
to be likely from the very outset if the programme was to be financed. The existence of 
the programme brought about tension and conflict, with many groups opposing the 
programme. Compared to earlier programmes with the same objective, this one was 
subject to the harshest criticism; meanwhile, the number of people accessing the 
programme grew rapidly due to the easier access to healthcare services and a politically 
motivated public relations campaign. This resulted in stress among healthcare 
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personnel as people developed high expectations of their performance 
(Nitayarumphong, 2003). 
Though the programme did not originate from the Thai Rak Thai Party’s think tank, its 
adoption and subsequent implementation had a large impact on the Thai public 
healthcare system which was unprecedented over the last 30 years. The ‘30 baht cures 
all illness programme’ formally guaranteed the accessibility of healthcare services to 
all, yet among the middle classes there was concern over the quality of the services 
provided and the possibility of dilution of the services the middle classes were already 
used to through various insurance schemes. This group did not constitute a major vote 
bank for the Thai Rak Thai Party, and their concerns were therefore of lesser 
significance for the ruling party. The middle class also rightly feared that the expansion 
of free healthcare services to the poor would sooner or later also lead to higher taxation 
for those who could be taxed. 
4.3 The ‘30 baht cures all illness programme’ and the Thai Rak Thai 
party 
The TRT party won its landslide victory in the 2001 general election because of the 
party’s promise to implement its policies. The party leader, Thaksin Shinawatra, on 
becoming prime minister of Thailand, announced at a press conference on election day, 
6 July 2001, that his Party was committed to implement its policies as promised. 
Furthermore, since his party was entrusted by the people to set up the government, the 
party’s policies were the government’s policies, and therefore ‘if the party cannot keep 
its promise, it would betray the electorate’s trust‘. As UC policy had been part of TRT 
party’s campaign under the slogan of ’Sam sib baht rak sa thuk rok’ (‘30 baht treating 
all diseases’), the ‘30 baht’ policy became one of the government’s top priority policies 
to be implemented after the election. 
Health policies of the TRT party announced on 26 March 2000 were aimed: 
1. To provide healthcare insurance for 62 million people according to the need 
and households contribute according to ability to pay. 
2. To provide choices for people to register with healthcare provider from both 
public and private sectors. The healthcare provider will receive an adequate 
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budget according to the number of registered population in order to shift the 
healthcare services authorities back to the citizens. 
3. To provide quality hospitals with geographic accessibilities. 
4. To support healthcare promotion in children, adolescents, adults and the 
elderly as national priorities. 
5. To provide disease prevention by healthcare education and universal 
coverage of vaccination. 
6. To integrate medical strategy, social strategy, and moral strategy to reduce 
the number of AIDS patients. 
7. To set the national accident prevention plan to educate people, encourage 
private and public collaboration, and prevent and cope with accidents. 
8. To use all types of mass communication to increase healthcare knowledge 
and healthcare skills of people. 
Source: TRTP (2000).The new profile of the public healthcare services. Policy declaration to the 
parliament by Thaksin Shinawatra government on 26 February 2001 
The universal coverage of healthcare policy was one of nine high priority policies. The 
universal coverage of healthcare policy aimed to reduce the national healthcare 
expenditures with 30 baht out-of-pocket per episode and provide accessible and 
equitable quality healthcare services. Health policy under a social sector policy aimed 
to implement healthcare system reform by establishing a National Health Security Fund 
through the legislation of National Health Security Act. 
The ‘30 baht cure all illnesses programme’ was presented to the public by the Thai Rak 
Thai party in late 2000 prior to the general election, and was speedily implemented 
when the party won the general election in early 2001. It was mainly implemented by 
the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), and the National Health Insurance for All Act of 
2002 provided the legal basis for the project. This was not the only social welfare 
programme in Thailand as there were two other related healthcare programmes, one 
covering bureaucrats and employees of state enterprises, and a second providing some 
healthcare insurance as part of the social security net covering workers in the private 
sector. The 30 baht Scheme was filling the gap left by these other two programmes, as 
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it covered those who were not entitled to the benefits from these two programmes. 
During the earlier stages of the 30 baht scheme the politicians involved in the project 
always referred to the project as the ‘filling the gap programme’ (TDRI, 2002). 
Although the programme was promoted by the Thai Rak Thai party, the idea of a 
national healthcare scheme covering all individuals was not a new one in Thai policy 
discussions and debates. The contribution of the Thai Rak Thai party was the 
introduction of the nominal figure of 30 baht that a patient was required to pay on the 
initiation of a course of treatment, and that would cover the full treatment. As 30 baht 
was less than one dollar, this was in effect making healthcare services virtually free for 
the poor. In fact, half of the people entitled to the benefits of this programme were not 
required to pay anything at all, as they have already been exempted from payment by a 
law establishing free healthcare as part of the welfare programmes for the old, the 
disabled, and children which existed prior to the introduction of the 30 baht scheme 
(TDRI, 2002). 
4.4 Ideology of the UC scheme 
The principles of Universal Healthcare Coverage were: 
1. Equity has to do with equal access to standardised service fair and progressive 
distribution of cost burden. 
2. Efficiency concerns the most economical use of resources. The role of primary 
care networks is stressed as their operation costs are lowest. 
3. Choice has to do with the opportunity enjoyed by people to have their access to 
wide variety of services including the ones provided by the private sector. 
4. Health for all that is achieved through healthcare promotion and disease 
prevention campaigns. 
The content of the UC policy underpinned by the equity principle was appealing to the 
public, because it identified the existing healthcare access problems, reflected social 
values, and upheld the government’s ideology. The UC policy was chosen by TRT 
party because it had a potential to win votes and gain popularity. The UC policy content 
was in line with Thai people’s constitution right to healthcare services. 
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The ideology behind the UC policy may be said to be egalitarianism or equal access to 
healthcare for all Thai citizens whose rights are enshrined in the 1997 constitution. The 
government therefore would resort to the general tax revenue to finance the UC 
scheme, which would also admit healthy competition within a ‘new’ public 
management by both public and private contracted healthcare providers. Because of 
Thailand’s liberalisation policy, private profit-making hospitals were also allowed to 
operate within the so-called free market. 
4.5 The actors 
4.5.1 Policy elites 
The policy elites in the UCS policy formulation process were the elected politicians, the 
prime minister, the minister of health, the minister of finance, the minister of labour 
and social welfare, the minister of commerce, the minister of interior, and the minister 
of education. The top civil servants participated in the formulation process were 
permanent secretary of the MoPH, the secretary general of economic and social 
development board, the director general of the comptroller general’s department, and 
the secretary general of the civil servant commission. 
4.5.2 Prime minister 
The prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra won the 2001 election with a majority of seats 
in the parliament. The reason for his victory was support from the middle-class and the 
rural people. The middle-class was confident in him in bringing his business acumen to 
bear in running the country’s economy, and his political platform appealed to the rural 
people with his promise of remedial measure to help farmers and villages. He was also 
a change-agent bringing about reforms in the healthcare system with the UC scheme. 
With his learning for business-based politicians’ power, the decline in bureaucratic 
power was inevitable (Pitayarangsarit, 2004). However, it is noted by scholars that the 
scheme provided benefits to him. 
‘….After the start of UCS, Thaksin managed to buy a large number of the 
stocks of large private hospitals. Only large hospitals were his objects of 
acquisition. X who acted as Thaksin’s proxy formed BGS Group managed to 
acquire 32 hospitals through the countries under the brands of Bangkok, 
Smitivej, BNH, Payathai, and Paolo. BGH is the largest healthcare 
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conglomerate in ASEAN expecting to reap benefits from the AEC...’ (A 
scholar) 
‘…Thaksin, projects are good to the public but insincere. They are aimed at 
contributing to Thaksin’s popularity. As for 30 baht scheme, people seek to use 
the services offered by the scheme in their irresponsible way. Drunken people 
can come to the hospitals and ask for free service. People can come to hospitals 
at 2 a.m. asking for drugs after spending their nights at nightclubs. They used 
the services irresponsibly without the knowledge about the limit of the projects. 
Thaksin never educated people about this. People look upon Thaksin with 
gratitude. They can be likened to desert travellers who encounter cool water 
vendors, but the cool water sold by Thaksin is very expensive…’ (Doctor of a 
hospital) 
4.5.3 Bureaucrats 
The bureaucrats were dominated by medical doctors. UCS, a rationally based policy 
change, was suppressed to maintain the bureaucrats’ power over public healthcare 
through the centralised hierarchical structure. However, a few reformist bureaucrats 
played autonomous roles in healthcare service and financing research, and formed a 
strong body of national researchers who had long studied problems and alternatives in 
the healthcare sector. They had close relationships and strong capacity. Many graduated 
from the same medical school and most of them were trained in healthcare policy and 
financing, and had attended post-graduate universities abroad. In 2000, a number of 
researchers were commissioned by the Health Systems Research Institute (HSRI), an 
autonomous research institution under an executive board chaired by the Health 
Minister, to suggest alternatives to achieve UC. All alternatives suggested that UC 
would change the healthcare financial structure and change the role of the MoPH in the 
control of the budget for healthcare services. This role would be partially transferred to 
consumers’ hands, administered under a board which reported directly to either the 
health minister or the prime minister (Pitiyarangsarit, 2004). 
One particular health reformist, Dr Sanguan Nitayarumphong played a central role as a 
‘policy entrepreneur’ by pursuing UC for a long time and when he met the TRTP 
leader, he took advantage of the subsequent discussions to promote UCS. 
4.5.4 Civil groups. 
The 1997 constitution had increased civilian power in policy decision-making. Firstly, 
state control over the appointment of the upper house was replaced by direct elections 
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of senators representing civil society. Many non-governmental organisation 
representatives were elected as senators and voted in parliament for the public interest. 
Secondly, the constitution eliminated the bureaucracy’s monopoly over public policy 
formulation in favour of public participation. Moreover, civilians are eligible to 
propose a law regarding rights. Thirdly, it transfers the bureaucracy’s role of election 
administration to an independent election commission. 
Civil society in Thailand includes non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The 
development of NGOs started in the 1970s. The prototype was the Thailand Rural 
Reconstruction Foundation founded in 1969 which benefits the rural people. The 
foundation stood for development which benefits the rural people (Phongpaichit & 
Baker, 1995). In the UCS case, voices in support came from a communication network 
of those interested in UCS who received information from reformist bureaucrats, not 
from independent technocrats as in other social movements. 
4.5.5 Policy stakeholders 
UC policy stakeholders fall into six categories as follows: 
1. Political actors; 
2. Agencies in the public sector; 
3. Service providers; 
4. UC users; 
5. The NHSO; 
6. A number of organisations involved in peripheral ways. 
1. Political actors are the ones formulating national policy and approving financial 
allocation to the UC scheme. 
2. Agencies in the public sectors are responsible for implementing policy after 
financial allocation is approved, such as the budgetary office and audit general 
office. 
3. Service providers are the service units registered as service providers in the UC 
scheme. They include public hospitals affiliated or not to the Ministry of Public 
Health and private hospitals and clinics participating in the scheme. 
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4. Users are Thai citizens entitled to the benefits offered by the UC scheme. As for 
Thais who are entitled to the benefits from the social security scheme, they are 
entitled to the service related to healthcare promotion and disease prevention.  
5. Health Security commission formulated policy for NHSO. The commission is 
chaired by the minister of public health. 
6. Other agencies involved include: 
• The association of healthcare-related personnel who have a role in 
determining entitlements and the conditions related to the provision of 
services. They include the council of doctors, the council of nurses, the 
council of pharmacists, the council of dentists, and the private hospitals 
association. 
• Non-profit organisations such as the organisation working for the 
improvement of the welfare of youths, women, the elderly, the disabled, 
people with mental disorders, workers, peasants, and ethnic groups. 
4.6 Conflict of interests and impact of the policy 
Since the National Health Security Board (NHSB) comprised all the stakeholders, and 
the majority of its members were representatives of healthcare providers and healthcare 
professionals, there was a tendency to postpone or not to support decision that could 
put pressure on providers to improve efficiency, quality and responsiveness, especially 
on healthcare providers under the jurisdiction of the MoPH (Tangcharoensathien, 
2004). The power struggles between NGO representatives, the government ex-officio 
representatives, and the healthcare professionals were evident in NHSB meetings. The 
interviewed data from key informants showed as follows; 
‘...Many members of the board of the National Health Security commission are 
involved in conflicts of interests as they still hold their position in the non-
governmental organisations...‘. (Doctor of a hospital) 
‘...Local politicians used the UCS’s healthcare promotion fund to increase their 
own popularity. They lied to local people that they used their own money to 
support healthcare promotion projects...‘ (An officer of local healthcare office) 
‘...Many members of the board of the National Health Security commission also 
have their positions in the commission’s sub-committees, with some even 
having their positions in nine sub-committees...‘ (A politician) 
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‘…In Singapore, the doctors at the public hospital get good salaries at a similar 
rate to that of the private hospitals. They were prohibited to work for private 
hospitals. This provides the solution to the problem of the doctors at the private 
hospital sending their patients to use the facilities of public hospitals. Private 
hospitals were thus forced to invest in sophisticated equipment…’ (A scholar) 
4.6.1 Budgetary allocation and management 
The budgetary request for supporting the operation of the UC scheme was based upon 
an estimation of costs and was submitted each year to the cabinet. The budgetary 
allocation for the UC scheme in 2003, the first year of the scheme, was based on a 
calculation that allocated 1,202.20 baht per capita for that year. This estimation was 
based upon a breakdown of the likely service costs per capita dividend into outpatient 
services, inpatient services, healthcare promotion, emergency services, equipment 
costs, and an allowance for costly treatments. The financing required for the UC 
scheme was calculated by utilising the figure of 45,613 million people registered as 
participants in the scheme, which resulted in a budgetary allocation of 56,055.677 
million baht. 
4.6.2 Increased allocation of funds for the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme 
The funding for the UC scheme was increased according to the rate of inflation. In the 
fiscal year for 2011 the per capita allocation was increased to 2,546.48 baht covering 
47.996 million people, and Table 4-1 shows the different services funded. The 
increased per capita allocation from 1,308.50 baht in 2004 to 2,546.48 baht in 2011 
reflected not only inflation, but also the growing number of patients undergoing costly 
treatments as a result of heart-related ailments and various kinds of cancer. In addition, 
dentistry services for children and the latest dentistry technology were introduced in 
2011, in addition to an increase in the per capita allocation to the primary units of 11.24 
baht for the promotion of the role of these units. 
Table 4-1  - Allocation per capita 2003-2011 
Services 
Per capita 
(baht/Population) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total 1,308.50 1,396.30 1,659.20 1,899.69 2,100 2,202.00 2,401.33 2,546.48 
1. Outpatients (OP) 488.2 533.01 585.11 645.52 645.52 666.96 754.63 795.39 
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Services 
Per capita 
(baht/Population) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
2. Inpatients (IP) 
 OP+IP for community 
hospitals 
418.3 435.01 460.35 513.96 845.08 837.11 
72.25 
885.94 
72.25 
954.72 
3. Additional services in 
particular areas – desolate 
places and dangerous zones 
10 7.07 7 30 30 - - 64.09 
4. Accidents/Emergency 
treatment (AE) 
19.7 24.73 52.07 51.02 - - - - 
5.High cost treatments (HC) 66.3 99.48 190 209.56 - - - - 
(4+5). High cost 
treatments/Accidents/ 
Emergency treatment/ 
Specific diseases/ 
Indispensable drugs 
    145.26 179.48 194.34 209.45 
6.Emergency Medical 
Service(EMS) 
10 6 6 10 12 - - - 
7. Health promotion and 
disease prevention 
206 210 224.89 248.04 253.01 269.66 283.15 312.50 
8. Dentistry - - - - - -  2.25 
9. Medical rehabilitation - 4 4 4 4 5 8.08 12.00 
10. Traditional Thai 
medicine and alternative 
medicine 
- - - - 1 1 2 6.00 
11. Compensation for the 
lifting of 30 baht fee 
- - - 24.11 - - - - 
12. Depreciation in value 85 76.8 129.25 142.55 143.73 148.69 148.69 148.69 
13. Additional payment in 
proportion to the quality of 
service 
- - - 20 20 20 40 25.00 
14. Basic financial aid 
provided to users in 
accordance with Article 41 
5 0.2 0.53 0.53 Using the 
remaining 
finance 
1 Using the 
remaining 
finance 
2.68 
15. Basic financial aid 
provided to users 
- - - 0.4 0.4 0.85 0.78 0.97 
16. Fund for primary 
services 
- - - - - - 10.63 11.24 
17. Fund for tertiary services 
requiring specific expertise 
- - - - - - 0.84 1.50 
Source: Adapted from NHSO, 2011 
The National Health Security commission undertook the planning and the policy 
formation for the UC scheme. The policy formulated by the commission had an effect 
on the increases or decreases in budgetary allocation to the various funds supporting the 
operation of the UC scheme, which resulted in an increase in the rise of operational 
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costs of the scheme. The commission set up several sub-committees assigned with the 
task of determining an appropriate budget reflecting inflation and the increases in 
benefits for the people covered by the scheme. The focus of these sub-committees 
included strategic co-ordination, the development of services and benefits, and the 
development of fiscal planning. 
The funds allocated to the UC scheme were distributed to the service units under 
contract to the NHSO. Those service units which did not provide a particular service 
did not receive funding for it, for example, units with no Thai traditional medicine 
service were not provided with the funds to support a Thai traditional medicine service. 
The budgetary allocation was divided into the five funds in order to achieve efficiency 
and flexibility in the budgetary management, and the NHSO was able to demonstrate 
how the calculation for each fund had been performed based upon data related to the 
number of patients. In addition to the cost calculations based on the number of patients, 
the methods of treatment and the amount of the funds to be allocated were outlined. 
The budgetary allocation for the UC scheme in 2011 totalled 122,222.38 million baht in 
order to cover 47,996,600 million people. From this, 28,272.98 million baht was set 
aside for the payment of salaries to personnel and thus the fund was reduced to 
93,999.40 million baht. 
In addition to the per capita allocation, a fund of 7,058.499 million baht was set up to 
support the treatment of specific diseases. This fund was sub-divided into treatment for 
HIV, chronic dysfunctional kidneys, chronic diseases, and mental illness, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. Money from this fund was allocated to service units under contract to 
provide treatment for AIDS, diabetes, high blood pressure, dysfunctional kidneys, and 
mental illness to the UC scheme population. 
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Figure 4-1 - Budgetary allocation for the UC scheme 2011 
Budgetary Allocation for the U.C. Scheme in the 
Fiscal Year of 2011
631 
204 
3,227 2,998 
93,999 
HIV/AIDS Chronically Dysfundtional Kindneys
Chronic Diseases DM/HT Mental Illness
Per Capital Allocation
 
Source: Adapted from NHSO, 2010 
4.6.3 Increased funding in proportion to the increase in benefits 
Allocation per capita has been the practice for funding the UC scheme since 2002. The 
practice of budgetary allocation led to the establishment of five large funds that were 
then sub-divided into smaller funds was aimed at attaining transparency and efficiency 
in budgetary management. When making a request for a budgetary allocation, 
applicants were required to provide information related to the number of patients, 
method of treatment, and to specify the amount of needed. The fund for patients with 
dysfunctional kidneys and for AIDS patients were set up in this manner, whilst the 
budgetary allocation to healthcare units was based upon the assessment of their 
capacity to provide services, with units capable of providing many services being better 
financed. 
Increases in the funding for particular hospitals and service providers were in 
proportion to the specific services they provided. By 2011, the finance for UC scheme 
was categorised into: 
1. A per capita allocation; 
2. A fund for the treatment of AIDS; 
Million baht 
Total 101,057.91 
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3. A fund for the treatment of chronically dysfunctional kidneys; and 
4. A fund for the prevention of chronic illness. 
Notes: ‘Requested’ represents the request for increased funds from the government, whilst ‘allocation’ is the 
budgetary allocation already approved by the government 
 
The per capita allocation fund was a large fund from which smaller funds were derived, 
such as those for outpatients, inpatients, healthcare promotion and disease prevention, 
and costly treatments. Hospitals provided with funds for outpatients were assigned the 
responsibility for UC population within their zones, which were demarcated based on 
the local geography. The funds for outpatients were allocated per capita at the 
beginning of the fiscal year, whilst the funds for inpatients were allocated per capita at 
the beginning of fiscal year but before the account was settled at the end of the fiscal 
year. The fund for traditional Thai medicine in 2011 was allocated at 6 baht per capita, 
with a total value of 285,000,000 baht (47.5 million x 6). The pre-requisites for the 
allocation of the funding was the presence of a Thai traditional medicine service that 
included massage, steaming, herbal treatments, and rehabilitation after child delivery. 
The per capita allocation increased steadily due to increasing wages, the increasing use 
of services, and inflation. However, although the funding increased each year, it was 
always less than the amount formally requested, accounting on average for 87.67% of 
Figure 4-2 - Comparison of the requested amount and the actual allocation, 2002 - 2010 
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the amount formerly requested. In 2010, the allocation of the budget for the UC 
scheme, in reality, was 89.62% of the amount formally requested, as shown in Figure 
4.2. 
4.6.4 The increasing expenses of the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme 
Full operation of the UC scheme in 2002 resulted in an increase in the total expenditure 
on healthcare, from 81,273.10 million baht in 1999 to 106,608.20 million baht in 2003. 
The implementation of this healthcare insurance scheme required 100,000 million baht 
which the government was obliged to fund. The budgetary allocation of 100,000 
million was an increase of 20,000 million baht from the previous funding for healthcare 
insurance programmes before the introduction of the UC scheme. 
In 2002 46 million people were covered by the UC scheme, and the budgetary 
allocation for it amounted to 53,093 million baht or 1,202 baht per capita, accounting 
for 49.8% of the total expenditure on healthcare. This increase in expenditure on the 
UC scheme resulted in a decrease in expenditures on non-UC schemes, from 65,209.9 
million baht in 2000, to 22,144.8 million baht in 2003, accounting for 66.04% of the 
funds allocated to the MoPH as show in Table 4-2 
Table 4-2  - Government’s expenditures on healthcare 
 Spending (Million baht) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total government’s expenditures 
on healthcare 81,273.10 90,504.10 94,221.80 106,608.20 107,806.20 
Annual increase -0.2 11.4 4.1 13.2 1.1 
30 baht Scheme  - - 1,909.90 53,093.80 55,708.90 
Civil Servant Medical Benefit & 
State enterprise Scheme (CSMBS) 15,253.00 17,058.00 19,180.00 20,475.00 20,519.00 
Social Security Scheme (SSS) 3,552.70 8,236.20 8,148.10 8,196.10 9,433.50 
Ministry of Public Health (Non-
UC) 
62,467.40 65,209.90 64,983.20 24,843.30 22,144.80 
Source: Adapted from the framework of budgetary planning and allocation 1999 – 2003 (NESDB, 2003) 
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4.6.5 Satisfaction and complaints with the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme  
A satisfaction survey of UC scheme users and service providers conducted by the 
Assumption University found that 89.76% of users were satisfied with the services, and 
the average satisfaction score was 8.77 on a ten-point scale, whilst 78.75% of service 
providers were satisfied with the services, giving an average satisfaction score of 7.64 
on a ten-point scale. Satisfaction scores from users have increased annually, although 
the latest scores were nearly the same as those for last year. Similarly, the satisfaction 
scores of service providers from 2003-2008 has also increased annually. A survey 
conducted in 2010 found the highest of all the satisfaction scores for the last eight 
years, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 4-3 - Satisfaction survey results from UC scheme, 2003 - 2010
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The UC scheme has contributed healthcare benefits to the public since 2003.   
‘…It seems to be a very good project, but you should know the quality of 
treatment is deteriorating and the money of the middle and higher class flows to 
the capitalists who have cultivated connections with politicians. Right now are 
there politicians, highly ranked bureaucrats, and doctors who exercise their 30 
baht right?’ (A scholar) 
‘…On the whole, the adoption of universal healthcare put us on the right path, 
but the finance allocated to the project needs to be increased and, if necessary, a 
tax hike is a must…’ (A scholar) 
‘…It’s a good project as it helps resolve the problem of income disparity to a 
certain extent. I’m not knowledgeable about medical science and I’m well off 
enough to waive the right of the 30 baht scheme. I think those who don’t have 
enough money to afford treatment aren’t serious about the poorly standardised 
services. They just want to be cured and then go the work the next day. They 
aren’t serious about their long-term health condition…’ (A scholar) 
 
Formal complaints made by users of the UC scheme provide a broad sense of the types 
of problems many poor users face. Complaints were made through the emergency line 
1330, which was staffed by personnel of the National Health Security 24 hours a day 
and even healthcare units were allowed to make complaints and seek consultation via 
Figure 4-4 - Average satisfaction scores for the UC scheme, 2003 - 2010
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this line. Most complaints referred to are being denied access to services to which card-
holders were formally entitled. In 2007, 973 complaints concerned this issue, 
accounting for 34.80% of all complaints, and in 2008, 1,871 complaints of this type 
were made, accounting for 44.14% of all complaints. However, in 2009 the number 
decreased to 1,640, accounting for 38.18% of complaints, as shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4-3 - Types of complaints registered about UC scheme 2007- 2009 
Complaints 
Fiscal Year 
2007 
Fiscal Year 
2008 
Fiscal Year 
2009 
No. % No. % No. % 
1. Standard of services  489 17.81 727 17.15 673 15.64 
2. Inconveniences  546 19.53 781 18.42 906 21.08 
3. Demand for payment 779 27.86 860 20.29 1,079 25.10 
4. Denial of access to services to which they were entitled 973 34.80 1,871 44.14 1,640 38.18 
Total 2,796 100 4239 100 4,298 100 
Source: Adapted from the annual report NHSO, 2009 
The interviewed data from key informants showed as follows; 
‘…They (politicians) have already got hospitals and targeted customers. 
However, the acquisition of doctors still proves costly for them. So, they intend 
to produce more doctors with no attention paid to the quality of doctors. They 
forced the central hospital to produce doctors in addition to the doctors 
produced by medical schools. As a result, novice doctors are of poor quality. 
They cannot perform surgeries, be they appendectomy or birth delivery. But at 
least, doctors’ salaries become lower…’ (A scholar) 
‘…An interesting point is that the private hospitals of the BGH group managed 
to acquire doctors of good quality at the very low costs as they did not want to 
deal with such a workload with a low salary and to work in a stressful 
atmosphere, as they were criticised by patients for the service not being up to 
the standard. UC provides service of a poor quality, considering doctors, drugs, 
and others. The gap between the rich and the poor keeps getting wider…’ (A 
scholar) 
• The financial impact 
The budgetary allocation to the provinces by the MoPH in the first year (2001) of the 
UC scheme was based on a payment proportionate to the number of people registered 
under the scheme at a particular hospital. This capitation-based payment covered the 
full cost of the healthcare services provided under the scheme, including the salaries of 
doctors and nurses. A fund of 5,000 million baht was also set up to support the 
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operation of hospitals affected by this new method of budgetary allocation; however, 
these hospitals were required to submit plans for improvements to their services to the 
commission. 
The financial impact of the UC scheme was characterised by an inadequacy in 
budgetary allocation per capita, especially for inpatients (Srithamrongsawad & 
Torwattanakitkul, 2005). This stemmed from basing the cost per capita on figures for 
1996, which had a significant impact particularly on inpatient costs due to the increases 
between 1996 and 2001. The service cost per capita in 2001-2002 was calculated to be 
higher than the actual per capita allocation by 212 baht (Prakongsai, et al., 2002), as the 
calculation was based on data related to the cost per unit incurred from the provision of 
hospital services. 
In the first full year of operation of the UC scheme outpatient expenses increased from 
17,077 million baht to 27,111 million baht, an increase by 59%, whilst the cost for 
inpatients increased by only 9%, from 13,814 million baht to 15,090 million baht. In 
2003, the total expenses of the MoPH decreased as requests to the security fund 
established to support hospitals adversely affected by the presence of the UC scheme 
decreased from 5,000 million baht in the first year of the operation of the scheme to 
500 million baht in the second year. 
Stringent cost controls were imposed on the UC scheme as a limit was set on the 
funding of the scheme. However, due to the politicians offering excessive benefits, 
service providers suffered operational losses (Siamwalla, 2005), and the scheme only 
survived because the participating service providers were affiliated to the MoPH. The 
stringent cost controls imposed by the MoPH on the service providers caused further 
problems, such as the registration of people without their consent in order to access 
more funding, as budgetary allocation is based on the size of the UC scheme population 
under the responsibility of the service provider. Another problem was the restriction of 
free competition from the private sector for the sake of the survival of the service 
provider affiliated with the MoPH, which was achieved by assigning a smaller UC 
scheme population to the private hospitals. Furthermore, salary cuts aggravated the 
problem of the poor distribution of personnel and also resulted in confusion regarding 
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the role of the provincial public health offices which simultaneously acted as 
purchasers and service providers (Leesmith &Pitayarangsarit, 2005). 
Budgetary allocation based on the size and distribution of population resulted in less 
financial support for provinces where there was a low doctor-patient ratio and more 
financial support for provinces with a high doctor-patient ratio, such as in the north-
eastern provinces and community hospitals (Srithamrongsawad &Torwattanakitkul, 
2005). The interviewed data from a doctor of a hospital, a scholar, a user showed as 
follows; 
‘…It’s a good project but those who are eligible for the benefits should be the 
ones whose incomes are low enough. Those who can afford the treatment on 
their own should pay to maintain the standard of service. As for costly 
treatment, the level of incomes of those eligible for the benefits of the services 
should be determined beforehand. If what I have said is done, all Thais, 
regardless of the class to which they belong, will enjoy the service not much 
differing in quality…’ (A doctor of a hospital). 
‘…If the 30 baht scheme is to be successful,  healthcare system with the 
emphasis of disease prevention is to be fully developed to reduce the cost of 
treatment of complex diseases. In addition, the number of taxpayers has to be 
increased to make the scheme sustainable in the long run…’ (A scholar) 
 ‘…I am well off enough to afford treatment by myself. I once paid 30,000 baht 
to a public hospital for the operation cost to save the life of my son. However, 
I’m not a rich person. The 30 baht scheme thus helped me save a considerable 
amount of my money. And I often used the services offered by the scheme. I 
would like to share my experience in using the services of many public 
hospitals to which I took my son. After my son was admitted, they gave me the 
documents to be signed. The documents showed the costs of my son’s 
hospitalisation that included the costs of room, bed, and food. I realise, I took 
the mat and had my son lie on the mat whilst staying overnight during 
hospitalisation. But the costs totalled 3,000 baht. Is this corruption? And who’s 
behind the corruption? Thaksin?’ (A user) 
4.6.6 Adjustments made by hospitals 
Provincial hospitals could earn income from other services, such as the CSMBS, SSS, 
foreign labourers, and payments by individual patients. The idea of obtaining revenue 
from the CSMBS was highly appealing, as the payments to service providers, made 
every time services were used, had no limitation. Furthermore, additional revenue could 
be obtained through an increase in the rate of service fees and thus it came as no 
surprise that the expenses of the CSMBS increased dramatically; 13% annually from 
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1994-1998 and 10% annually from 1999-2003.  During the same time period of 1996-
2003, the number of people covered by the gold card scheme or UC scheme decreased 
on average by 1.6% annually, due to the government’s policy relating to the 
enhancement of operation and the reduction of manpower (Srithammarongsuwad 
&Torwattanakitkul, 2005). 
From the introduction of the UC scheme in 2002 until 2011, 57 private hospitals have 
opted out of the scheme; 22 had 100 or more beds, whilst 35 had fewer than 100 beds, 
with 13 of them in Bangkok, 7 of them in the northern region, 11 of them in the north-
eastern region, 23 of them in the central region, and 3 of them in the southern region. 
The earlier years of the UC scheme witnessed more hospitals opting out of the scheme, 
with 15, 11, and 9 leaving in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively (NHSO, 2012). 
The practice of making payments for the SS was based on capitation as in the UC 
scheme. To obtain increased revenues from the SSS hospitals had to have more 
participants registered as users of the services provided by a hospital. However, 
participants in the SSS tended to be less inclined to use a hospital’s services than 
participants in the UC scheme. Therefore, from the hospital’s viewpoint it was 
preferable to register individuals under the SSS than under the UC scheme, as the 
profits from providing healthcare insurance to foreign labourers were similar in nature 
those obtained from the SSS. However, only the hospitals located in areas with 
significant numbers of migrant non-resident foreign labourers had the opportunity to 
obtain such revenues by providing healthcare insurance to foreign labourers. 
Provincial hospitals were in a more advantageous position than community hospitals to 
obtain revenues from individual patients, although all hospitals were desirous of the 
extra revenues which could be obtained from the service fees charged to individual 
patients. However, provincial hospitals well equipped in terms of equipment were 
attractive to individual patients who could afford special services arranged for them. 
Other cost cutting measures adopted by all hospitals participating in the UC scheme 
hospitals included delaying payment for the acquisition of drugs, limiting the 
dispensation of essential drugs, dispensing domestically produced drugs instead of 
imported drugs, reducing the number of workers other than doctors and nurses working 
overtime, cutting costs not related to medical services, and delaying long-term 
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investment in equipment, infrastructure, and training.  The interviewed data from a 
scholar and NHSO officer informants showed as follows; 
‘…Hospitals tried to take profits as much as possible from the drugs not 
included in drug lists. Those drugs were sold to bureaucrats as the cost of those 
drugs borne by bureaucrats could were disbursed from the comptroller general. 
The hospitals thus promote the use of those drugs by pricing those drugs as high 
as possible…’ (A scholar) 
‘Service units failed to learn the disbursement process properly, so the funds 
were not disbursed in full. It is thus unfair to say that UC scheme caused 
losses…’ (One of the NHSO officers) 
‘The approaches to fund management were changed very often and were so 
detail-oriented I could hardly catch up with the change…’ (A staff member of a 
provincial health office) 
‘The approaches to fund management were changed very often. We hardly 
caught up with the changes. Once we were accustomed to the rules, they were 
changed. We had to start learning them again…’ (Staff member of a hospital) 
‘To be free from losses, hospitals should be assigned with enough UC 
population under their responsibility. The small hospitals with 20-30 beds 
should have at least 25,000 UC populations under their responsibility…’ (A 
director of a hospital joining UC) 
4.6.7 Improvement in the services provided by primary units 
The per capita allocation of funds to community healthcare units under the UC scheme 
enabled them to afford drugs, equipment and other items necessary for improving 
services at locations that were much more convenient for many, particularly rural, users 
of healthcare services. This raised the status of community healthcare stations to 
community centres for healthcare promotion and disease prevention and enabled the 
deployment of professional nurses to these centres and improved medical services. 
Thus, the per capita allocation model did improve the operation of primary healthcare 
units located close to many rural populations (Srithamrongsawad & Lapying, 2003). 
Improved services provided by community healthcare units attracted more users as 
capitation required users to use the services provided by the hospitals with which they 
were registered, before they were eligible to be transferred to a hospital with the 
capacity for more sophisticated treatment. The number of users of community hospitals 
increased during 2001-2002, whilst the number of users of general and tertiary 
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hospitals decreased. This was due to the adoption of the DRG approach to payment 
which was also applied to the general hospitals, whilst the cost of providing services at 
the community hospitals were lower (Pannarunothai & Kongsawat, 2001). The 
introduction of DRG resulted in the equal allocation of funds to hospitals, whether they 
were provincial or community hospitals and the lower costs of providing services at 
community hospitals resulted in a surplus in the funds allocated to them under the DRG 
payment system. Community hospitals were therefore motivated to seek users for their 
services, resulting in an increase in the users of their services. 
4.6.8 Effects of Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme on health-related 
personnel 
The presence of the UC scheme effectively reduced the price of accessing healthcare 
services for a sizeable part of the population, and this inevitably increased the demand 
for healthcare services. Thus there was an immediate effect was on healthcare sector 
professionals, with their workloads increasing by 70% in 2003 compared to 2001. 
According to a survey of the state of healthcare and welfare conducted by the National 
Office of Statistics, the use of outpatient services increased by 25% during 2001-2003, 
whilst the consumption of drugs without prescription and the use of services provided 
by unregistered healthcare units decreased by 8%. The use of inpatient services also 
increased by 9%, whilst the use of outpatient and inpatient services provided by private 
hospitals decreased, as shown in Table 4.4 
Table 4-4  - Provision of services to the participants in the gold card scheme as inpatients and 
outpatients 2001 and 2003 
 Outpatients Inpatients 
2001 2003 % +/- 2001 2003 % +/- 
The number of times of service using by an individual patients 2.846 3.547 24.6 0.076 0.083 8.8 
% of Gold Card using (UC scheme)  56.6   80.9  
The use of service provided by unregistered healthcare units 30.6 28.0 -8.5    
Community healthcare units 22.2 26.2 18.0    
Community hospital 14.2 22.0 54.9 30.0 54.4 81.0 
Provincial hospitals and tertiary healthcare units 18.3 8.9 -51.6 59.0 35.9 -39.1 
Private clinic 12.0 12.3 2.8    
Private hospital 2.6 2.5 -3.0 11.0 9.7 -11.9 
Source: The survey of the state of public healthcare and welfare 
Note: 2001 data includes participants in the MWS for the poor, the gold card scheme and uninsured people 
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4.6.9 Increased workloads 
According to a study conducted from 2002 to 2009, doctors stationed at the community 
hospitals were assigned the highest workloads, followed by doctors at the general 
hospitals, whilst doctors at the university hospitals were assigned the lowest workloads. 
The amount of work assigned to the doctors at private hospitals was similar to that of 
public central hospitals. 
Table 4-5  - Workload of doctors 2002-2009 
Hospitals 2002 2007 2008 2009 
Workload 
of an 
individual 
doctor 
Comparison 
index 
Workload 
of an 
individual 
doctor 
Comparison 
index 
Workload 
of an 
individual 
doctor 
Comparison 
index 
Workload 
of an 
individual 
doctor 
Comparison 
index 
Community 34,379 2.2 28,487 2.0 25,728 1.7 23,006 1.5 
General 18,805 1.1 19,742 1.4 16,680 1.1 17,260 1.1 
Central 12,020 0.7 13,305 0.9 14,373 0.9 11,721 0.7 
University 4,931 0.3 2,701 0.19 2,937 0.2 3,353 0.2 
Private 12,849 0.8 15,681 1.1 15,168 1.0 15,295 1.0 
Total 16,535 1.0 14,469 1.0 15,340 1.0 15,808 1.0 
Source: The report on healthcare related resources (MoPH, 2010) 
 
Community hospitals, especially in the north-eastern region, have suffered from a lack 
of doctors. In general, a shortage of doctors has posed a great obstacle to the extension 
of the UC scheme (Srithamrongsawad & Torwattanakitkul, 2005). In 2002 the number 
of doctors resigning from bureaucratic posts in government hospitals was twice that of 
2001. These resignations have stemmed from increased workloads whilst salaries 
remained low and stagnant (ABAC, 2003; Suan Dusit, 2004). The interviewed data 
from scholars showed as follows: 
‘…You may think doctors lose interest from the existence of UC. But in reality, 
doctors do not care much about increased workloads. They find services not up 
standard unacceptable. Even many doctors who are university professors and 
work for private hospitals are opposed to the project, even though they stand to 
reap benefits as the number of patients at the public hospital decreases. They 
view that the poor get service of a low quality and the middle class’s money 
flows to politicians…’ (A scholar) 
‘…What is happening is that skilful doctors join private hospitals whilst inept 
doctors remain in public hospitals, having to bear hard work and be offered with 
low salaries whilst providing services of low quality…’ (A scholar) 
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4.6.10 The public sector’s loss of health-related personnel 
The public sector has lost healthcare-related personnel to the private sector and some 
have switched to other professions. The move of a large number of healthcare-related 
personnel to the private sector has not resulted in a loss to the whole healthcare system 
but has adversely affected the provision of medical services to the public, as the 
majority of rural people depend on the medical service provided by the MoPH. 
There has been a growing tendency among medical professionals to leave their jobs in 
the public sector. In 1996 just prior to the economic crisis, 21 community hospitals 
were found to be without doctors, although paradoxically, the situation improved in 
1997 as the economic recession caused a slump in the demand for doctors in private 
hospitals. However, during the time of the economic recovery in 2001-2003, the issue 
of doctors resigning from their jobs at the MoPH again became acute, and during 2005-
2009, 600-800 doctors resigned from their jobs (MoPH, 2010). 
4.7 Evaluation of the performance of the Universal Healthcare 
Coverage Scheme during its first year 
The failure to achieve universal coverage of the whole healthcare insurance scheme 
before 2002 was, according to the National Economic Development Board, due to the 
existence of various programmes under the responsibility of various agencies. No 
action was taken to promote co-operation among those agencies; moreover, fiscal 
planning of the operation of healthcare related programmes was lacking (NESDB, 
2003). According to the NESDB’s report, 43.9 million people, accounting for around 
70% of the total population, gained access to healthcare insurance, but the remaining 19 
million people, accounting for around 30% of the total population, were yet to gain 
access to healthcare insurance. 
4.8 The reformed health insurance scheme 
The 9th National Economic and Social Development Plan, which was in effect from 
2002-2006, featured a strategy for human development and social protection, which 
resulted in reforms aimed at improving the existing five categories of healthcare 
insurance, as well as to accelerate access to healthcare insurance for people previously 
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without healthcare insurance. The whole healthcare insurance system was reshaped, 
resulting in three forms of healthcare insurance programmes which remain in place to 
this day: 
1. Medical welfare for bureaucrats and employees of state enterprises. 
2. Compulsory healthcare insurance programme consisting of a compensation fund 
and social security fund. 
3. Universal healthcare coverage, the 30 baht scheme. 
The service fee of 30 baht, or around one US dollar, was charged to the users of the 30 
baht scheme. However, this group of people includes the poor, children up to 12 years 
of age, the disabled, and veterans who were exempt from fee payment. 
After the coup d’état, the Surayudh Chulanond administration ordered the charging of 
the 30 baht fee to be cancelled on 31 October 2006. The justification for this was to 
enhance the accessibility of the UC scheme, and it was later renamed the ‘Gold Card 
Scheme’. A public relations campaign was launched to improve public awareness of 
the change in the name of the scheme; however, many people continued to refer to the 
UC scheme as 30 baht scheme as this was the name during Thaksin’s premiership. 
4.9 Conclusions 
The UC insurance system in Thailand has evolved from the various forms of healthcare 
insurance that existed before the National Health Insurance Act of 2002. The UC 
scheme was an addition to the already existing insurance systems and extended 
healthcare services coverage to new and previously excluded groups. The National 
Health Security Act passed during Thaksin’s premiership came to be known as the 30 
baht Scheme, and was adeptly used to promote the popularity of the Thaksin 
administration. 
The history of the evolution of universal healthcare coverage can be traced back to 
1980, when healthcare cover for civil servants and their families was introduced. In 
1990, the social insurance programme for workers was introduced, in addition to the 
implementation of an assistance programme for the needy, which was characterised by 
the provision of healthcare services to the impoverished, the elderly, and children. A 
healthcare insurance policy with a relatively low premium of 500 baht per person per 
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year was also developed at this time. This led to there being five forms of healthcare 
insurance in Thailand: 
1. MWS for the poor and the needy; 
2. VHCS, which was established by the government and shared the responsibility 
for the cost of treatments or co-payment; 
3. CSMBS for civil servants and employees of state enterprises; 
4. SSS for the formal private sector employees; 
5. Private Insurance covering around 1.4% of the country’s population, with 
premiums depending on the conditions of the insurance policy. 
Nearly half of those covered by the UC scheme were already covered under previous 
schemes, such as the MWS for the poor and the needy, who were already exempt from 
payment for services. The introduction of the UC scheme has had the most significant 
impact on the practice of public healthcare in Thailand in the past 30 year (TDRI, 2009) 
as it was through this scheme that universal healthcare coverage was actually 
introduced. Unlike other projects initiated by the Thai Rak Thai party, the UC scheme 
appears to have stood the test of time. In fact, it has not been politically possible for 
subsequent governments to abolish it and it is therefore even more important to 
understand the limitations of the project design and to determine the implications of 
reform in different directions. 
Other policies of the populist Thai Rak Thai party have been subjected to criticism 
regarding corruption, a lack of transparency, and unsustainability. It is very likely that 
the 30 baht Scheme was also part of its populist programme for buying support from 
particular constituencies, regardless of the financial viability of the programme. 
Nevertheless, once the National Health Insurance Act in 2002 was passed, Thailand 
achieved a national universal healthcare system and political imperatives have ensured 
that the scheme has evolved in different ways as successive governments have 
attempted to make it sustainable by increasing its budgetary claim and reforming the 
method of its application 
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Chapter 5. Financial management of the Universal 
Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
This chapter analyses the management of the fund for financing the service units 
joining the UC scheme. The allocation of funds was guided by regulations that were 
subject to revisions reflecting the changing conditions and priorities of successive 
administrations. Changes to these regulations and the criteria for fund allocation 
affected the finance obtained by different types of service units joining the UC scheme. 
5.1 Management of the Universal Healthcare coverage fund 
Management of the UC fund has frequently undergone revisions in response to the 
changing situation. A major revision was undertaken at the beginning of the 2002 
budgetary year commencing on 1 October 2001 and the UC scheme underwent an 
expansion during this period to cover all 15 provinces except Bangkok. The major shift 
in the approach to budgetary allocation based on the size of population at this time 
caused a significant change in the operation of healthcare facilities, especially those 
affiliated to the MoPH (TDRI, 2004). In 2005 principles for financing healthcare 
facilities were introduced which aimed to achieve a number of objectives:  
1. The allocation of funds in accordance with the needs and demands of different 
healthcare facilities (Differential Capitation). 
2. The allocation of funds in a close-end fashion (see chapter 4). 
3. The same rate of payment for patients grouped together with the same diseases 
(DRG) was introduced with the intention of fixing or standardising the cost of 
treatment. However, this was not aimed at achieving equality in access to 
treatment for all patients with the same disease. 
In 2007 the principles of financing healthcare facilities were further refined to include 
the following additional objectives: 
1. Allocation of funds to ensure equality to indispensable but costly services, with 
the rates of payment fixed approximately in line with the costs of hospitals. 
Different hospitals could charge different rates for the same diseases if their 
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costs were different, but the rate could not vary significantly from the fixed 
rates resulting from the calculation based on DRG.  
2. The introduction of a disease management and managed referral system for 
diseases with high treatment costs. Referral is the transferring of patients to 
larger hospitals within a particular UC zone and is necessitated by smaller 
hospitals’ inability to treat complex diseases. The costs of the referral of 
inpatients were borne by the NHSO, whilst the costs of the referral of 
outpatients were borne by the referring hospital in accordance to their 
agreement. 
3. Assurance of equal access to emergency services in cases of accidents and 
sudden illnesses, including a referral system for patients to other UC zones. 
4. Supplementary funding for healthcare facilities located in sparsely populated 
areas, and dangerous zones, meaning areas experiencing violent conflict, such 
as in the Deep South and frontier areas. 
In 2009, a further objective was added and the principles of financing healthcare 
facilities were amended. This new objective was that patients with diseases requiring 
long-term and costly treatment should have their cases separately managed to ensure 
equal access. 
In 2010, priority was given to the role of local government in healthcare services. To 
improve the efficiency of fund management, the 9th regional office in 
Nakhonratchasima and the 13th regional office in Bangkok were empowered to make 
their own decisions related to fund management in order to suit the particular needs of 
these areas, such as the use of funds for capital replacement, healthcare promotion and 
disease prevention, and medical rehabilitation for outpatients.  
In 2011, the original principle related to the objective of assuring public access to 
efficient healthcare services remained in place and the capitation of 101,057.91 million 
baht was allocated for this purpose. Funds for AIDS patients (2,997.74 million baht), 
patients with chronically dysfunctional kidneys (3,226.55 million baht), patients 
afflicted with chronic diseases like diabetes and high blood pressure (630.60 million 
baht), and patients afflicted with mental illness (203.62 million baht) were established, 
the latter two only in 2011. 
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The budgetary allocation to the NHSO was divided into two parts: 
1. That used for financing the provision of effective and efficient healthcare 
services and in securing public access to such services. The allocation of these 
funds increased annually, as shown in Table 5.1. 
2. Funding for the management of the NHSO which was then sub-divided to 
support routines and the implementations of policies or strategies. 
Table 5-1  - The capitation management of the National Security Fund 2004-2011 
Budgetary 
allocation 
Fiscal year 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Per capita 
allocation 
(baht) 
1,308.50 1,396.30 1,659.20 1,899.69 2,100.00 2,202.00 2,401.33 2,546.48 
UC population 
(million) 
46.82 47.00 47.75 46.07 46.48 47.03 47.24 48.00 
Allocation to 
the fund 
(inclusive of 
salaries)  
(million baht) 
61,212.39 67,582.60 82,023.00 91,369.05 101,984.10 108,065.09 117,969.00 129,280.89 
Fund for 
salaries 
(million baht) 
27,639.52 26,692.65 27,594.37 24,002.66 25,385.30 27,467.40 28,584.23 28,222.98 
Allocation to 
the fund 
(salaries not 
included) 
(million baht) 
33,572.87 40,889.95 54,428.63 67,366.39 76,598.80 80,597.69 89,384.77 101,057.91 
Source: Adapted from NHSO, 2012. 
5.2 Budgetary allocation of the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme 
The allocation of the National Health Security Fund by the NHSO was based on rules 
and criteria, which, as already discussed, are constantly subject to revision. During the 
earlier years of the UC scheme (2002-2004), the per capita allocation to smaller funds 
deriving from capitation was based upon the age structure of the people eligible for 
registration, and the demand of local service units as dictated by the problems they 
encountered. The budgetary allocation was for the support of outpatients, inpatients, 
and healthcare promotion and disease prevention. 
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The allocation of support for outpatients was based upon the age structure of the UC 
population, although the difference in the amount allocated to the funds provided to 
each province was no more than 10% on a per capita basis. The allocation for 
supporting conscripts and college students, however, was beyond the application of 
such rules but instead based upon the calculated value (NHSO, 2004).  
The MoPH provided 65,876 million baht in 2002 and the allocation to the UC scheme 
accounted for 72.8% of the total allocation to the MoPH, amounting to 47,988 million 
baht. This allocation to the UC scheme was used as follows: 
1. Salaries for personnel and finance for service units, amounting to 23,850 
million baht. 
2. General subsidies in addition to salaries, amounting to 22,138 million baht. 
3. A central fund for the development of a central database, amounting to 2,000 
million baht. 
4. A contingency fund amounting, to 5,000 million baht. 
After the deduction of salaries and the central fund, the allocation to the UC population 
was 45,000 million baht, but with the intended per capita allocation of 1,202.40 baht, 
only 37 million people could be covered instead of the 46.6-50.3 million people as 
estimated by the MoPH (TDRI, 2004).  
A contingency fund was established to compensate for the losses of the service units. 
Compensation was provided on condition that they demonstrated operational plans 
featuring details on revenue and expenses and including a cost reduction plan. In the 
2002 fiscal year the contingency fund has paid out compensation four times to 183 
hospitals in 51 provinces, to the value of 4,419 million baht. After the deduction of 
salaries amounting to 383 million baht, the remaining 4,036 million baht was the figure 
actually used as compensation from the losses incurred.  
The better financial condition of some service units led to a reduction in the amount of 
funds provided to these units, and some even received demands to make repayments. In 
total, 181 service units were financed by the contingency fund in 2002, to the value of 
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3,527 million baht, which was lower than the 5,000 million baht contained in the 
contingency fund, whilst two hospitals were required to make repayments. 
The budgetary allocation to the UC scheme was based upon the size of the population 
from the very beginning of the scheme in 2001, with the fund for salaries being 
separated from the per capita allocation. The allocation of funds according to the size of 
the population was in contrast with the allocation of funds according to the size of 
hospitals or the availability of healthcare-related resources, be they personnel or 
equipment, as experienced by hospitals before the introduction of the UC scheme in 
2001. This shift in budgetary allocation practice from the basis of the availability of 
resources to the size of the population was introduced in 2001 and meant that the 
availability of hospital resources was no longer the factor determining the amount of 
funds provided to a hospital. 
This shift in budgetary allocation practice resulted in a significant increase in the 
budgetary allocation to the hospitals in the north-eastern provinces with a large UC 
population, despite their limited resources in terms of personnel and equipment before 
the introduction of the UC scheme. In contrast, the budgetary allocation to provinces 
like Ratchaburi in the central region which had a smaller population but where there 
were four large hospitals did not increase. The MoPH propose two ways to divert more 
funds to large hospitals: 
1. Separation of the fund used as salaries for healthcare-related personnel 
employed by the service units affiliated to the MoPH in the provinces from the 
funds provided per capita to the UC population. The funds used for salaries 
were provided to hospitals in proportion to the size of the UC population. This 
practice negated concerns about the payment of salaries in large hospitals, 
salaries were overseen by all service units in each province. 
2. The separation of inpatients from outpatients was considered the solution to the 
problem characterised by the reluctance of service units, mostly community and 
district hospitals, to admit patients and to refer inpatients. This practice ensures 
the inflow of income to large hospitals to certain extent because they have more 
inpatients. 
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Provinces were granted autonomy to choose one of the two methods described above 
by which to divert more funds to large hospitals. In reality, their choices were varied 
but small hospitals tended to avoid sharing risk with large hospitals.  
To cushion the impact of the shift to budgetary allocation according to the size of 
population, the Budgetary Bureau set up a contingency fund valued at 5,000 million 
baht in 2002. In the 2002 fiscal year the contingency fund provided financial assistance 
to 55 large central and general hospitals affiliated to the MoPH, 60% of all large 
hospitals, and accounting for 83% of the financial support provided by the contingency 
fund. In addition, 122 community hospitals, accounting for a sixth of all community 
hospitals, were provided with financial support from the contingency fund. Large 
hospitals on average received 52 million baht, whilst small hospitals on average 
received 5 million baht. 
5.3 Finance of the UC Scheme   
5.3.1 The financing requirements of the 30 baht Health Scheme 
The ‘30 baht cures all illnesses’ scheme is the biggest healthcare insurance scheme ever 
organised in Thailand, and its introduction caused extensive changes within the MoPH. 
Financing the scheme was complex, and it was based upon a matrix system 
characterised by a combination of various methods of financing. For example, there is a 
difference between the financing method applied to hospitals and that applied to 
primary healthcare units, such as community clinics and urban healthcare centres 
(NHSO, 2011). 
The implementation of the healthcare insurance for all schemes in 2002 caused a rise in 
the public sector’s healthcare expenses from 90,504 million baht in 2000 to 106,608.2 
million baht in 2002, a growth rate of 13.1%. The finance supplied by the state was 
valued at 100,000 million baht, with a 20,000 million baht increase attributed to the 
implementation of the healthcare scheme based on the principle of universal coverage. 
However, this figure does not include individual citizens’ expenditures on healthcare, 
which was found to decrease from 55 billion baht to 47 billion baht per year after the 
introduction of the healthcare scheme based on universal coverage. This decrease in the 
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individual expenditures on healthcare was equivalent to 14.5% (Tungcharoensatien, 
2002, cited in NESDB, 2002). 
In 2002, the government provided 53,093.82 million baht (1,202 per capita) to the 30 
baht scheme which was to cover 46 million people, and expenditure on this scheme 
accounted for 49.8% of the total finance for all healthcare insurance schemes. The 
increase in finance for the scheme led to a decrease in expenditure on other healthcare 
related schemes which were not universal coverage in their nature from 65,209.9 
million baht in 2000 to 24,843.3 million baht in 2002, a decrease of 61.9%. In 2003, the 
finance for the 30 baht scheme was increased by 4.9% from that of 2002 to 55,708.9 
million baht, whilst expenditure on non-universal coverage schemes decreased by 
10.9% to 22,144.75 million baht. The dramatic decrease in expenditure on non-
universal coverage schemes was a concern since any unexpected event requiring an 
increase in non-universal coverage schemes would adversely affect the operation of the 
30 baht scheme (NESDB, 2003). 
The National Health Insurance Act requires all state-run hospitals to serve as providers 
of services, whereas the participation of private hospitals in the scheme is on a 
voluntary basis. A number of private hospitals have withdrawn from the scheme since 
the commencement of its operation: in 2003 there were 88 private hospitals 
participating in the scheme, but the number was reduced to 71 in 2004, 63 in 2005, 61 
in 2006, and 60 in 2007. However, the number of private clinics joining the schemes as 
a Primary Care Unit (PCU) rose from 89 in 2004 to 105, 116 and 152 in 2005, 2006, 
and 2007, respectively (NHSO, 2009). This rise in the number of private clinics (as 
opposed to hospitals) participating in the scheme indicates the scheme’s potential as a 
source of revenue for private clinics that have undergone an adjustment in the 
management of their services and finances as a result of the changing situation. 
However, private clinics as PCUs must establish a connection with hospitals in case 
they have to transfer patients for treatments which they are unable to provide. 
In the early stages of the scheme there were three primary constraints concerning its 
operation (NESDB, 2002): 
1. The database of service users was incomplete and thus unusable, giving rise 
to problems due to the inaccuracy of the information on those eligible for 
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the service and leading to confusion and duplication in card issuing. People 
experienced inconvenience in accessing services and hospitals failed to be 
subsidised as agreed in their contracts. 
2. Proper cost accounting was not introduced, and as a result, salaries for 
personnel were included in the 30 baht scheme’s expenses per capita, whilst 
care was provided to people already covered by other healthcare insurance 
schemes. 
3. The allocation of funds for the support of the scheme was delayed due to 
bureaucratic procedures. This was also related to a lack of information on 
the size of population in a particular area which could be used to determine 
the allocation of funds to hospitals within a particular area. 
5.3.2 Internal resource allocation 
The Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme (UC) depends on the budgetary allocations 
made by the government to cover the services that are provided under the scheme. The 
rules of allocation of funds for the operating costs of service delivery under the scheme 
initially recognised that not all types of services could by jointly financed by a single 
transfer without important and expensive services falling out of the remit of many 
hospitals as they specialised in less expensive treatments. To prevent this, the financing 
model provided a general operating fund to hospitals but then tried to identify a number 
of critical areas for which special funds were allocated from the outset to ensure that 
some critical services were ring-fenced and therefore protected. The National Health 
Security Fund initially limited its additional allocation to the five following funds: 
1. The fund for supporting the general provision of services to all those 
covered by the UC scheme (this was based on a per capita allocation to 
hospitals to cover all the UC patients registered with them). 
2. The fund for supporting the provision of services to those who have HIV. 
3. The fund for supporting the provision of services to those chronically 
afflicted by dysfunctional kidneys. 
4. The fund for supporting the prevention of diabetes and high blood pressure. 
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5. The fund for supporting the provision of services to those afflicted by 
mental illness. 
In the 2011 fiscal year the budgetary allocation to these five funds totalled 
129,280.8881 million baht, whilst the budgetary allocation for the daily operation part 
of the budget totalled 961.30 million baht, thereby accounting for only 0.74% of the 
total budgetary allocation of funds. The financing for the scheme’s daily operation and 
for the five different funds was allocated to branches of the National Health Security 
Office (NHSO) located in the Bangkok Metropolis and in the provinces. Together, 
these branches made up the 13 administrative units of the NHSO in 13 regions spread 
throughout the country. The budgetary allocation to those branches enabled the five 
funds and the scheme as a whole to operate. 
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Figure 5-1 - The budgetary allocation of finance 
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The per capita allocation was sub-divided into 14 parts, as shown in Table 4.4 
Generally, the per capita allocation was divided into a larger part which was used to 
support treatments and the acquisition of drugs, and a smaller part which was used to 
develop the system and ensure there were resources to invest in improving efficiency 
and ensuring the efficient use of resources. 
Table 5-2  - Services covered by per capita allocation in 2011 
Services 
1 Outpatients 
2 In patients 
3 Additional services provided by healthcare units located on specific areas 
4 Costly treatment/ accident/ sudden experience of illness/ necessary but hardly accessible drugs 
5 Health promotion and disease prevention 
6 Dentistry services for children and false teeth 
7 Medical rehabilitation 
8 Thai traditional medicine and alternative medicine 
9 Depreciation of medical equipment 
10 Additional wages for staff to reward quality of work 
11 Preliminary financial aid to users according to article 41 
12 Preliminary financial aid to providers 
13 Finance for primary services  
14 Finance for specific tertiary services 
Source: Manual for National Health Insurance in the fiscal year of 2011  
In the fiscal year 2011, the per capita allocation amounted to 2,546.48 baht per capita 
per year. The per capita allocation comprised not only the expenditures on the medical 
services to which inpatients and outpatients were entitled under the UC scheme, but 
also on healthcare promotion and disease prevention, medical rehabilitation, 
depreciation in value of investments in medical equipment, the preliminary aid 
provided to those adversely affected by treatment (under Article 41), and the cost of 
necessary drugs and hard to access drugs, as shown in Table 5-2 
The finance supporting the provision of outpatient services was also separated from that 
supporting inpatient services. The allocation for the two was based on the number of 
registered patients in a hospital adjusted to reflect the age structure of the population, 
and data on the services provided to individual outpatients, healthcare promotion and 
disease prevention services provided to individuals, and the financial condition of 
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healthcare units. The amount allocated to inpatient services was calculated using a 
weighted average for a sample of patients. The relative weight based on these 
calculations was then used to divide the allocation between inpatients and outpatients. 
The allocation to healthcare units located in specific areas was to cover the fixed costs 
incurred as a result of introducing the provision of services as required by UC scheme. 
Some less developed areas required a supplementary allocation to cover the fixed costs 
of setting up new service delivery arrangements. The allocation to the emergency fund 
for accidents and sudden illness was divided to support outpatients and inpatients. The 
fund created from this allocation was managed in the same manner as the central fund. 
The allocation to support costly treatments was calculated using a point system for 
different diseases and treatments with a cut-off ceiling within the global budget. 
Funding for healthcare promotion and disease prevention programmes was considered 
to apply to all Thais, regardless of their healthcare insurance scheme. Consequently, 
part of the allocation went to local governments to support their healthcare promotion 
and disease prevention programmes. Support for Thai traditional medicine and 
alternative medicine services was as an additional allocation to outpatients. This was 
aimed at promoting Thai traditional medicine services and included massage, steam 
treatments, the use of herbal vapours, and traditional methods of rehabilitation after 
delivery. 
5.4 Financial impact during the early years of the Universal 
Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
The government proposed two measures to cushion the impact of the shift in budgetary 
allocation: separation of the funds for salaries at the provincial level according to the 
wishes of the provinces, and providing a contingency fund for affected hospitals. These 
measures resulted in effective capitation received by hospitals being different from the 
rate of per capita allocation (1,202.40 baht) used as a reference for the entire scheme 
(Naranong, 2004). Effective capitation for the service units affiliated to the MoPH as 
determined by the TDRI were of three types: 1) capitation with the inclusion of 
salaries; 2) capitation with the exclusion of salaries; and 3) capitation with the 
exclusion of salaries and the costs of service fees demanded by hospitals from each 
other, so that the real hospital incomes would be revealed (TDRI, 2004). Contingency 
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funds, regarded as income, were taken into consideration in order to establish the actual 
income of a hospital. 
Hospitals receiving contingency funds were categorised as large or small hospitals. 
Large hospitals included central hospitals, general hospitals and hospitals not affiliated 
to the MoPH, such as psychiatric and paediatric hospitals, whilst small hospitals were 
community hospitals. 
The TDRI found that the nationwide effective capitation plus salaries of the large 
hospitals (150 beds or more) affiliated to the MoPH was 1,306 baht per capita per year, 
which was higher than the figure of 1,037 baht per capita per year which was as derived 
from the per capita allocation of 1,202 baht minus the vaccination costs of 165 baht. 
The average effective capitation for community hospitals was 924 baht per capita per 
year. The difference in the rates of effective capitation between large hospitals and 
community hospitals stemmed from the separation of salaries at the provincial level, 
which occurred after the effective capitation for each province had been determined, 
and so salaries were omitted from the effective capitation and the remaining sum was 
used in the provision of medical services to the UC population in each province. 
Currently, 50% of the provinces in Thailand opt for the separation of salaries at the 
provincial level. 
Effective capitation with the exclusion of salaries for large hospitals was 91 baht per 
capita per year, whilst that of community hospitals was 595 baht per capita per year. 
However, large hospitals also obtained revenues by accepting referrals from medium-
sized and small hospitals, which leads to an increase in the effective capitation for large 
hospitals to 230 baht per capita per year, whilst the effective capitation for community 
hospitals is lowered to 583 baht per capita per year.  
Effective capitation inclusive of salaries differed from region to region. Large hospitals 
in the north-eastern region received the highest effective capitation inclusive of salaries 
at 1,568 baht per capita per year, followed those in the eastern region (1,430 baht), 
northern region (1,315 baht), southern region (1,277 baht), central region (1,152 baht), 
and western region (1,099 baht). Effective capitation inclusive of salaries for 
community hospitals throughout the country did not differ much, with 995, 950, 946, 
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933 and 932 baht for community hospitals in the Western, northern, southern, north-
eastern and central regions, respectively. The highest effective capitation received by 
large hospitals in the north-eastern region was due to the separation of salaries at the 
provincial level, which led not only to higher effective capitation for large hospitals but 
also to lower effective capitation for community hospitals (TDRI, 2004).  
With the separation of salaries, the average effective capitation for a large hospital was 
485 baht per capita per year, not much lower than that of a community hospital which 
was 68 baht per capita per year. With the inclusion of income from accepting referrals 
from community hospitals, the effective capitation for a hospital in the north-eastern 
region was increased to 736 baht per capita per year, higher than that of community 
hospitals in the same region. The average effective capitation after the exclusion of 
salaries for hospitals in the southern region was 56 baht per capita per year, whilst that 
of hospitals in other regions dropped to zero. 
With the inclusion of incomes derived from accepting referrals from community 
hospitals, the average effective capitation for large hospitals improved. However, for 
some hospitals in the central, western, and eastern regions the average effective 
capitation remained at zero. With the inclusion of incomes derived from accepting 
referrals from community hospitals, the average effective capitation after the exclusion 
of salaries for hospitals in the southern, northern and north-eastern regions were 152, 
112 and 736 baht, respectively. 
Effective capitation after the exclusion of salaries but inclusive of incomes derived 
from accepting referrals for community hospitals in the central, eastern, western, 
southern, northern and north-eastern regions were 435, 486, 524, 492, 536 and 686 baht 
per capita per year, respectively, which were higher had been previously received 
before the introduction of the UC scheme by nearly 50%. However, communities in 19 
provinces, including Pitsanuloke, Uthaithani, Maehongsorn, Uttaradit, Singburi, 
Angthong, Nakornnayok, Samutssongkram, Nontaburi, Rayong, Trad, Prachinburi, 
Ratchaburi, Chumporn, Ranong, Pattalung, Pangnga, Phuket, and Satun, received less 
per capita per year than had previously received (Naranong, 2004). 
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It was found that hospitals not provided with finance from the contingency fund 
received an effective capitation with the exclusion of salaries but inclusive of incomes 
derived from accepting referrals from community hospitals at 581 baht per capita per 
year, which was higher than that received by hospitals provided with finance from the 
contingency fund at 492 baht per capita per year. Community hospitals not provided 
with finance from the contingency fund received an effective capitation at 611 baht per 
capita per year, higher than the rate for hospitals provided with finance from the 
contingency fund at 491 baht per capita per year. Hospitals in the north-eastern region 
not provided with finance form the contingency fund received the highest effective 
capitation minus salaries but inclusive of incomes from accepting referrals, with an 
effective capitation of 771 baht per capita per head for large hospitals and 688 baht per 
capita per year for community hospitals. Hospitals in the central region not provided 
with finance from the contingency fund received the lowest effective capitation after 
the exclusion of salaries but inclusive of incomes from accepting referrals, with an 
effective capitation of 320 baht per capita per year for large hospitals and 481 baht per 
capita per year for community hospitals. 
For hospitals provided with finance from the contingency fund, those in the southern 
region received the highest effective capitation after the exclusion of salaries but 
inclusive of incomes derived from the service fees charged to each other, 665 baht per 
capita per year, followed by those in the eastern region, 619 baht per capita per year. 
The figures for the community hospitals are shown in Table 5-3 
Effective capitation that included only the budgetary allocation from the UC scheme 
did not reflect the real state of a hospital’s finances, especially large hospitals whose 
sources of income were more varied. In assessing the financial condition of hospitals, 
the net revenues were thus to be taken into consideration. The TDRI found that 
separation of salaries from effective capitation affected the revenue of hospitals, 
resulting in the net revenues of 80% of large hospitals (74 out of 92 hospitals) to drop 
to zero, whilst the net revenue of 15% of community hospitals (105 out of 717 
hospitals) also dropped to zero. The availability of finance from the contingency fund 
contributed to the reduction of the number of large hospitals whose revenues dropped 
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to zero (26 out of 92 hospitals, whilst the number of community hospitals whose net 
revenue dropped to zero was also reduced (18 out of 717 hospitals) (TDRI, 2004). 
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Table 5-3  - Average effective capitation at the provincial level 
Hospital All hospitals Hospitals not provided with contingency fund Hospitals provided with contingency fund 
Capitation 
inclusive of salaries 
Capitation after the 
exclusion of salaries 
Capitation after the 
exclusion of salaries but 
inclusive of fees 
demanded from other 
hospitals 
Capitation 
inclusive of 
salaries 
Capitation after the 
exclusion of salaries 
Capitation after the 
exclusion of salaries but 
inclusive of fees 
demanded from other 
hospitals 
Capitation 
inclusive of 
salaries 
Capitation with the 
exclusion of salaries 
Capitation with the 
exclusion of salaries but 
inclusive of fees 
demanded from each 
other by hospital 
Mean 
LH 
Mean 
SH 
Mean 
LH 
Mean 
SH 
Mean 
LH 
Mean 
SH 
Mean 
LH 
Mean 
SH 
Mean 
LH 
Mean 
SH 
Mean 
LH 
Mean 
SH 
Mean 
LH 
Mean 
SH 
Mean 
LH 
Mean 
SH 
Mean 
LH 
Mean 
SH 
Total 1334 940 91 595 230 583 1443 938 412 623 581 611 1837 1208 384 509 492 491 
North 1315 950 -13 570 162 536 1406 949 169 607 444 572 1835 1249 462 616 586 594 
Northeast 1568 933 485 686 736 686 1601 932 522 688 771 688 1458 1261 318 688 601 692 
Central 1152 932 -75 451 -33 435 1158 932 319 495 320 481 1874 1232 175 399 268 372 
East 1430 917 -194 505 -110 486 1273 927 654 549 654 529 2293 1001 523 333 619 325 
West 1099 995 -229 541 -182 524 1321 993 379 572 429 556 1457 1559 20 397 66 359 
South 1277 946 56 504 152 492 1405 939 386 552 429 541 1835 1187 553 465 665 448 
Source:  Adapted from the calculation of effective capitation really received by service units 2002, TDRI, 2004 
Notes: Effective capitation of each case was calculated from data obtained from service units weighted by UC population to determine the average value at the provincial, regional, and 
national level 
 Contingency fund finance was calculated from the data in the report prepared by the Office of Health Service Development of the MoPH 
 LH – large hospital, SH – small hospital 
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The net revenue figure still did not necessarily reflect the financial condition of a 
hospital. Although the net revenue of hospitals dropped to zero, this might not indicate 
that the hospital faced severe problems regarding their financial condition (TDRI, 2004) 
and so the MoPH used the ratio of total revenue to salaries as an index of financial 
condition. Total revenue should be more than two fold higher than salary costs and the 
MoPH categorised hospitals into four groups according to this ratio. Hospitals with a 
ratio equivalent to more than two were considered as having no problem regarding the 
shortage of operational funds, whilst those with a ratio of 1.5-2.0 were considered to be 
overstaffed and were advised to scale down their workforce to reduce salary costs. 
Hospitals with a ratio of 1.0-1.5 were regarded as not sufficiently staffed to provide 
decent services to patients and those with a ratio of less than 1 were considered as not 
having sufficient revenues to bear the cost of salaries. The MoPH employed this ratio as 
a criterion in making its decision to provide contingency fund finance to hospitals. 
Table 5-4  - Revenue to salary ratio as an index of a hospital’s financial condition 
Group Description Ratio of total revenue to salaries 
1 No problem > 2 
2 In need of adjustment 1.5-2.0 
3 In need of reform 1.0-1.5 
4 In crisis < 1 
Source: TDRI, 2004  
The use of this ratio in assessing the financial condition of hospitals affiliated to the 
MoPH revealed that the financial condition of the hospitals provided with finance from 
the contingency fund were similar, whatever the method employed for the separation of 
salaries from effective capitation. The separation of salaries within a hospital network in 
a province resulted in the financial condition of 10 hospitals and 56 community 
hospitals in the <1–1.5 category. Separation of salaries at the provincial level resulted in 
the financial condition of 5 large hospitals and 60 community hospitals falling in the 
<1–1.5 category. The use of this ratio in assessing the financial condition of the 
hospitals affiliated to the MoPH also revealed that the provision of finance from the 
contingency fund in the early years resulted in 69 hospitals affiliated to the MoPH 
facing financial problems accounting for 8% of the total number of the hospitals 
affiliated to the MoPH, as shown in Table 5.5 (TRDI, 2004). 
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Table 5-5  - Financial condition of the hospitals affiliated to the MoPH that were provided with 
finance from the contingency fund in 2002 
Hospital Revenue with the addition of contingency fund 
General Hospital Community 
hospital 
Hospitals not 
affiliated to the 
MoPH 
Total 
1. Capitation with the deduction of salaries within the hospital network in the province 
Group1 > 2 42 46% 518 72% 10 56% 570 69% 
Group2 1.5 - 1 40 43% 143 20% 5 28% 188 23% 
Group 3 1 – 1.5 10 11% 54 8% 1 6% 65 8% 
Group 4 < 1 0 0% 2 0% 2 11% 4 0% 
Total 92 100% 7.7 100% 18 100% 827 100 
2. Capitation with the deduction of salaries at the provincial level 
Group1 > 2 60 65% 480 67% 10 56% 550 67% 
Group2 1.5 - 1 27 29% 177 25% 5 28% 209 25% 
Group3 1 – 1.5 5 5% 55 8% 2 11% 62 7% 
Group4 < 1 0 0% 5 1% 1 6% 6 1% 
Total 92 100% 717 100% 18 100% 827 100% 
Source: Adapted from TDRI, 2004  
5.5 Withdrawal of hospitals from the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme 
As early as the third year of the UC scheme (2003), two groups of hospital sought to 
withdraw from the scheme. The first group was comprised of hospitals affiliated to the 
MoPH but which were not under the control of the office of the permanent secretary, 
whilst the second group consisted of private hospitals. Nine out of the 16 hospitals 
affiliated to the MoPH withdrew in 2003 on the grounds that their work was mostly 
concerned with healthcare promotion and disease prevention. These hospitals were the 
mother and child hospitals and local healthcare promotion centres. Five private hospitals 
withdrew from the scheme on the grounds that the per capita allocation they received 
failed to cover their operating costs (TRDI, 2004). 
Table 5-6 - Numbers of registered hospitals and target populations 
 
Dec 2001 Sep 2002 May 2003 
Number % Number % Number % 
Total Number of hospitals within the UC scheme 967 100 1,006 100 1,000 100 
Central/General  92 9.5 94 9.3 94 9.4 
Community  720 74.5 719 71.5 720 72 
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Dec 2001 Sep 2002 May 2003 
Number % Number % Number % 
Total Number of hospitals within the UC scheme 967 100 1,006 100 1,000 100 
State hospitals beyond the control of the office of 
the permanent secretary of the MoPH 17 1.8 16 1.6 7 0.7 
State hospital not affiliated to MoPH  60 6.2 70 7.0 74 7.4 
Private  67 6.9 93 9.2 88 8.8 
Others 11 1.1 14 1.4 17 1.7 
Total population under the UC scheme (millions) 40.68 100 45.33 100 45.61 100 
Central/General  8.93 22.0 9.96 22.0 10.29 22.6 
Community  29.3 72.0 30.95 68.3 31.21 68.4 
State hospitals beyond the control of the office of 
the permanent secretary of the MoPH 0.55 1.4 056 1.2 0.4 0.9 
State hospitals not affiliated to the MoPH 1.11 2.7 2.02 4.5 1.98 4.3 
Private  0.79 1.9 1.84 4.1 1.73 3.8 
Others 0.1 0.2 0.17 0.4 0.19 0.4 
Source: Adapted from the report entitled ‘the first year of the UC scheme’ TRDI, 2004 
 
5.6 The problems associated with the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme during its early years 
The early years of the operation of the UC scheme were marked by problems associated 
with the extension of coverage through the issuing of so-called ‘gold cards’. The UC 
scheme was originally meant to be named ‘the gold card scheme’ but it came to be 
known as the 30 baht scheme which denoted the public share in the responsibility for 
the costs incurred through the provision of medical services. As issuing of gold cards 
was based upon information provided by registered households, there were problems 
with the accuracy of the information available due to people relocating without 
informing the proper authorities. There was also a problem related to the timing of the 
recording of data by the MoPH. Full coverage was not achieved during the earlier years 
of the scheme and people who did not receive the gold cards included workers who had 
been employed for less than three months who were yet to benefit from the SSS. This 
group was excluded from the gold card scheme due to the perception that they 
automatically benefited from the SSS upon their employment. There were also those 
workers who had left their jobs and stopped contributing to the SSS but who were still 
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entitled to its benefits, and the database of the UC scheme also failed to include these 
people. 
Prior to the presence of the NHSO, the Office of Health Security, which is affiliated to 
the MoPH, was responsible for issuing cards. The office was also in charge of checking 
the identity of the people to be provided with cards and card issuing was based upon 
information on residence registration prepared by the Ministry of Interior. For the cards 
issued during the first three months, October to December 2001, 5 million did not pass 
the validity test, accounting for 16% of the total number of cards issued during that time 
(TDRI, 2004). In addition, as the information for issuing cards came only from 
registered households, this made the UC scheme inaccessible to the poor who tended to 
be itinerants without a fixed address, not to mention tribal people who did not possess 
identity cards. 
5.7 Availability of supportive funds in the early years of the Universal 
Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
Supportive funds could be likened to bank deposits, as these funds were collected 
revenues and profits that were reserved to be used for sustaining operations in 
accordance to the rules set out by the Ministry of Finance. The management of the 
hospitals and provincial healthcare offices assessed solvency through the consideration 
of revenue and expenses. The reserve fund, in addition to the yearly allocation to 
hospitals, formed part of the revenue and in times when the allocated funds were 
insufficient or delayed, then the supportive fund could be used to sustain operations.  
Supportive funds have increased since 2002, especially those of community hospitals 
which have risen by nearly 50% to 2,453 million baht. This increase in supportive funds 
is probably due to the budgetary allocation based upon the size of the UC population. In 
contrast, the supportive funds possessed by central and general hospitals has remained 
nearly the same as that in 2002. However, it must be taken into consideration that the 
supportive funds possessed by some central and general hospitals have increased whilst 
in others it has decreased. This fluctuation is connected to the time of budgetary 
allocation to service units in the provinces. The amount available in supportive funds 
dramatically increased in March 2002, and at the time 80% of funds were allocated to 
service units in advance as a solution to the problem of the delayed acceptance of 
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registered clients of the UC scheme. However, the latter part of 2002 saw a decrease in 
the amount of supportive funds available due to the poor performance of hospitals and 
inadequate cash flow, which resulted in the delayed allocation of funds, in fact some of 
the per capita funds were delayed until November 2002 (Naranong, 2004). 
Table 5-7  - The supportive fund reserves 2001-2002 
 Sep 2001 Dec 2001 Mar 2002 Jan 2002 Sep 2002 
Nationwide reserve of 
supportive funds (million 
baht) 
11,855.67 11,940.24 15,515.79 16,118.57 14,305.48 
Central and general 
hospitals 8,079.93 8,130.79 9,125.32 8,977.12 8,037.51 
Community hospitals 3,734.51 3,739.26 6,295.51 7,040.64 6,187.28 
The hospitals not under the 
supervision of the 
permanent secretary of the 
MoPH 
26.66 40.73 33.52 11.26 4.19 
The hospitals in the public 
sector but not affiliated to 
the MoPH 
14.57 29.40 61.44 89.55 76.51 
Source: Adapted from Naranong, 2007  
5.7.1 Fund provision characteristics 
Depending on the type of fund, payments from government to hospitals could be made 
either prior to or after the delivery of services (NHSO, 2011).  
1. Pre-payment was marked by the transfer of funds in advance during the first 
three months of the fiscal year, so that service units could use the funds in their 
operation. Pre-payment was applied to the outpatient fund, some parts of the 
healthcare promotion fund, and also some of the inpatient fund; in total, 60% of 
funds were supplied to service units as pre-payments. 
2. Post-payment was the allocation of funds based on services provided, and the 
quality of work was monitored before payments were made. Post-payment was 
applied to the Thai traditional medicine fund, the costly treatment fund, and the 
fund for patients suffering from sudden illness or accidents; in total, 40% of 
funds were provided to service units as post-payments. 
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5.7.2 The transfer of funds 
The NHSO utilised three means for the transfer of funds endorsed by the National 
Health Security commission (NHSO, 2011): 
1. Direct transfer from the NHSO to service units. 
2. Transfer via the provincial offices of the NHSO, which acted as system 
managers empowered to establish the rules to suit the need of the UC population 
under their responsibility. These rules were required to be within the bounds of 
the main rules set by the NHSO. The funds allocated to provincial offices were 
then relayed to service units according to the work output or quality of work, as 
well as per the agreement. Monitoring the quality of work was achieved through 
studying the reports submitted to the provincial healthcare office by service 
units. Agreements were forged between service units and provincial healthcare 
offices to accomplish some tasks and payment was made upon the 
accomplishment of such tasks.  
3. Transfer of funds to other service units within the province, outside the province, 
and outside the zone of responsibility. This type of funds transfer was a form of 
payment of fees that the service units demanded from each other. 
The Provincial Health Offices are assigned with the following duties: 
1. Collecting and analysing data on the operation of healthcare services.  
2. Registering service users, service units, and networks of service units. 
3. Financing service units and networks of service units. 
4. Checking and verifying the bills used in collecting service fees by service units. 
5. Assigning people to service units, responding to the people’s request to change 
their service units, and providing people with the information on service units. 
6. Ensuring that the operation of service units follows the line of the National 
Health Security commission, providing convenience in lodging complaints. 
7. Carrying out the routine works of the Provincial Health Security commission 
and their sub-committee, carrying out any tasks related to healthcare security. 
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8. Carrying out other duties in accordance with other laws or regulations, or other 
duties assigned to them by the National Security commission, the Office of 
Health Standard, and the National Health Security Office. (NHSO, 2010) 
5.7.3 Costs of treatment borne by the hospitals joining the Universal 
Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
The cost of treatments varied according to the size of a hospital; those of large hospitals 
were generally higher than those of small hospitals. Although the cost of treatment at 
large hospitals was higher, the quality of treatment was also higher due to the 
availability of better equipment and supporting systems, in addition to better qualified 
personnel and availability of specialists.  
Due to their better equipment and personnel, large hospitals attracted larger numbers of 
patients. People tended to opt for treatment in large hospitals, even when suffering from 
a less severe disease which could be treated by healthcare stations and community 
hospitals. The high expectation of the quality of hospitals led to a huge investment in 
personnel, equipment, facilities, and infrastructure to support these large hospitals, in 
turn causing the cost of treatment to increase. The MoPH set up a separate fund for 
supporting the investment in infrastructure for hospitals affiliated to the Ministry. As the 
investment was undertaken by the hospitals in the public sectors affiliated to the MoPH, 
profits were not taken into account as a factor in making the decision to invest. Instead, 
investment was undertaken as a public service. 
In the early years of the UC scheme a number of concerns about large hospitals were 
raised (Naranong, 2002):  
1. The availability of better personnel, equipment, and supporting systems enjoyed 
by large hospitals, which were generally located in urban areas, drew larger 
number of patients, both as inpatients and outpatients who could be afflicted 
with uncomplicated diseases. This resulted in a higher cost per capita being 
borne by large hospitals and the revenue they obtained from treating 
complicated diseases might not be enough to cover the costs of their operation. 
2. Their per capita allocation, especially inclusive capitation that was directed to 
districts resulted in a fear among large hospitals that small hospitals might keep 
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patients to themselves. Inclusive capitation was the means by which large 
hospitals obtained their revenue through the allocation of funds that were to be 
used for the treatment of inpatients and outpatients. The allocation of funds to 
hospitals through inclusive capitation resulted in hospitals receiving large sums 
of money that they did not want to lose through referring patients to other 
hospitals, as the hospital to which patients were referred would then charge 
treatment fees from the hospitals referring the patient. 
3. As large hospitals regarded the fund for inpatients as insufficient, they feared 
that the revenue from the DRG-based programme would result in further 
reductions.  
Consequently, a contingency fund was set up to address these problems. 
5.8 Cost of treatment in hospitals run by medical schools 
The cost of treatment in hospitals run by medical schools affiliated to the Ministry of 
Education was generally higher than that of hospitals affiliated to the MoPH, be they 
central or general hospitals. This was because (TRDI, 2004): 
1. A large number of patients referred to hospitals operated by medical schools had 
undergone treatment in community hospitals, general hospitals, or even central 
hospitals, but the diseases afflicting them had not been cured. The hospitals 
operated by medical schools therefore became a repository for patients with 
difficult diseases. 
2. The treatment in the hospitals run by medical schools tended to use more 
sophisticated drugs and technology. 
3. In addition to providing treatment, the hospitals affiliated to medical schools 
were responsible for teaching medical students. Performing the double duties of 
providing medical treatment and providing medical instruction added to their 
running costs. However, the cost of teaching should not be added to cost of 
treatment, as teaching costs, should in theory, be covered by the fees charged to 
students or allocation of funds by the government to pay for the teaching. 
The participation of the hospitals run by medical schools proved to be profitable for 
them as a lot of people found them appealing and became registered users of the 
 166 
 
hospitals. However, the majority of registered users were not ill and so a large part of 
their per capita allocation was not required to cover the cost of treatments and was 
instead kept as profit (TDRI, 2002). 
5.9 The financial condition of the hospitals affiliated to the Ministry 
of Public Health 
The presence of a UC scheme did not result in serious problems for hospitals affiliated 
to the MoPH, except for those with a small registered UC population or located in 
distant areas or along the border, which faced severe financial problems (MoPH, 2010). 
The financial condition of a hospital could be determined by the availability of their net 
reserve funds which increased continually from 2003-2009, as shown in Table 5.8. Net 
reserves can be likened to accumulated profits and were derived from the inflow of 
revenue from many sources, including profits from operational costs and even 
donations. Revenues measure the financial healthiness of a service unit and a large 
reserve is a good indicator that service units are in a good financial condition. Hospitals 
in specific areas plagued by financial problems have been provided with financial 
assistance from the NHSO and the MoPH (MoPH, 2010). 
Table 5-8  - Financial condition of the healthcare related service units during 2003 - 2009 
Items 
Fiscal Year (million baht) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
The number of the hospitals 
providing complete 
information 
783 662 711 792 809 818 822 
1. Cash left 15,635 15,734 21,158 18,468 28,141 43,276 42,963 
2. Supply left 2,990 2,972 3,590 3,783 4,294 4,818 5,241 
3. Debt 6,938 9,513 16,672 16,054 12,316 15,825 16,626 
4. Net reserved funds 11,687 9,193 8,076 6,197 20,119 32,270 31,579 
Source: MoPH, 2010, cited by the NHSO 
5.10 Financial condition of service units 2007-2011 
5.10.1 Hospitals affiliated to the Ministry of Public Health 
Hospitals affiliated to the MoPH suffered losses from the fourth quarter of 2009 to the 
fourth quarter of 2010, totalling 4,692 million baht. Financial conditions began to 
improve in 2011 and profits increased every quarter of the year, totalling 7,837 million 
 167 
 
baht, thereby reflecting the continual increase in net reserve and supportive funds as 
shown in Figure 5.2 (MoPH, 2012). 
Figure 5-2 - Profits and losses of the service units affiliated to the MoPH, 2008-2011 
 
Source: MoPH, 2012  
In 2011, the net reserve increased from 28,126 million baht in the first quarter to 31,580 
million baht in the fourth quarter, indicative of the availability of cash for unit operation 
(net reserve = current assets including cash and inventories - current liabilities) as 
shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5-3 - Net reserve of hospitals affiliated to the MoPH, 2008-2011 
 
Source: MoPH, 2012 
Supportive funds were a factor of financial security and thus indicative of the capability  
to spend: supportive funds = cash + assets that could be translated into monetary value – 
liabilities and committed long term liabilities. In general, supportive funds increased 
from the first quarter of 2011 onwards, although they decreased slightly in the third 
quarter, but then rose again (Figure 5.4).  
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Figure 5-4 - Net supportive funds for hospitals affiliated to the MoPH, 2008-2011 
 
Source: MoPH, 2012 
The financial crisis experienced by the hospitals affiliated to the MoPH worsened in the 
fourth quarter of 2010, when 71% of hospitals suffered from a combined loss of 7,388 
million baht, whilst the remaining 29% of hospitals gained a total profit of 2,727 million 
baht. The situation was much improved in 2011 when the number of hospitals suffering 
from losses was reduced to 37%, totalling losses of 2,566 million baht, whilst the 
remaining 73% of hospital reported total profits of 10,403 million baht. The MoPH 
attributed the better financial condition to the increase in budgetary allocation for the 
UC scheme by 15,000 million baht (MoPH, 2012). 
Taking into consideration the two factors of the net reserve and profits from a unit’s 
operation, the MoPH categorised hospitals into four groups according to their level of 
financial risk in the fourth quarters of 2010 and 2011. It was found that the percentage 
of hospitals in the highest risk category had dropped from 72.25% to 36.74%, whilst the 
percentage of the hospitals in the lowest risk category from 28.74% to 36.74%. 
According to the MoPH, the hospitals in the highest risk category in 2010 remained in 
the same category in 2011, and an analysis of the cause of this is yet to be made, as 
shown in Table 5.9 (MoPH, 2012). 
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Table 5-9  - The hospitals affiliated to the MoPH categorised according to the level of financial risk 
2010-2011 
Level of risk Net reserve Profits 
2010 (Q4) 2011 (Q4) 
No. of 
hospital 
% No. of 
hospital 
% 
Highest negative negative 217 26.43 115 13.99 
High positive negative 368 44.82 187 22.75 
low negative positive 41 4.99 60 7.3 
No risk positive positive 195 23.75 460 55.96 
Source: Adapted from MoPH, 2012  
5.10.2 The better financial condition of hospitals affiliated to the Ministry of 
Public Health 
Generally speaking, the financial condition of hospitals affiliated to the MoPH 
improved during 2009-2011 (MoPH, 2012). By the end of 2009, 505 hospitals 
accounting for 63% of the total, suffered total losses of 5,575 million baht, whilst 302 
hospitals accounting for 37%, reported total profits of 4,329 million baht. By the end of 
2010, the number of the hospital suffering from losses increased to 585 with total losses 
of 7,388 million baht, whilst 236 hospitals reported total profits of 2,727.19 million 
baht. At the end of 2011, the situation improved further, with 525 hospitals reporting 
total profits of 10,403 million baht whilst only 303 hospitals suffered from losses 
totalling 2,566 million baht (Table 5.10). 
Table 5-10 - Profits and losses from operation of the hospitals affiliated to the MoPH, 2009-2011 
Profits and 
losses from 
operation 
2009 2010 2011 
The number 
of hospitals 
Million 
baht 
The number of 
hospitals 
Million 
baht 
The number of 
hospitals 
Million 
baht 
Losses 505 5,575 585 7,388 303 2,566 
Profits 302 4,329 236 2,727 525 10,403 
Total 807 n.a. 821 n.a. 828 n.a. 
Source: MoPH, 2012  
In 2011, 828 out of a total of 841 hospitals provided information on their financial 
condition to the MoPH. These were 25 central hospitals, 69 general hospitals, 727 
community hospitals and 6 community medical centres. Net reserve funds were found 
to have increased by the end of 2011 by 6,399 million baht compared to the end of 
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2010. This indicated that financial stability had become better and higher net reserve 
funds meant better financial performances. 
The NHSO determined the level of financial risk of hospitals in order to assess their 
financial condition, taking into account the net reserve and ratio of revenue to salaries. 
Financial risk was characterised as eight levels, ranging from level 1 which denoted 
high risk to level 8 which denoted no risk. In the fourth quarter of 2012, 644 hospitals 
affiliated to the MoPH reported their financial condition and 57 of 79 large hospitals 
and 294 of 565 small hospitals were classified as level 8, Considering the solvency of 
hospitals region by region, it was found that 16 of 17 large hospitals in the northern 
region, 10 of 13 large hospitals in the north-eastern region, 23 of 37 large hospitals in 
the central region, and 8 of 12 large hospitals in the southern region were classified as 
level 8, as shown in Table 5.11 (NHSO, 2012). 
The MoPH attributed the decreasing losses to the allocation of more funds from the 
NHSO to service units (MoPH, 2012). It was also suggested that the deduction of 
salaries from the per capita funds should be undertaken at the national level, as at 
present (2012), salaries are deducted from capitation within the provinces. The amount 
of finance to be allocated to hospitals is determined by multiplying the number of 
people under the responsibility of each hospital by the number of funds, such as that for 
healthcare promotion and prevention. This multiplication results in the amount of 
money to be allocated to hospitals before the deduction of salaries. Provincial Health 
Offices are empowered to make requests for increases to the in outpatient fund, 
inpatient fund and part of the promotion and prevention funds for some hospitals with a 
large number of personnel, which require money from these many funds to be used as 
salaries, despite the smaller size of the UC population under their responsibility. As 
more finance is used for salaries, the fund for supporting the provision of treatment 
needs to be replenished. 
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Table 5-11  - Risk level of the hospitals affiliated to the MoPH in the last quarter of 2012 
Region Risk level (highest → lowest) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
North 
Large hospital 1 - - - - - - 16 17 
 Small hospital 21 12 9 11 4 - 8 70 135 
Northeast          
Large hospital - 3 - - - - - 10 13 
 Small hospital 25 29 5 25 3 4 18 89 198 
Central          
Large hospital - 1 - 3 3 3 4 23 37 
 Small hospital - 7 7 3 7 2 19 96 141 
South 
Large hospital 1 - - 1 - 1 1 8 12 
 Small hospital 17 7 1 2 2 2 21 39 91 
Subtotal  
large hospital 
2 4 - 4 3 4 5 57 79 
Subtotal  
small hospital 
63 55 22 41 16 8 66 294 565 
Grand total 65 59 22 45 19 12 79 351 644 
Source: NHSO, 2012  
Note: 1) Large hospitals include central and general hospitals 
2) The NHSO divided the area under its responsibility into 13 zones 
3) Financial risk was characterised by eight levels, ranging from level 1 highest risk to level 8 lowest risk 
5.11 Private hospitals 
The number of private clinics joining the UC scheme has increased since 2004 but the 
number of private hospitals joining has dropped as show in Table 5-12 
Table 5-12  - The number of private service units joining the UC Scheme 2004-2011 
Private service 
units 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Hospitals 71 63 61 60 55 50 49 44 
Clinics 89 105 116 152 150 167 169 167 
Total 160 168 177 212 205 217 218 211 
Source: NHSO, 2012 
Private clinics joining the UC scheme can be categorised by size and capacity for 
providing services as branches of hospitals, franchised clinics and standalone clinics. 
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The revenue of clinics has been derived from the budgetary allocation based upon the 
size of UC population under their responsibility, and funds used for screening, such as 
for patients with diabetes, high blood pressure, and strokes, as well as providing care to 
pregnant women, flu vaccinations, and birth control consultation. Capital replacement 
has also been allocated to hospitals according to their operational costs incurred for 
inpatients, outpatients, and healthcare promotion and disease prevention during the 
previous year. Funding is also supplied to support approved projects.  
It is clear that clinics can derive their revenue from many sources and profits can be 
gained from the inflow of additional revenue and the implementation of effective cost 
controls. The increasing number of private clinics joining the UC scheme testified to the 
profitability of joining the scheme. No research has been conducted on the financial 
condition of private service units joining the UC scheme; however, it can be ascertained 
that their retained participation in the scheme is profitable. 
5.12 Conclusions 
Budgetary allocation to service units that were parts of the UC scheme has been subject 
to change; however, the main objective has been maintained. The allocation of funds 
has been adjusted to be responsive to differences in the age structure of patients, as 
children and the elderly are more prone to diseases, and consequently more finance has 
been allocated for the purpose of their treatment and the provision of services 
encouraged by the NHSO, such as healthcare promotion and disease prevention 
services. Funds have also been made available to the service units in remote areas so 
that they could provide services with high fixed costs to smaller populations. The 
allocation of funds according to disease groups has also been introduced. This method 
of fund allocation has led to different units providing different types of services. Ten 
years after the implementation of the UC scheme there have been many complaints 
about actual or impending insolvency of hospitals and clinics due to the insufficient 
allocation of funds. The National Health Security commission recognised these 
problems and made adjustments to the budgetary allocation in order to resolve these 
issues, taking into account the quantity and quality of services provided by units and 
their financial conditions which were subject to the fiscal limitations of the public 
healthcare sector of the government. The health security commission has made an 
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annual demand for an increase in the per capita fund and the government has complied 
by increasing the annual funds allocated to the UC scheme. The government has also 
yielded to the demand that the per capita allocation be separated from the allocation of 
funds to support the treatment of dysfunctional kidneys, diabetes, high blood pressure, 
and mental illness. The allocation of funds to clearly targeted groups has contributed to 
increasing public access to healthcare services.  
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Chapter 6. Case Study 1: B-Care Medical Centre: a 
case of non-viability and opting out 
B-Care Medical Centre was a private hospital which joined the UC scheme at the 
beginning of the 2002 fiscal year on 1 October 2001(B-care Hospital, 2001). Although 
its core mission was to be a private hospital catering to relatively high fee-paying 
patients, it voluntarily joined the UC scheme believing that the delivery of state-
financed healthcare services to an excluded group would be both financially feasible 
and socially responsible. After several years of attempts at making the experiment work, 
the hospital decided to leave the scheme in 2006. The reasons for it joining the scheme 
and later leaving provide valuable insights into the relative costs and benefits of 
providing services to the different categories of patients and the consequences of the 
financing formula for the hospitals participating in the scheme (B-care Hospital, 2007). 
During the five years of its participation in the UC scheme it also provided services to 
private patients (general patients) and those covered by the SSS (the Social Security 
Scheme, also financed by the government and discussed earlier). According to the 
director of the hospital, the hospital withdrew from the UC scheme at the end of fiscal 
year 2006 on 30 September 2006, due to the dramatic increase in UCS patient numbers 
that adversely affected the quality of their services and the image the hospital was 
attempting to project as a premium hospital and a provider of high quality healthcare 
services to all its patients including the UCS ones. Interestingly, the hospital also 
temporarily exited from the SSS in 2011 for two years as a cost-reducing measure that 
will also be discussed later as it is relevant to understanding the types of calculations 
that hospitals have to make in order to balance their books.  
This case study draws on numerical and accounting data as part of the analysis of the 
hospital’s strategy for joining and eventually withdrawing from the UC scheme. The 
case study therefore highlights a number of common problems and difficulties faced by 
private hospitals joining the scheme, and some general conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the feasibility of the participation of private hospitals in the UC scheme. 
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6.1 Background 
B-Care Medical Centre was founded in 1999 by medical doctors with over fifty years of 
collective experience. As doctors and entrepreneurs they understood both the medical 
needs and the service expectations of patients. Even though Thailand went through an 
economic crisis after 1997, the opening of the hospital on 16 September 1999 was not 
affected and it was relatively successful from the outset. It is located in an area adjacent 
to the Paholyothin Road in the north of Bangkok, near the old airport, which is now 
used mainly for domestic flights. During the years of its participation in the UC scheme, 
the hospital was regarded as a Contracted Unit of Primary Care (CUP) (B-care Medical 
Centre, 2004). 
The relative profile of the B-Care Hospital compared to other private hospitals can be 
seen in detail for 2012. Although this is after the period that is the focus of this study, 
this is the earliest period for which comparable data are available. As the relative size of 
the hospital did not change considerably after 2006, the comparison gives an accurate 
estimate of the relative size and financial profile of the hospital relative to the average 
private sector hospital. B-Care is considered to be a relatively large private hospital 
(above average size), the B-Care Medical Centre had 120 beds and in 2012 it 
accommodated 6,168 inpatients, which was 77.75% of the average number of inpatients 
in private hospitals in Bangkok, whilst its outpatients numbered 147,695, around 
68.43% of the average number of outpatients of a private hospital in Bangkok. To 
provide services to patients, the hospital employed 598 personnel who were responsible 
for providing treatments, higher than the national average of 429 employees for a 
hospital (B-care Hospital, 2012). 
The hospital’s revenue was approximately 34,570,000 baht, in the same year compared 
to the average revenue of a private hospital in Thailand of 37,270,000 baht. B-Care 
Medical Centre’s revenue was thus 92.91% of the average revenue. A comparison with 
patient numbers suggests that relative to other private hospitals, this hospital specialised 
in higher quality services for its patients as it was very close to the average revenue of a 
private hospital but with much less than the average number of patients. The 
intermediate expenses of the hospital amounted to 30,231,000 baht, higher than the 
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national average which was 22,390,000 baht. A summary of the financial profile of the 
hospital relative to the average private hospital is shown in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6-1- General statistics for private hospital in 2011 and those of B-Care Medical Centre 
Vital Statistics All B-Care Comparison 
The number of private hospitals 321   
< 31 beds 59   
31 – 50 beds 50   
– 100 beds 108   
> 100 beds 104 120  
Number of patients(IP + OP)  46,335,100 153,863 0.3321% 
Inpatient (nationwide) 2,176,800.00   
Average number of inpatients in Bangkok 7,933.00 6,168 77.75% 
Outpatients (nationwide) 44,158,300   
Average number of outpatients in Bangkok 215,838 147,695 68.43% 
Number of personnel 137,598   
Average number of personnel of a private hospital 429 598 139.35% 
Revenue (million baht) 119,447.50   
Average revenue obtained by a private hospital (million baht) 372.10 345.70 92.91% 
Operation costs  71,881   
Average operation costs of a private hospital 223.90 302.31 135.02% 
Added value (million baht) 47,566.50   
Average added value of private hospital (million baht) 148.20 43.39 29.28% 
Source: 1) Adapted from ‘The 2012 Private Hospital Survey’: National Statistical Office 2012  
 2) B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
Note: Operating costs= Administrative costs + other expenses (which includes all other costs, such as medicines, 
equipment, all staff) – (land rental, taxes, depreciation, interest)  
Added value = Revenue – Operating expenses 
Revenue = Revenue from providing treatment + Revenue derived from other sources  
The hospital had an above average number of personnel in charge of treatments. In 2012 
there were 598 personnel, with 401 of them working full time and 197 part-time. In 
comparison, the national average for private histories was 429, with 337 working full 
time and 92 part-time. Whilst the average number of doctors employed by a private 
hospital was 70, B-Care Medical Centre employed 104 doctors, of which 100 were 
specialists and 4 were general practitioners. The hospital also employed 18 dentists, 
three times higher than the national average and 113 professional nurses, again higher 
than the national average which was 75. In addition, the hospital had an above average 
number of medical personnel such as radiologists, physical therapists, and pharmacists. 
In conclusion, B-Care Medical Centre is a large private hospital focusing on higher 
valued services compared to the average for private hospitals, provided by specialist 
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doctors. It employs medical personnel, such as doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists, 
and physical therapists, at a level higher than the national average, as shown in Table 
6.2. 
The hospital has been engaged in providing a number of services, but focuses on 
services relating to child delivery, healthcare for mothers and their babies, and 
healthcare promotion and disease prevention. Sophisticated medical equipment is also 
used, generating additional income for the hospital, including a 16-slice computer 
tomography machine, digital fluoroscopy, 4-dimension ultrasonography, gasto-
colonoscopy, laparoscopy, C-arm fluoroscopy, computer-assisted arthroplasty, 
extracorporeal shockwave lithotripsy, and a cosmetic laser. Supplementary services 
generating income for the hospital include therapeutic Thai massage, a spa, and special 
care for mothers (B-care Hospital, 2012). 
The quality of treatment services provided is comparable to that of Thai teaching 
hospitals and the hospital is accredited with ISO version 9001-2008, and the Hospital 
Accreditation mode HA-HPH (B-care Hospital, 2012). Though focusing on services 
provided by specialist doctors, the revenue obtained from all categories of patients was 
mostly through ‘standard medical treatment’. However, the proportion of its revenue 
obtained through ‘high value medical treatment’ increased during 2010-2012. In 2010 
the revenue obtained from high value medical treatment accounted for 26% of the total 
revenue from treatment, 445,971,000 baht. In 2011 it rose to 28.08% of the total 
revenue of 493,781,000 baht, and in 2012 it grew further to 32.86% of the total revenue 
from treatment of 345,704,000 baht, as shown in the Table 6.3. In 2000 when the 
hospital entered the UC scheme, the share of high valued services was lower, but it was 
not less than 20% of the total and the aspiration of the hospital managers was to increase 
that share whilst also delivering the healthcare required under the UC scheme. There 
was no reason to believe on the basis of the available information in 2000 that this 
would prove to be an almost impossible task. 
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Table 6-2  - Average number of personnel employed by a private hospital in 2012 compared to that 
for B-Care Medical Centre 
Personnel Average number of personnel in a private 
hospital 
B-Care 
Total Full time Part time Total Full 
time 
Part 
time 
Total 429 337 92 598 401 197 
yAdministrators 28 27 1 20 18 2 
yPersonnel in charge of 
treatment 
241 161 80 379 201 178 
Doctor 70 20 50 104 17 87 
-General 
Practitioners 
14 4 10 4 2 2 
-Specialist doctors 56 16 40 100 15 85 
Dentists 6 1 5 18 1 17 
Nurses 79 57 22 113 45 68 
-Professional 75 55 20 113 45 68 
-Technical 4 2 2 - - - 
Assistants 20 19 1 4 4 - 
Nurse assistants 57 55 2 113 108 5 
Child care and delivery 1 1 - - - - 
Other kinds of nurses 7 7 - 27 26 1 
yPersonnel in charge of 
medical services 
55 46 9 42 25 17 
Radiologists 5 4 1 8 3 5 
Physical therapists 4 3 1 5 4 1 
Medical technicians 6 5 1 Sub-contract 
Pharmacists 9 6 3 16 5 11 
Nutritionists 2 2 - 2 2 - 
Other kinds of medical 
Technicians 
29 28 1 11 11 - 
yWorkers in charge of 
daily routines 
105 102 3 157 157 - 
Source:  1) Adapted from the 2012 Private Hospital Survey, National Statistical Office 2012 
2) B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
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Table 6-3  - Revenue from standard medical treatment and high value medical treatment for all groups of patients 2001-2012 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Revenue  
(G,SSS,UC) 
(unit 1,000 baht) 
140,126 176,222 213,130 258,136 294,033 293,798 343,270 381,426 445,971 493,781 345,704 
Standard Medical 
Treatment 
116,541 
(83.17%) 
134,912 
(77.00%) 
163,720 
 (76.82%) 
217,630 
(84.31%) 
257,109 
(87.44%) 
271,029 
(92.25.%) 
248,466 
(72.38%) 
340,216 
(89.20%) 
328,597 
(74.00%) 
355,140 
(71.92%) 
232,113 
(67.00%) 
High Value Medical 
Treatment 
23,585 
(16.83%) 
41,310 
(23.00%) 
49,410 
(23.18%) 
40,506 
(15.69%) 
36,924 
(12.56%) 
22,769 
(7.75%) 
94,804 
(27.62%) 
41,210 
(10.80%) 
117,374 
(26.00%) 
138,641 
28.08%) 
113,591 
(32.86%) 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
Note: Medical Treatment is as follows: 
 
 
1. Standard Medical Treatment  
a. Application of other wound dressing 
b. Suture of skin and subcutaneous tissue of other sites 
c. Application of other cast 
d. Other incision with drainage of skin and subcutaneous tissue 
e. Other incision of eyelid 
f. Injection of insulin 
g. Injection or infusion of cancer chemotherapeutic substance 
h. Removal of nail, nail bed, or nail fold 
i. Dilation and curettage following delivery or abortion 
j. Debridement of open fracture of tibia and fibula 
k. Other caesarean section of unspecified type 
l. Low cervical caesarean section 
m. Others 
 
2. High Value Medical Treatment 
a. Singleton, born in hospital 
b. Diarrhoea and gastroenteritis of presumed infectious origin 
c. Acute upper respiratory infection, unspecified 
d. Attention to surgical dressings and sutures 
e. Follow-up examination after other treatment for other conditions 
f. Acute pharyngitis, unspecified 
g. Acute bronchitis, unspecified 
h. Delivery by elective caesarean section 
i. Pneumonia, unspecified 
j. General medical examination 
k. Others 
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SSS patients made the most frequent visits to the hospital as the figures from 2008-2011 
show that their number of outpatient visits was more than 50% greater than that of 
general patients, as shown in Table 6.4, and is increasing over time. 
Table 6-4  -The number of B-Care Medical Centre’s visiting patient falling into groups 2002-2012 
Year 
Patients 
General SSS UC Scheme 
No. OP visits % IP visits % No. 
OP 
visits % 
IP 
visits % No. 
OP 
visits % 
IP 
visits % 
2002 NA 67,539 95 3,333 5 29,740 72,729 99 900 1 21,555 16,262 97 492 3 
2003 NA 79,373 96 3,351 4 44,526 105,287 98 1,706 2 20,176 19,256 97 690 3 
2004 NA 88,506 96 3,272 4 52,113 123,555 98 1,995 2 27,137 37,603 95 1,828 5 
2005 NA 88,572 97 3,192 3 60,561 147,422 98 2,596 2 29,710 44,395 97 1,583 3 
2006 NA 88,891 97 3,117 3 65,859 185,580 98 4,701 2 27,416 31,875 96 1,167 4 
2007 NA 104,062 96 4,379 4 68,629 184,474 98 3,779 2 - -  -  
2008 NA 114,811 96 5,028 4 74,618 227,209 98 4,695 2 - -  -  
2009 NA 112,626 96 5,112 4 80,256 249,663 98 5,036 2 - -  -  
2010 NA 119,442 95 5,974 5 84,201 264,258 98 5,414 2 - -  -  
2011 NA 105,294 95 5,339 5 81,329 237,331 98 4,570 2 - -  -  
2012 NA 140,091 95 6,927 5 NA NA  NA - - - 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
Note: IP – inpatient, OP – outpatient 
6.2 The decision to join the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
Interviews with hospital management revealed that management carefully considered 
the UC scheme on the basis of the available evidence and decided to join for a number 
of reasons. According to the hospital, its decision to join the UC scheme was based on 
the consideration of a number of factors:  
1. The number of general patients and the patients covered by the Social Security 
Scheme (SSS) was not large, so there was sufficient space and equipment for 
use in the medical treatment of a broader group of patients. As the fixed costs 
were already paid for, the opposition should have been viable as long as the 
marginal costs of additional treatments based on the available equipment could 
be covered.  
2. The hospital needed to increase its flow of funds to finance its daily operations 
and management in the early years of its operation. The UC scheme offered an 
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enhanced flow of funds and could therefore have usefully complemented its 
existing business model by being added on to the existing systems.  
3. Moreover, fewer benefits and treatments were offered by the UC Scheme to 
patients in the earlier years of its implementation which made it feasible for 
hospitals to control costs. 
6.3 Income 
Before its withdrawal from the UC scheme and the SSS, the hospital obtained its 
income from three main sources: general (private) patients; SSS patients; and the UC 
scheme patients. During the five year period of 2002-2005, the percentage of income 
from general patients, which represented the largest proportion of total income, dropped 
from 57% in 2002 to 52.8% in 2003, 43.4% in 2005 and then 37.1% in 2006. In 
contrast, the percentage of the income from the SSS increased from 25.2% in 2002 to 
50.5% in 2003 and from the UC scheme it decreased from 16.9% in 2002 to 13.8% in 
2003, and 13.6% in 2004, then rose to 17.6% in 2005 before dropping to 12% in 2006, 
as shown Table 6.5.  
Table 6-5  - Sources of income for the hospital 2002-2006 
Sources of income
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
General patients 
 
79,871 
(57%) 
93,057 
(52.8%) 
108,916 
(53.4%) 
112,091 
(43.4%) 
106,662 
(37.1%) 
SSS 
35,351 
(25.2%) 
57,999 
(32.9%) 
74,073 
(32.5%) 
99,279 
(38.5%) 
151,017 
(50.5%) 
UC scheme 
23,617 
(16.0%) 
24,381 
(13.8%) 
28,888 
(13.6%) 
45,409 35,297 
(12.0%) 
Others 
1,287 
(0.9%) 
785 
(0.4%) 
1,253 
(0.6%) 
1,357 
(0.5%) 
1,057 
(0.4%) 
Total 
140,126 
(100%) 
176,222 
 
213,130 258,136 294,033 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
Note: unit 1,000 baht 
After its withdrawal from the UC scheme the hospital got its income mainly from two 
sources. In 2007, the income from general patients amounted to 157.18 million baht, 
comprising 54% of the total revenue, in 2008 it increased to 223.57 million baht, 
accounting for 65%, in 2009 it increased to 241.02 million baht, accounting for 63%, in 
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2010 it grew to 277.54 million baht, accounting for 62%, and in 2011, it grew further to 
310.38 million baht accounting for 63% of the total revenue. Meanwhilst, the income 
from the SSS also increased over the same period, from 132.30 million baht in 2007 to 
119.70 million baht, 140.40 million baht, 168.42 million baht, and 183.39 million baht 
in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively. With the deduction of pre-taxation costs 
and capital replacement, the revenue gained by the hospital always remained higher 
than its costs, as shown in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6-6  - Costs and revenue derived from providing services to patients of all categories 2002-2011 
Revenues 
(unit 1,000 baht) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
General 79,871 93,057 108,916 112,091 106,662 157,185 223,569 241,022 277,544 310,385 
SSS 35,351 57,999 74,073 99,279 151,017 132,301 119,700 140,403 168,427 183,395 
UC 23,617 24,381 28,888 45,409 35,297 4,311 - - - - 
Total (3 schemes) 138,839 175,437 211,877 256,779 292,976 292,062 335,101 373,144 436,481 483,088 
Others 1,287 785 1,253 1,357 1,057 1,736 8,169 8,282 9,490 10,693 
Total revenues 140,126 176,222 213,130 258,136 294,033 293,798 343,270 381,426 445,971 493,781 
Costs (all three 
categories) 
          
Drugs 17,961 22,538 31,374 39,267 45,322 41,436 51,394 60,234 76,870 81,276 
Disposable medical 
materials 
13,376 2,147 2,869 3,787 4,457 4,925     
Doctors 22,765 30,194 39,916 47,638 60,136 66,101 76,857 87,137 98,019 104,270 
Personnel 10,473 25,959 32.325 41,384 48,612 55,547 85,799 91,647 111,705 122,215 
Network of clinic and 
other hospital 
454 2,777 2,630 6,316 5,976 8,105 5,398 6,125 13,101 12,641 
Administrative costs 25,711 40,022 52,942 59,725 79,483 89,609 80,225 97,762 98,312 105,811 
Total costs 90,741 123,638 162,058 198,119 243,988 265,726 299,676 342,908 398,009 426,215 
Revenues higher than 
cost 
49,384 52,583 51,071 60,016 50,044 28,072 43,594 38,518 47,962 67,565 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
Note:  1) The hospital opted out from the UC scheme in 2006 
2) Administrative costs exclude interest and depreciation 
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Revenue from the UC scheme demonstrated a general increase from 2002-2006. However, 
when taking costs into account, profits from the scheme tended to decrease. In 2001 the per 
capita profit was 679.49 baht, but this decreased to 575.42 baht and 184.25 baht in 2003 
and 2004, respectively. In 2005 it increased to 273.44 baht but this turned to a loss of 13.36 
baht per capita per head in 2006, as shown in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. 
Table 6-7  - UC scheme revenue 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
UC scheme registered users 22,915 20,774 24,225 35,190 22,648 - 
Average per capita income from the UC 
scheme 
1,030.63 1,173.63 1,192.48 1,290.39 1,558.50  
Revenue(unit 1,000 baht)       
• Outpatients - - - 19,511 15,624 - 
• Inpatients 22,744 18,763 24,324 14,553 8,084 - 
• Private patients - - - 3,285 3,236 199 
• Investment costs/Capital 
replacement 
- 3,565 1,675 2,406 2,274 - 
• High cost treatments - - 467 2,001 892 127 
• EXC/RW  - - - 3,285 5,073 180 
• Insurance costs 346 369 612 765 702 - 
• Added value 526 1,683 1,808 2,886 1,518 3,180 
• Others - - - - 2,439 623 
Total revenue 23,617 24,381 28,888 45,409 35,297 4,311 
Costs (unit 1,000 baht)        
• Drugs 1,153 2,359 4,813 7,577 6,568 - 
• Disposable medical materials 207 268 531 776 790 - 
• Doctor 1,507 1,630 3,899 5,902 7,191 - 
• Personnel 1,180 2,325 4.147 6,146 6,411 - 
• Network of clinic and other 
hospital 
- 1,146 1,024 3,059 1,158 - 
• Administrative costs 3,997 4,697 10,008 12,323 13,478 - 
Total costs 8,046 12,427 24,424 35,786 35,599 - 
Net revenue 15,570 11,953 4,463 9,622 -302 4,311 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2009 
Note: Administrative costs exclude interest and depreciation 
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Table 6-8  - UC scheme net revenue and cost per capita 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
UC registered users 22,915 20,774 24,225 35,190 22,648 
Average per capita income  1,030.63 1,173.63 1,192.48 1,290.39 1,558.50 
Average per capita cost 351.14 598.21 1,008.23 1,016.95 1,571.84 
Net Revenue per capita  679.49 575.42 184.25 273.44 -13.36 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2009 
6.4 Cost and expenditures 
The hospital’s operational costs fell into six categories, which continually increased from 
2002-2011: 
1. Drugs 
2. Medical equipment and materials 
3. Doctors salaries 
4. Personnel salaries 
5. Network of clinics and other hospitals - transfer of patients 
6. Administrative costs 
Details of these costs are provided in Tables 6.9- 6.13. 
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Table 6-9  - B-Care Medical Centre patient costs 2002-2003 
Costs 
2002  2003  
Private 
Patients SSS 
UC 
scheme Total 
Private 
Patients SSS UC scheme Total 
Number of patients NA 29,740 22,915  NA 44,526 20,774  
Cost per capita (baht)  883.46 351.14   958.59 598.21  
Cost by patients (unit 1,000 baht) 
Drugs 12,104 4,704 1,153 17,961 13,513 6,666 2,359 22,538 
Disposable medical materials 11,830 1,339 207 13,376 946 932 269 2,147 
Doctors 17,842 3,416 1,507 22,765 22,193 6,371 1,630 30,194 
Personnel 5,610 3,683 1,180 10,473 14,064 9,570 2,325 25,959 
Network of clinic and other 
hospital 
- 454 - 454 - 1,631 1,147 2,778 
Administrative costs 9,037 12,678 3,997 25,712 17,813 17,512 4,697 40,022 
Total 56,423 26,274 8,046 90,741 68,529 42,682 12,427 123,638 
Percentage 62.2 28.9 8.9 100 55.5 34.5 10.0 100 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
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Table 6-10  - B-Care Medical Centre patient costs 2004-2005 
Costs 
2004  2005 
Private 
Patients SSS 
UC 
scheme Total 
Private 
Patients SSS 
UC 
scheme Total 
Number of patients NA 52,113 27,137  NA 60,561 29,710  
Cost per capita (baht)  1,138.28 1,008.23   1,231.02 1,016.95  
Cost by patients (unit 1,000 baht) 
Drugs 16,510 10,050 4,814 31,374 17,559 14,131 7,578 39,268 
Disposable medical materials 1,127 1,212 531 2,870 1,299 1,712 776 3,787 
Doctors 24,095 11,922 3,899 39,916 29,097 12,639 5,903 47,639 
Personnel 16,107 12,071 4,147 32,325 18,591 16,647 6,146 41,384 
Network of clinic and other 
hospital 
- 1,607 1,024 2,631 - 3,256 3,060 6,316 
Administrative costs 20,477 22,457 10,008 52,942 21,235 26,167 12,323 59,725 
Total 78,316 59,319 24,424 162,058 87,781 74,552 35,786 198,119 
Percentage 48.3 36.6 15.1 100 44.3 37.6 18.1 100 
 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
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Table 6-11  - B-Care Medical Centre patient costs 2006-2007 
Costs 
2006 2007 
Private 
Patients SSS 
UC 
scheme Total 
 Private 
Patients SSS 
UC 
scheme total 
Number of patients NA 65,859 27,416  NA 68,629 0  
Cost per capita (baht)  1,779.50 1,571.84   2,062.26 NA  
Cost by patients (unit 1,000 baht) 
Drugs 18,080 20,674 6,568 45,322 20,153 21,284 - 41,437 
Disposable medical materials 1,341 2,326 791 4,458 1,984 2,942 - 4,926 
Doctors 26,785 26,159 7,192 60,136 39,850 26,251 - 66,101 
Personnel 20,479 21,722 6,411 48,612 24,858 30,689 - 55,547 
Network of clinic and other 
hospital 
- 4,817 1,159 5,976 - 8,106 - 8,106 
Administrative costs 24,508 41,498 13,478 79,484 37,350 52,259 - 89,609 
Total 91,193 117,196 35,599 243,988 124,195 141,531 - 265,726 
Percentage 37.4 48.0 14.6 100 46.7 53.3 - 100 
 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
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Table 6-12  - B-Care Medical Centre patient costs 2008-2009 
Costs 
2008  2009  
Private 
Patients SSS 
UC 
scheme Total 
Private 
Patients  SSS 
UC 
scheme Total 
Number of patients NA 74,618 0  NA 80,256 0  
Cost per capita (baht)  2,113.23 NA  2,289.92 NA  
Cost by patients (unit 1,000 baht) 
Drugs 24,104 28,350 - 52,454 25,967 35,367 - 61,334 
Disposable medical materials 1,999 3,096 - 5,095 2,181 3,700 - 5,881 
Doctors 47,674 29,183 - 76,857 52,095 35,043 - 87,138 
Personnel 28,306 33,846 - 62,152 41,119 54,748 - 95,867 
Network of clinic and other 
hospital 
- 5,447 - 5,447 - 6,125 - 6,125 
Administrative costs 39,908 57,763 - 97,671 37,766 48,797 - 86,563 
Total 141,991 157,685 - 299,676 159,128 183,780 - 342,908 
Percentage 47.4 52.6 - 100 46.4 53.6 - 100 
 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
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Table 6-13  - B-Care Medical Centre patient costs 2010-2011 
Costs 
2010 2011 
Private 
Patients SSS 
UC 
scheme Total 
Private 
Patients  SSS 
UC 
scheme Total 
Number of patients NA 84,201 0  NA 81,329 0  
Cost per capita (baht)  2,577.17 NA   2,978.79 NA  
Cost by patients (unit 1,000 baht)  
Drugs 29,529 40,294 - 69,823 32,908 44,987 - 77,895 
Disposable medical materials 2,651 4,397 - 7,048 2,680 4,583 - 7,263 
Doctors 58,769 39,250 - 98,019 64,420 42,036 - 106,456 
Personnel 49,047 62,658 - 111,705 54,573 72,569 - 127,142 
Network of clinic and other 
hospital 
- 13,102 - 13,102 - 12,325 - 12,325 
Administrative costs 44,329 57,299 - 101,628 45,775 65,762 - 111,537 
Total 184,325 217,000 - 401,325 200,356 242,262 - 442,618 
Percentage 47.4 52.6 - 100 46.4 53.6 - 100 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2012 
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6.5 Outcome of operation during the hospital’s participation in 
Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
Detailed discussions and access to its broad accounting data show that income from the 
UC scheme funds were adequate to cover the operating costs of the scheme for the 
hospital during the first four year of its participation in the Scheme. However, in the last 
year of its participation in the UC scheme its suffered losses due to the higher 
proportion of costs for the treatment of severe and chronic diseases, as the hospitals 
admitted more patients with cancer, heart diseases, diabetes, and high blood pressure. A 
significant problem was that adequate funds were not provided to the hospital to support 
the treatment of severe and chronic diseases and as a result, the hospital had to bear 
much of the higher costs itself.  
Most of the revenue for the hospital from UC scheme came through payments for 
standard medical treatments during 2002-2006. In 2002, the revenue from standard 
medical treatments amounted to 12,379,600 baht, accounting for 83.17% of the total, 
whilst the revenue for higher value medical treatments within the scheme amounted to 
2,505,400 baht, accounting for 16.83% (Table 6.14). 
Table 6-14  - Revenue from standard medical treatment and high value medical treatment UC 
2001-2012 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Revenue  
 (unit 1,000 baht) 
14,885 16,788 28,887 43,062 40,566 
Standard Medical Treatment 
12,379.60 
(83.17%) 
12,852 
(76.55%) 
20,329 
(70.37%) 
22,785 
(52.91%) 
29,205 
(71.99%) 
High Value Medical Treatment 
2,505.40 
(16.83%) 
3,936 
(23.45%) 
8,558 
(29.63%) 
20,277 
(47.09%) 
11,361 
(28.01%) 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2009 
Note: Some examples of medical treatments in standard and high-valued categories are given below.  
Table 6.15 shows that the profit/revenue ratio achieved in the general group of private 
patients remained steady, although there was a slight decline, from 29.35% in 2002 to 
26.36% in 2003, before increasing to 28.10% in 2004, but then dropping to 21.61% in 
2005 before dramatically decreasing to 14.50% in 2006. In contrast, the profit/revenue 
share in the Social Security (SSS) group remained quite stable at 20-26%, while the 
profit/revenue from the UC scheme, like those of the general group, steadily declined 
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and finally turned negative in 2006. The losses from the UC scheme, together with the 
much lower revenues obtained from this scheme compared to the revenues gained from 
patients in the other categories was the background to the hospital decision to withdraw 
from the UC scheme. 
Table 6-15  - Profit/revenue from the services provided to each group of patients 2002-2006 
Patients 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Private patients  
(unit : 1,000 baht) 
Revenue 79,871 93,057 108,916 112,091 106,662 
Cost 56,423 68,529 78,316 87,781 91,193 
Profit 23,448 24,528 30,600 24,310 15,469 
Profit share in 
revenue (%) 29.35 26.35 28.10 21.69 14.50 
Social Security 
Fund 
 
Revenue 35,351 57,999 74,073 99,279 151,017 
Cost 26,274 42,682 59,319 74,552 117,196 
Profit 9,077 15,317 14,754 24,727 33,821 
Profit/revenue 
(%) 25.67 26.41 19.92 24.91 22.39 
Universal 
Healthcare 
Coverage  
Revenue 23,617 24,381 28,888 45,409 35,297 
Cost 8,044 12,427 24,423 35,786 35,599 
Profit 15,573 11,954 4,465 9,623 (302) 
Profit/revenue 
(%) 65.93 49.01 15.46 21.19 -0.85 
Source: B-care Medical Centre, 2010 
Note: unit is 1,000 baht 
6.6 Withdrawal from the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
The hospital’s participation in the UC scheme led to a number of problems. Table 6.15 
shows that the returns to joining the scheme were very high for private hospitals in the 
early years the per capita payments for registered patients came in immediately but the 
demands on the hospital for treatments, particularly for high cost treatments were low in 
the early years as newly registered UC patients took time to work out their entitlements 
and their more chronic diseases and requirements took time to diagnose. In a couple of 
years, however, expensive treatment regimens were engaged in for increasing numbers 
of patients in the UC scheme. Table 6.15 also shows that the revenue coming from the 
government also increased, as the ad hoc payments that were discussed in earlier 
chapters began to come in to cover the rapidly increasing costs of the scheme. However, 
the increase in revenues coming from the government could not keep pace with the 
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rapidly increasing costs of delivering services to UC patients and the hospital eventually 
went into a financial deficit on the UC patient account.  
Interviews with hospital management suggest that they did not have access to clear 
projections by the government on the likely costs of the scheme based on a clear 
financial model of the finances that would be available to cover specific treatments, the 
treatments that would be allowed under the scheme, and the rules for dealing with cases 
that were expensive. Private hospitals in Thailand like the B-Care Hospital potentially 
have very sophisticated treatments for difficult cases, and these are based on the private 
side of the hospitals’ service delivery. Costs can rapidly increase beyond the 
government’s ability to match it with tax-based revenues. A clearer understanding on 
the part of policy-makers about how to manage expectations by defining the treatments 
that were available under the scheme would have enabled private hospitals to manage 
their UC service delivery model better.  
Instead of a clear business model, what happened was an initial level of optimism on the 
part of the hospital that it would be able to provide a high level of service to the UC 
patients based on some of the same equipment and treatments that were available to its 
private patients and that the government would at least cover the operating costs of 
these treatments. It soon transpired, however, that this expectation was misplaced.  
Management discovered that quality control was difficult to maintain as staff got 
overloaded with work and this gave rise to low quality services and led to complaints 
being made either directly to the hospital or by being posted on the internet. The 
complaints mostly came from UC scheme inpatients and outpatients concerning the 
long waiting times for examination, treatment, and surgery. As the demand for service 
delivery to the UC patients increased rapidly, the hospital evolved informal ways of 
internal rationing that led to longer waiting times for the UC patients because there was 
a much lower level of financial support for the treatment of these patients coming from 
the government.  
Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction of the UC patients could not be insulated from the 
general image of the hospital. The hospital was trying to maintain a positive image as a 
provider of high quality healthcare services to its paying patients because the bulk of its 
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profits came from this sector, and the projection was to raise that part of the hospital’s 
activities even more. From this perspective, the hospital management found that the 
problem of the UC scheme was a negative impact on its reputation as a provider of high 
quality services unless it could find a way of providing high quality services to the UC 
patients with the limited resources available. The hospital management argues that the 
steep decline in profits attributed to the UC service delivery side reflects the fact that the 
hospital tried its best to maintain service delivery to the UC patients even at the cost of 
declining profits, and eventually losses. However, even so, it could not protect itself 
from the dissatisfaction of the UC customers because some decline in the quality of 
service delivery was inevitable and the same level of service could not be provided to 
the UC patients. The expectations of the UC patients were however in line with the 
somewhat better services they saw being delivered to the paying customers.  
A negative attitude towards the hospital was thus developed among its UC service users 
and as a result, the image of the hospital as a premium hospital was adversely affected. 
The complaints of the UC customers affected the general reputation of the hospital and 
this was deemed even more damaging to the hospital than the low profits or small losses 
associated with the UC scheme. Being seen as a premium hospital was crucial to its 
brand image and had to be maintained at any cost to sustain the revenue flow that was 
necessary even for subsidising the UC scheme. By 2006, the hospital management 
decided they could no longer accept the deterioration of the environment in the UC part 
of the hospital to one comparable to that of public hospitals caused by the influx of UC 
scheme users. Paradoxically, even though UC customers were complaining about delays 
and queues, the problem for the private hospitals was that many UC customers preferred 
to register in a private hospital rather than in a public hospital because the conditions 
and environment were relatively better. This caused an overload on the private hospitals 
that exacerbated the problem of maintaining service quality. By 2006, the deterioration 
of the hospital environment began to have an effect on the attractiveness of the hospital 
for paying customers and the hospital began to lose the growth in revenue that it had 
projected from these customers. This exacerbated the losses in operational costs that 
were experienced by the hospital on its UC scheme registered users (B-care Hospital, 
2006; 2012). 
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6.7 Conclusions 
UC allows for the participation of private hospitals. Participation of private hospitals in 
large numbers in UCS helps strengthen the scheme in that it increases the availability of 
service units, and patients enjoying easier access to services due to such availability will 
provide their steady support to the scheme, not to mention that the politicians who back 
the scheme from the start will increase in popularity. As for the private hospitals 
participating in the scheme, they will benefit in terms of higher revenues, marketing and 
public image. As a result, private hospitals are expected to continue their support for the 
scheme. 
The experience of B-Care was not untypical. Many private hospitals discovered that the 
UC scheme would not cover the full costs of treatment for UC patients at the level that 
was being delivered to their private paying customers. The result was an informal two-
tier system that satisfied neither the UC patients, who compared their service delivery to 
the private patients, nor the private patients who were affected by the complaints of the 
UC patients. The private hospitals thus had a choice. They could either downgrade their 
services overall, to cater fully to the UC type of patient or they would have to opt out of 
the UC scheme. The strategy of maintaining a two-tier system was neither desirable 
(though some private hospitals continue to attempt this), nor feasible for hospitals like 
B-Care which wanted a transparent quality of service across the full body of patients. 
In the case of B-Care the problem of a two-tier system emerged even more quickly 
because the hospital had been set up to cater to the demands of affluent private patients 
delivering high value medical services. The hospital was meant to be a premium 
hospital employing an above average number of medical personnel, especially specialist 
doctors. However, most of the hospital’s income came from standard medical treatment, 
despite its huge investment in the best qualified personnel and sophisticated equipment. 
However, after joining the UC scheme, the hospital found that the most likely growth 
area for future incomes was high value medical treatments. After leaving the UC 
scheme, high value healthcare for private patients has grown rapidly in importance as a 
proportion of the hospital’s total revenue. This is a trend across the private sector 
hospitals in Thailand as the more affluent sections of Thai society are able to afford 
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increasingly expensive treatments and Thailand is also emerging as a regional centre for 
high net worth patients from neighbouring countries.  
However, despite this, the hospital continues to deal with state supported Social 
Security (SSS) patients. Indeed, these patients comprise the most frequent service users 
of the hospital, and are considered the mainstay of the hospital’s revenue and profits in 
addition to general patients. This anomaly shows that private hospitals can deal with 
state supported patients provided they are relatively few in number and are adequately 
funded. 
It can be deduced from the figures presented in this chapter that healthcare insurance 
schemes such as the SSS remain an important source of revenue for premium private 
hospitals such as B-Care Medical Centre. Funds from this income source have 
contributed greatly to the hospital’s financial viability. The hospital hoped to gain a 
similar income from the UC scheme. However, the reality fell far short of this 
expectation and resulted in the hospital making losses as a result of the inadequate 
resources received by the hospital through the funding formulae. The UC claimants 
registering under the UC scheme had rapidly rising expectations and the state funding 
formulae fell short of adequately supporting the costs involved in providing a high level 
of healthcare services to these patients.  
Compared to the UC scheme, the SSS guaranteed a steady flow of income to the 
hospital because it allowed hospitals to draw in as many SSS patients as possible based 
on the reputation of the hospital and its specialisations. The number of SSS patients per 
a hospital is not fixed, and as a result, many high quality hospitals such as B-Care 
Medical Centre can attempt to attract as many SSS patients as possible. In contrast, the 
number of UC scheme patients assigned to a hospital is constrained by the UC 
population under its responsibility and so the number cannot be increased nor can extra 
revenue be generated.  
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Chapter 7. Case Study 2: Baanpaew Hospital: A 
case of viable evolution 
7.1 Background 
Baanpaew Hospital is a public hospital in the province of Samutsakorn that has been 
granted autonomy in its management and operation. As a result, it is no longer subject 
to the normal rules guiding public hospitals in general, even though it remains under 
public ownership and is under the direction of the state (Baanpaew Hospital, 2011). 
Many public hospitals struggle to deliver the UC services, but unlike private hospitals, 
they had no choice and could not opt out of the scheme. Most public hospitals suffered 
from severely enhanced workloads and delays in the treatment of patients as a result of 
the inadequate funding of the programme (Pitayarangsarit, 2004). However, Baanpaew 
Hospital was one of the few public hospitals that were able to innovate new ways of 
service delivery and achieved specialisation in the delivery of particular services that 
served to reduce or limit the escalation of their costs (Baanpaew Hospital, 2011). What 
the hospital achieved will be considered, and later the implications for the long-term 
viability of the UC scheme will be discussed. The one significant difference of 
Baanpaew Hospital relative to other public hospitals is that it was an autonomous public 
hospital that was exceptional in its ability to restructure itself. It also benefited from 
exceptionally good leadership and vision in its higher management, that enabled it to 
design new and effective ways of delivering healthcare services at relatively low cost.  
Baanpaew Hospital began as a first-rate public healthcare station in 1965, and then 
became a medical Centre and district hospital in 1975 and 1976, respectively, with its 
name changing to Baanpaew Hospital in 1981. Its size gradually expanded and it 
became a 30-bed hospital in 1982. The number of beds further increased to 60, 90, and 
120 in 1991, 1994, and 1996, respectively (Baanpaew Hospital, 2000). 
Before being granted autonomy under a royal decree of 2002, the hospital was 
effectively semi-privatised in its management but with allowances for public 
participation as it remained formally a public hospital. The hospital contracted out to the 
private sector items such as the food supply for patients and the maintenance of 
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elevators, as well as entering into a partnership with the private sector to provide a CT-
scanning service. In the bidding arrangement for equipment and construction, 
representatives of the community have seats on the hospital development committee and 
have been invited to witness the bidding process and to help bargain with the bidders 
(Baanpaew Hospital, 2011). 
The hospital was founded by a royal decree in 2002 based on the Public Organisation 
Act enacted in 1999, and the hospital has been in operation in its present form since 11 
September 2002. The intention of the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in enabling 
these decrees was to establish autonomous hospitals as a condition of receiving loans 
for such hospitals from the Asian Development Bank. The history of this policy package 
can be traced back to the suggestions made by analysts at the Health System Research 
Institute in 1997 to representatives of the Asian Development Bank (HealthSystems 
Research Institute, 2011a, 2011b). At present, the hospital has nine branches:  
1. Baanpaew Hospital, two in the province of Samutsakorn. 
2. A branch in the Prommitr area in Bangkok. 
3. A branch in Changwattana in Bangkok, an area where government 
administrative offices are located. 
4. A branch in the Kasetpattana area in the province of Samutsakorn. 
5. A branch in the Lakha area in the province of Samutsakorn. 
6. A community medical centre in Ratbamrung in the province of Samutsakorn. 
7. A community medical centre in Laksam in the province of Samutsakorn. 
8. Thonburi Kidney Treatment and Dialysis centre in Bangkok. 
9. Thonburi Medical Centre in Bangkok. 
In allowing some public hospitals like the Baanpaew hospital to achieve operational 
autonomy, the central government had a number of objectives that are listed below. 
However, the implementation of the autonomy-granting policy to fulfil these objectives 
was limited to particular public hospitals which were deemed ready for autonomous 
operation outside the bureaucratic controls and limits of most public hospitals. The 
objectives of the government in the implementation of this policy included the 
following: (MoPH, 2000). 
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1. Reduction of administrative complexity 
This was reduced through improvements in the regulation of budgetary management, 
salary payments, the acquisition of equipment, and the recruitment of personnel. The 
management of Baanpaew Hospital was free to make changes to the rules and 
regulations in order to enhance administrative flexibility, subject to cabinet 
supervision and was required to report to the cabinet. However, the allocation of 
funds to the hospital was based on the same formula and criteria as was used by the 
MoPH for all hospitals.  
2. Efficient resource allocation 
This was associated with the allocation of funds, equipment, and personnel to meet 
the specific needs of particular areas which was only made possible through the 
elimination of external bureaucratic rules. Local service providers like the different 
branches of the Baanpaew hospital identified local requirements and acquired 
equipment and personnel to meet these needs. 
3. Enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness 
Efficiency relates to the outcomes of operations relative to the resources invested, 
whilst effectiveness refers to the outcomes of operations viewed as a fulfilment of the 
stated objectives of the operation. Reductions in the complexity of the administrative 
structure and the efficient allocation of resources were believed to contribute to the 
enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness. 
4. Accountability 
This is in relation to the evaluation of performance, assessment of the quality of 
hospitals and personnel, as well as public participation in assessing and improving 
the operation of a hospital. The autonomous public hospitals like Baanpaew were 
still accountable to public boards and ordinary citizens participated in the operational 
committees of the hospital. 
5. Political objectives 
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There was in addition a political objective of the reformers to carry out these 
bureaucratic reforms to achieve a decentralisation of authority. This was one of the 
key objectives of the government. 
6. Community participation 
This is closely related to the question of accountability. The policy-makers 
supporting the autonomy of public hospitals believed that autonomy together with 
community participation was crucial for achieving the objective of serving the whole 
community, not just those who are privileged or well-informed.  
To achieve these aims the following measures were taken (Thammathat-aree, 2001). 
7. Deregulation 
The royal decree granting the status of public organisation to the Baanpaew Hospital 
made the hospital autonomous in the following ways: 
• The role of the director of the hospital was not set by the central authorities but 
was to be determined by the executive committee of the hospital. 
• The hospital was free to determine positions for jobs, the conditions of 
employment, the qualifications of employees, salary levels etc. It was also free 
to deal with recruitment, appointments to positions, evaluations of job 
performance, dismissal from posts, disciplining and punishment, the 
management of finance and property, and the welfare of its employees. 
However, the hospital was subject to inspection from agencies such as the office 
of the general auditor of Thailand and the healthcare accreditation institute. 
• The chain of command within the hospital was shortened as it was left to the 
hospital to determine its own administrative structure. 
• The hospital was free to issue bonds to raise further funds. 
• The hospital was free to enter into partnerships with other legal entities. 
• The hospital was free to keep all its revenues from the provision of services and 
donations from the public.  
8. Re-organisation 
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The aim of the re-organisation was to shorten the chain of command and this 
was actually achieved. The old chain of command before the hospital was 
granted autonomy is represented in Figure 7.1 and we can compare it with the 
organisational map of the hospital after autonomy had been granted.  
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Figure 7-1 - Chain of Command before autonomy was granted 
 
The new chain of command after the hospital was granted autonomy is shown in Figure  
Figure 7-2  - Chain of Command after autonomy was granted 
 
Once autonomy had been granted to the hospital, the administration was also re-
structured. The administrative restructuring was particularly important for the reforms 
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that the hospital was able to carry out to achieve the successful delivery of UCS 
services. Figure 7.1 represents the old administration structure of the hospital. 
Figure 7-3 - Administrative structure after autonomy was granted 
 
The main service units dealt with outpatient services for surgery, childbirth, 
emergencies, paediatrics, eye treatment, neck treatment, nose treatment and dentistry, 
bone surgery, healthcare promotion, epidemiology and disease prevention, psychiatry 
and mental health, hygiene and safety. Ratbamrung Medical Centre and the second 
branch of the Baanpaew Hospital were also included in the main service units. The 
secondary service units dealt with inpatient services for surgery, paediatrics, childbirth 
rooms, the physical health of mothers after child delivery, pharmacies, operation rooms, 
radiology, anaesthetics, diagnostics, special in-patient cases, and kidney treatment and 
dialysis.  
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Figure 7-4  - Administrative structure before autonomy was granted 
 
The supporting units dealt with healthcare security, the acquisition of equipment, 
personnel management, accounting and financial management, and public relations. The 
education and human resource development unit dealt with the development of the 
quality of the hospital, disease prevention, personnel development, the hospital library, 
planning and evaluation, information management, and statistics and registration. The 
re-organisation resulted in a new administration structure shown in Figure 7.4. 
The service units dealt with surgery, childbirth, paediatrics, treatment of eyes, ears, 
throat and nose, orthopaedics, healthcare promotion and disease prevention. Baanpaew 
2 Hospital treated in-patients, and provided pharmacy and radiology services. 
Supporting units dealt with healthcare security, general management, public relations, 
and quality development. 
Re-organisation resulted in: (Baanpaew Hospital, 2011) 
1. Real autonomy for the hospital as the executive committee and director of the 
hospital were authorised to determine the rules and regulations relating to the 
operation and administration of the hospital.  
2. The hospital was free to transfer and dismiss personnel, as well as to increase or 
lower salaries, based on its own rules and regulations. 
3. The private sector was approached to take over the dispensing of drugs. The 
prices of drugs are agreed upon and payment to the private sector is made after 
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the drugs are dispensed on a monthly basis. In developed countries when the 
private sector dispenses drugs, the costs can increase because the seller has an 
incentive to provide expensive drugs. This did not happen with Baanpaew as the 
drugs were specified in advance. 
4. Personnel were allowed to negotiate their full and part time wages.  
5. The management of the hospital adopted marketing principles in attracting 
patients to the hospital by publicising what the hospital was doing. 
6. The allocation of human resources to the hospital was no longer through the 
Civil Service Commission and the MoPH. The hospital is free to recruit 
personnel who are considered to be employees of public organisations rather 
than bureaucrats. Their salaries are also higher than those of bureaucrats. When 
the hospital was turned into a public organisation, the bureaucrats who continued 
to work for the hospital became employees of a public organisation, and this 
resulted in a 50% increase in their salaries. 
7. The hospital is able to acquire drugs from various sources.  
8. The hospital is free to invest in expensive equipment, land and buildings with 
the approval of the Executive Board alone and no approval from the MoPH is 
required as in the past.  
9. The hospital has a better ratio of doctor/dentists per head of population, 
compared to the other hospitals located within its service radius. 
The royal decree under which the hospital was founded in 2002 required the setting up 
of an executive board, which is comprised of: (Baanpaew Hospital, 2000). 
1. A Chairman who is a qualified professional and not a bureaucrat. 
2. Three persons who are appointed on the basis of their currently held positions. These 
are representatives of the MoPH, the Governor of the Samutsakorn province, and the 
head of the Provincial Health Office. 
3. Three community representatives who are selected from the local residents and who 
must have been resident there for at least two years. These are nominated by the local 
government and civic groups in the district of Baanpaew. 
4. Three qualified persons based on their experience in the fields of public healthcare, 
finance, accountancy, law, or any other profession which would contribute to the 
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operation of the hospital. At least one must not be a salaried bureaucrat or an officer 
of a government agency. 
5. The director of the executive board acts as a board member and secretary to the 
executive board. 
Many members of the executive board are residents of the community in which the 
hospital is located, and the three community representatives and three qualified persons 
are residents of the Baanpaew community. 
Upholding the principle of public participation is also evident in the establishment of 
the joint committee which was expanded to include government officials and residents 
of the community in accordance with article 12 of the Royal Decree. This committee 
performs useful functions such as settling disputes between patients and hospital 
personnel. As an autonomous hospital there are few restrictions on the expansion of its 
services to new areas and consequently it has extended its services to other areas such as 
kidney dialysis and dental surgery. The hospital also sends its personnel to community 
hospitals to achieve a co-ordinated approach to healthcare promotion and disease 
prevention at the primary level of healthcare provision (Baanpaew Hospital, 2011). 
In conclusion the administrative structure was horizontally reorganised to achieve 
greater flexibility in its management and efficient communication. Regulations were 
changed to suit the needs of the organisation and to allow it to be responsive to the 
changing situation. The Executive Board contains qualified individuals as well as 
representatives from the community and other agencies to ensure there are checks and 
balances in its policy-making and delivery. The hospital was able to create its own 
flexible financial system that was approved by the executive board and costs have been 
systemically controlled and planned as a result. 
‘The first seven years of our being a public organisation was marked by our lack 
of funds despite our being blessed with a number of specialists. We had to spend 
economically and strictly observe ‘transparency’. During those days, if the roles 
set to achieve ‘transparency’ in operation were not enforced, we would have 
witnessed much waste and inefficiency’ (the executive of Baanpaew Hospital). 
Decision making has also been based on ‘transparency’. The decision to extend services 
to other areas in the district of Baanpaew and the range of treatments offered, such as 
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cataract surgery, were approved by the executive board. Information on the decision 
making process of the hospital’s executive board can be accessed through websites, 
local radio broadcasting, and the hospital’s public relations unit, and therefore the 
hospital is subject to public scrutiny and ‘transparency’ is achieved. 
7.2 Human resource management 
Salaries of the hospital personnel are based on a different pay structure to that of other 
public hospitals, and are also increased in proportion to their workloads. Employees and 
their direct relatives are entitled to the benefits offered by the SSS for public servants. 
As the hospital is autonomous its executive board is free to provide additional financial 
and other incentives to the hospital’s personnel to maintain their job motivation. 
Personnel are guaranteed their salaries and receive extra payments corresponding to 
their performance. In addition, a pension fund has been created. Personnel, especially 
doctors, can enter into a contract with the hospital to further their education and are 
allowed to take paid leave to study (Baanpaew Hospital, 2011). 
However, the executive board is also aware that financial incentives are not the only 
factor which keeps its personnel motivated. Therefore all staff at the hospital is given 
the opportunity to be innovative and demonstrate their abilities, and can do so with 
flexibility and ease, as they are not restricted by bureaucratic procedures. The hospital 
has also developed a monitoring system to check the health and satisfaction of their 
personnel on a regular basis.  
‘Salary increases have meant that many of our doctors have got salaries of many 
hundreds of thousands of baht, starting from 60,000 baht, I remembered signing 
salary checks worth 3-4 hundred thousand baht.’ (The executive of the 
Baanpaew Hospital) 
Whilst a newly graduated nurse stated: 
‘My salary is 12,000 baht, but when OT, professional practice fees, and other 
benefits are included, it totals 27,000-30,000 baht. My friends at private 
hospitals get 30,000-40,000 baht, but they said costs of living are high and they 
were also required to contribute to the hospital’s ‘Social Security Fund’. They 
asked me if I was interested in higher salaries offered by private hospitals. At 
first, I found such offers attractive, but on balance I prefer to be here.’ 
Data concerning the personnel at Baanpaew Hospital are given in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
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Table 7-1 - Baanpaew Hospital personnel 
Category 
Budgetary Years 
2008 2009 2010 
Physicians 36 40 58 
Dentists 5 6 8 
Pharmacists 9 12 16 
Nurses 134 146 171 
Medical technicians 6 6 7 
Physical therapists 4 4 4 
Radiologists 2 2 2 
Public healthcare analysts 23 43 45 
Health educators 3 3 3 
Others 472 466 550 
Total 694 728 864 
Source: Human resource department of the Baanpaew Hospital, 2011 
Table 7-2  - Turnover rate 2010 
Data All personnel Medical personnel 
New recruits (person/month) 14.70 1.80 
Personnel leaving (person/month) 7.50 0.60 
Total personnel 870.25 326.75 
Turnover rate 0.86% 0.18% 
Source: Human resource department of the Baanpaew Hospital: 2011 
The data on staff retention and turnover shows that the hospital was very successful in 
retaining staff despite the increase in pressures on delivery as the UC scheme was rolled 
out. Unlike other public hospitals, the increasing workloads did not result in a loss of 
morale and the intention to look for jobs in the private sector. In Baanpaew Hospital, 
staff were happy to remain in a public sector hospital (admittedly an autonomous one) 
because the hospital was able to rapidly increase salaries to close to private sector 
levels, and could offer additional benefits and the chance to work for the public purpose 
that the private sector hospitals could not. 
7.3 Health services 
Over the period of 2001 to 2010, the average daily number of outpatients serviced by 
the hospital increased from 800 to 1519, a 90% increase. During the same period, the 
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annual number of inpatients increased from 14,272 to 18,783, a 32% increase. The rate 
of bed occupation increased from 72 to 88%, and the average length of hospitalisation 
per patient increased from 3.03 to 4.75 days. In 2010 43.3% of outpatients were 
participants in the UC scheme followed by participants in other public insurance 
schemes (CSMBS, SSS) totalling 26.3%. Participants in the UC scheme accounted for 
52.7% of the hospital’s resource usage, followed by participants of the SSS who 
accounted for 20.1%. Details of the hospitals usage are provided in Tables 7.3-7.6.  
Table 7-3  -Service usage for Baanpaew Hospital, 2001-2010 
Budget year Outpatient visits Visits/day 
Inpatient 
cases 
Rate of bed 
occupation 
Average 
hospitalisation 
(days) 
2001 292,359 800 14,272 N/A N/A 
2002 360,769 988 14160 N/A N/A 
2003 345,536 946 12,205 83% 3.96 
2004 360,118 1,000 15,572 80% 3.03 
2005 399,503 1,105 16,041 81% 3.34 
2006 422,974 1,158 17,670 88% 3.19 
2007 444,060 1,216 15,365 85% 3.64 
2008 496,444 1,360 15,010 83% 3.67 
2009 518,014 1,419 16,636 79% 4.75 
2010 551,538 1,519 18,783 72% 4.57 
Source: Information Centre, Baanpaew Hospital, 2011 
Table 7-4 - Outpatients under the different healthcare schemes 2007-2010 
Scheme Units 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1. UC scheme Patients 
(%) 
55,381 
(48.7) 
57,327 
(49.7) 
60,798  
(47.5) 
39,793 
(43.3) 
Visit No.  
(%) 
235,667 
(53.1) 
276,401 
 (55.5) 
285,857  
(55.2) 
185,918 
 (52.7) 
Daily average   646 757 783 509 
2.CSMBS Patients 
(%) 
13,041 
(11.5) 
14,778 
(12.8) 
17,812  
(13.9) 
8,531 
 (9.3) 
Visit No.  
(%) 
36,693 
(8.3) 
49,280 
 (9.9) 
58,689 
 (11.3) 
42,754 
(12.1) 
Daily average   101 135 161 117 
3.SSS Patients 
(%) 
21,200 
 (18.6) 
19,003 
(16.5) 
20,237  
(15.8) 
19,359 
(21.1) 
Visit No. 
(%) 
107,848 
 (24.3) 
107,660 
(21.6) 
103,215  
(19.9) 
70,757 
(20.1) 
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Scheme Units 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Daily average   295 295 283 194 
4.Other 
schemes 
Patients 
(%) 
24,067 
(21.2) 
24,337 
(21.1) 
29,245  
(22.8) 
24,128 
(26.3) 
Visit No.  
(%) 
63,852 
(14.4) 
64,396 
(12.9) 
70,268  
(13.6) 
53,049 
(15.1) 
Daily average  Patients 175 176 193 145 
Source: Baanpaew Hospital, 2011 
Note: 2010 data was collected October 2009 to May 2010. 
Table 7-5  - Patients covered in healthcare promotion and disease prevention campaigns 
Items Samutsakorn Hospital 
Kratumban 
Hospital 
Baanpaew 
Hospital 
UCC Thalassemia screening 886 533 - 
UC Thalassemia examination of foetus  - - 1,402 
UC screening Iodine deficiency and Thyroid 1,899 770 - 
(0-1 month)    
Rehabilitation UC 13,054 10,602 - 
Rehabilitation other 78,969 1,107 4,931 
Home visits  6,371 1,513 850 
UC  36,415 3,070 839 
UC (0-5) DPT vaccination 3,686 1,147 2,971 
UC (0-5) BCG vaccination 1,910 881 598 
UC (0-5) MMR vaccination 1,059 360 18 
UC (0-5) Hepatitis B vaccination 3,755 1,201 73 
UC (0-5) Dental  4,919 1,749 263 
Source: NHSO, 2009 
Table 7-6  - Hospital re-visits following treatment 2006-2010 
Indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Percentage of days after treatment inpatients re-visited the hospital within 28 days  
(complications)  
1.Diabetes - - - 2.8 3.74 
2.High blood pressure - - - 4.4 0 
3.Cerebral Thrombosis - - - 0.59 1.73 
4.Within 14 days after surgery - - - 0.002 0.06 
5.Within 14 days after child delivery - - - 0.14 0.58 
The percentage of diabetes patients undergoing treatment 
1.For annual checks of eye nerves 63 65 67 67 81 
2. For annual checks of feet  - - - 68.6 81 
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Indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
3.For annual checks of kidneys  - - - 68.05 83 
Percentage of AIDS patients receiving anti-
HIV drugs on time - - 100 100 94.6 
Source: Baanpaew Hospital, 2011 
On a scale of 0-100 for satisfaction, the hospital scored 80 in responses from 
outpatients, inpatients and the whole community (Table 7.7). However, it scored poorly 
in terms of time spent waiting for treatment. In 2009 and 2010, on average the waiting 
times in queues for normal patients was 116 minutes and 106.2 minutes, respectively. 
For patients with complications, the average time was 190 minutes in 2001, but this 
reduced to 107 minutes and then to 103.7 minutes in 2009 and 2010, respectively. The 
hospital uses these figures to monitor patient satisfaction and tries to take remedial 
measures.  
Table 7-7  - Satisfaction indicators 2006-2010 
Indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Satisfaction with hospital - - - 81.99 - 
1. Outpatients - 84.9 - 78.3 77.2 
2. Inpatients 83.6 88.1 83 85.6 84.6 
3. Community 88 - 87 - 82.8 
Percentage of complaints 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.007 
Percentage of inpatients unwilling to stay  - 3.91 3.49 2.46 0.06 
Outpatients’ waiting time (minutes)      
1.Casual visit 67 55 92 116 106.2 
2.Visits with appointment 48 42 53 30 31.8 
3.Visit caused by complications (under treatment) 92 88 190 107 103.7 
Percentage of people within the area of responsibility of the 
hospital having healthcare insurance - - 98 99.04 98.54 
Percentage of cataract patients having surgery within 20 days - 75.95 76.92 67.22 65.7 
Source: Baanpaew Hospital, 2011 
7.4 Interview data 
A former director of the Baanpaew Hospital was interviewed and the following section 
is an account of the findings from these interviews.  
 214 
 
When the hospital was affiliated to the MoPH, Baanpaew Hospital was subject to 
bureaucratic rules and regulations that were obstacles to the enhancement of flexibility 
in the provision of services, resulting in limited opportunities for improving service 
delivery to the general public, and limitations in supporting human resource 
development. Doctors retired without learning anything new relative to their initial 
skills.  
‘There were more or less 1,000 hospital affiliated to the MoPH with different 
specialisations. Community hospitals had very limited functions and powers, 
and central hospitals was placed under many bureaucratic restrictions, which 
resulted in limited access to services for the general public, and low 
opportunities for human resource development. Training to improve human 
resources could only happen piecemeal; and many doctors retired without 
having the opportunity to learn anything new. Baanpaew Hospital thus used to 
be a low quality hospital.’(A former director of the Baanpaew Hospital) 
As reliance on the MoPH and the budget bureau posed an obstacle to development, the 
hospital decided to become self-reliant. As a doctor who had gained a lot of experience 
from working in district hospitals, the management relied on the director’s extensive 
experience to initiate new programmes to assist the development of the hospital. Firstly, 
he instilled a new service delivery mentality among the existing hospital personnel. He 
introduced them to new ideas concerning the provision of services and for improving 
customer care, believing that the talent of the hospital personnel would bloom once 
bureaucratic restrictions were lifted. Most importantly, the management of the hospital 
adopted a new positive attitude towards the broader community they were servicing. 
The management of the hospital had to be left to leaders with management skills, not 
those with surgical and other medical skills. The executive initiated the development of 
the hospital as early as 1987 in order to increase its capacity so that people would not 
have to travel to Bangkok to seek treatment. He believed that if the hospital could 
convince the community that it had the quality and the capacity to serve them, they 
would place their trust in the hospital and participate in creating a new high quality local 
healthcare system. He invited the community to donate resources to the hospital, not 
just to collect funds but also to create a sense of local ownership and participation. This 
strategy was very successful, not only in fundraising but also in involving the 
community in long-term relationships with the hospital. The management team spent 
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ten years in turning the hospital around using a slow process of building community 
trust and improving the service delivery mentality within the hospital. During this 
period data was constantly collected to monitor progress and to identify progress or 
obstacles in the achievement of the action agenda.  
7.4.1 Changing attitudes in the community 
Ties with the community were essential for the success of Baanpaew Hospital, and this 
was brought about by instituting transparency in its management and ensuring the wider 
participation of community residents in the management of the hospital. Emphasis was 
placed on public participation, with the personnel being taught how to be people-
oriented and community residents being taught to be responsible for their own health, 
and not be totally reliant on the hospital. People’s responsibility for their own healthcare 
helped reduce excessive drug dispensation and thus improved the hospital’s operating 
costs. According to the executive, people were often neglecting their basic healthcare 
and this could be resolved by making them more aware and responsible for their own 
health. Some problems required public participation to resolve, but as people gained a 
better understanding of the system, they were willing to participate more actively in 
developing the emerging local healthcare system that the hospital was developing. A 
campaign was launched by the hospital in 1987 to convince community residents of the 
capacity of the hospital so that they would feel no need to travel to Bangkok to seek 
simple treatments. The development of the concept of a community hospital helped 
local people develop their ties with the hospital, which was very important to make the 
project sustainable. The involvement of patients in the hospital made, for instance, 
patients more aware of resource limitations and made waiting times more acceptable, 
local residents were also made more aware of the quality of services so that they did not 
feel they had to go to Bangkok. It also made doctors more responsive to patient 
demands.  
The executive highlighted that this strategy was risky because the hospital could provide 
people with all the assistance they needed, but it may not be enough to achieve patient 
satisfaction or even to sustainably improve their health. For example, patients who were 
not aware of their health conditions and responsibilities may fail to take the drugs 
provided to them as regularly as prescribed by doctors. This was why a system of 
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communication with patients was thought to be important in order to improve patient 
care and health outcomes.  
According to the executive, health issues concern all people, and thus require public 
participation; they cannot be the sole responsibility of the government. The community 
was also an important source of funds for the hospital and community residents could 
donate collectively donate substantial funds, buildings, areas of land, and equipment. 
The hospital encouraged this and made itself open to public donations. This also entitled 
the community to play an active role in the management of the hospital and provided a 
strong sense of ownership. Participation by community residents was sought in all 
aspects of the development of the hospital, together with participation in the 
management of the hospital by the representatives of the community. The hospital 
received an initial donation of 100 million baht from the community to construct a 
building and such donations demonstrated the growing trust in the hospital and helped 
build further trust. The local community residents soon saw the hospital as theirs, and 
this sustained a flow of contributions to the hospital. According to the current director 
of the hospital, one of the salient facts about Baanpaew Hospital is that most of the 
management team of the hospital are natives of the Baanpaew community. Three 
representatives of the community and three qualified persons on the management team 
are in fact natives of Baanpaew.  
The formation and implementation of development plans were done in a way that 
contributed to the achievement of the objectives set by the government. According to a 
doctor at the Baanpaew Hospital:  
‘As a public organisation, the hospital still pursues the same objectives as those 
assigned to it during the time when it was part of the healthcare bureaucracy. 
Those objectives are to attend to all aspects of healthcare of the community. We 
have to deal with mental and physical health as well as healthcare promotion and 
disease prevention and rehabilitation.’ 
The success of the hospital in terms of achieving the government healthcare objectives 
is confirmed by healthcare bureaucrats. According to the head of the Provincial Health 
Office in the province of Samutsakorn, the hospital has been noted by NHSO for its 
high level of efficiency and flexibility compared to public hospitals in Bangkok.  
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The management focus on efficient delivery resulted in improvements in the efficiency 
in the use of equipment. This in turn helped to reduce the cost per unit of treatment:  
‘In the early years we didn’t have a lot of funds. We had to rely on the 
equipment lent to us from private companies wanting to test their products. As 
our finance was limited during the first seven years of our life as a public 
organisation, we had to be thrifty and relied on our specialisations and 
management capabilities. But first of all our operations had to be transparent and 
open to public scrutiny because we understood the importance of building trust.’ 
(A former director of the Baanpaew Hospital) 
As medical equipment was expensive, the hospital had to use equipment as efficiently 
as possible. Mobile surgery units were developed to achieve economies of scale as such 
units could provide treatment to large numbers of patients. The vehicles used by the 
hospital were also donated by community residents. The presence of mobile surgery 
units provided the hospital with the capacity to deal with the numerous surgical cases 
without the need to purchase a lot of equipment. According to the executive, dealing 
with all these surgeries also helped to improve the skills of surgeons and in turn 
increased their incomes. 
The shift towards a mass treatment strategy required the treatment of a larger number of 
cases in order to reduce costs. The executive described a local appendectomy case 
which no hospital in Bangkok would admit and instead had to be referred to a hospital 
in more distant Nakhonpathom. In response, he suggested setting up an appendectomy 
centre to perform mass appendectomies and saw that it could be profitable if certain 
conditions could be met. If doctors and nurses at the centre were sufficiently skilful to 
accomplish each appendectomy operation within 20 minutes, then the centre could 
prove profitable.  
The hospital management took the view that the capability of the personnel had to be 
constantly developed and improved. Whilst the doctors at the hospital accepted the 
condition that they had to be on call twenty-four hours a day, acceptance of such 
conditions provided them with the opportunity to continually improve their skills. 
Dealing with a large number of surgical cases helped to improve the surgical skills of 
the doctors as well as increasing their own income and that of the hospital. This too had 
a positive effect in lowering the turnover rate of personnel, as doctors were more 
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satisfied with their incomes. According to the executive, the effective and efficient 
management of the personnel and equipment was essential for the survival of the 
hospital. 
A new concept of a production line was borrowed from industrial Fordism and in an 
appropriately adapted form was put into practice by the management of the hospital in 
the development efficient treatments. The adaptation of the concept of a production line 
to treatments resulted in the clear division of functions of different members of staff and 
contributed to the development of their skills through specialisation and increased their 
efficiency and the rapidity of treatment. This was directly borrowed from Fordist 
industrial production, but its adaptation to the very different and more complex world of 
medical treatment was a significant achievement by the management.  
Access to social security funds was essential to strengthen the financial position of the 
hospital. The hospital thus sought to have its status elevated from a primary care unit to 
a secondary care unit. According to the executive, the hospital took the position of 
supplementing its social security income with contributions from the community but it 
had to primarily rely on the flow of funds from official sources. To this end it had to 
ensure that its access to social security funds was secure. Donations from community 
residents were received without any condition. However, the hospital had to convince 
the whole community that change would occur if they could work together but they also 
had to ensure government funds through the SSS would be received. The hospital had 
many specialists who initially had low aspirations but soon supported the change in the 
status of the hospital, from being a subcontractor to being a main contractor of the SSS. 
The executive argues that during its reform process, the hospital seriously took the SSS 
into consideration during their budgeting process. Based on their estimate that the per 
capita allocation provided to the hospital would be 750 baht, the hospital concluded that 
it could provide a range of primary to tertiary services provided it sustained its 
efficiency in service delivery. 
The hospital used its own resources to improve the range and availability of its services. 
The reach of its services was extended to remote areas through co-operation with 
hospitals in sub-districts in an effort to reduce inequality in access to healthcare 
 219 
 
services. According to the executive, the hospital felt that all citizens were entitled to 
medical treatment provided by the hospital, regardless of the healthcare security 
schemes to which they belonged (CSMBS or SSS or other). The patients who wanted 
extra services, like extra room service, were required to make extra payments and 
sacrifice their social security rights. The hospital effectively operated a private ancillary 
system in parallel for those patients who could afford to pay for additional services, 
without sacrificing the equitable distribution of healthcare services.  
The following factors contributed to the sustainability of the Baanpaew Hospital 
business model: 
1. Co-operation from all sectors of society contributed to an increase in the 
hospital’s annual revenue, from 100 million baht to 1,000 million baht 
2. The strategy of increasing the number of operations and allowing skilled doctors 
to make more money reduced the turnover rate and improved staff morale and 
doctors’ satisfaction levels.  
3. The growing availability of sophisticated equipment helped to keep doctors 
motivated to learn more and to continue to work for the hospital. 
4. The growing prestige of the hospital made its personnel feel that they did not 
work for a district hospital but for an important metropolitan hospital. The low 
morale problem in district hospitals was effectively removed.  
According to the executive, the experience of Baanpaew Hospital does not mean that all 
public hospitals should be converted to public organisations in the same way. However, 
the model could work for hospitals in large provinces such as Phuket and Pattaya, where 
scale economies could be achieved by a hospital with management autonomy. He also 
highlighted that the design of the healthcare social security systems in Thailand was 
excessively complicated and arbitrarily placed people in disadvantageous positions. He 
is a strong advocate of simplifying the system and funding public healthcare out of a 
single consolidated fund.  
The following qualitative data was obtained from customers and healthcare related 
personnel pertaining to the efficiency in the operation of the hospital. According to the 
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interviewees, the hospital’s reputation attracts a number of customers who have been 
satisfied with the services provided. The problems of tardy services were overcome, and 
customers were pleased with the flexibility regarding the provision of services, for 
example they were happy to be allowed to attend to their hospitalised relatives. In 
addition, service fees were deemed to be low relative to the quality of the services 
provided. However, the hospital did not perform well with regard to healthcare 
promotion and disease prevention, as it had to co-operate with local healthcare stations 
still encumbered by bureaucratic rules. 
The data obtained from interviewing the management of the hospital and members of 
local government indicates that; 
1. The district of Baanpaew and Baanpaew Hospital have a large number of 
healthcare-related personnel compared to the number in the provincial capital 
and in the district of Kratoomban. The increase in healthcare-related personnel 
in the district of Baanpaew went hand in hand with the increase in the capacity 
of Baanpaew Hospital. 
2. Baanpaew Hospital continues to monitor patient satisfaction, be they inpatients 
or outpatients, through systematic research. 
3. The hospital, through its cooperation with local healthcare stations, has formed a 
network with the district healthcare system for providing treatment, as well as 
for launching healthcare promotion and disease prevention campaigns. The 
hospital supplies the network with funds, drugs, and personnel. 
4. The hospital is open to new management ideas and has adopted the production 
line system used in Fordist factories. It places an emphasis on cost control and 
the efficient use of resources and has adopted a proactive approach to the 
provision of its services. 
Over the past ten years the hospital’s capacity to provide services to inpatients and 
outpatients has increased, and it now has a higher capacity for inpatient services than 
those of Samutsakorn Hospital and Kratoomban, but is similar to those of other general 
hospitals. Half of the hospital’s outpatients are UC scheme participants, followed by 
SSS and general patients who pay for their services. The number of patients who are 
 221 
 
bureaucrats has increased slightly, whilst the number of other patients has slightly 
decreased. The increased usage by bureaucrats also signifies the improvement in the 
quality of services provided by the hospital. A priority of the hospital is to match the 
quality of its services to the needs of the community. Evaluations of the hospital’s 
performance are regularly conducted and a flexible approach to changing the mix of 
services provided is attempted (Baanpaew Hospital, 2011). 
7.4.2 Examples of satisfaction among personnel 
‘There’s no wide gap between the rates of salaries here and the ones of private 
hospitals, and I’m satisfied with this. And salary levels are determined by work 
and responsibility assigned to each doctor.’ (Doctor at the hospital) 
‘Compared with private hospitals, salary levels here are satisfactorily high. 
Specialists at private hospitals surely get slightly higher salaries, but here we get 
pleasure from serving our patients. Profits and salaries are not our priority.’ 
(Doctor at the hospital) 
‘If we purchase everything with money, we destroy the culture of our 
organisation and there’ll be no more loyalty to the organisation. Retention of 
personnel will be more difficult if we try to do that only by offering higher 
salaries than other hospitals.’ (Director of the hospital) 
The hospital puts a very high emphasis on the satisfaction of its personnel and continues 
to monitor satisfaction. It also takes proactive measures to respond, often pre-emptively 
with new schemes to ensure that personnel satisfaction is maintained at a high level. 
Examples of the types of schemes and proposals that the hospital has adopted in this 
regard include the following. 
1. The development of new incentives for personnel in addition to financial 
incentives, as the latter alone cannot prevent the turnover or departure of 
personnel. 
2. Creation of a new culture within the organisation, with an emphasis on 
organisational development.  
3. Providing doctors and other hospital personnel with the opportunity to 
demonstrate their abilities. Rewards to personnel are awarded depending upon 
their performance, as they hold no bureaucratic rank or position. 
4. Introduction of performance-related pay, with salaries as a guaranteed minimum 
and additional payments based on different measures of performance. 
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5. At a higher level, management realised that none of this would be possible 
without taking continuous steps to generate sufficient revenue for the survival of 
the hospital. 
Data obtained from interviews highlights the merit of a public organisation in term of 
public participation. The organisation is autonomous but it is still responsive to 
governmental policy and the public’s needs. However, the successes of the hospital’s 
operation were heavily dependent upon the performance of its director and the executive 
board. In that sense the hospital is an example of the achievements of strong leadership 
rather than simply the operation of a different set of institutional rules governing 
financing, pay and monitoring.  
Whilst other public hospitals were not willing to engage in frank discussions about their 
financial and personnel problems under the UC system, we were able to informally 
interview doctors and other care providers in other public hospitals in Bangkok. The 
picture that emerged was uniformly one of an increased level of financial and personal 
stress after the inception of the UC scheme. The reasons that were commonly given 
included much longer working hours without adequate compensation, longer queues 
and lower customer satisfaction, and most important of all, growing financial deficits 
that were being covered on an ad hoc basis by government transfers. The growing 
financial deficits and the political pressure to not reveal this to the public was one of the 
main reasons why many of our hospitals were extremely reluctant to talk to us openly 
about the situation after the introduction of the UC scheme. Unlike Baanpaew Hospital, 
most public hospitals were unable to respond in flexible and creative ways to raise 
money and motivate their staff to deliver services, whilst making the public aware of the 
constraints by involving them in management. Such a strategy may not even have been 
feasible in many public hospitals which faced more severe demands (for instance 
because of their location in particularly deprived areas) and which did not have the 
entrepreneurial leadership that this particular hospital was fortunate enough to enjoy at a 
critical juncture.  
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7.5 Conclusions 
Thaksin was so interested in re-structuring the Baanpaew hospital and implementing the 
30 baht scheme through the hospital that he personally became involved in the 
supervision of change in the hospital. He hoped the repetition of Baanpaew’s success in 
other hospitals would contribute to his popularity and thus his victory in the next 
election. Therefore, in addition to the leadership and vision of the hospital’s 
management, the government’s intervention also contributed to the change 
Baanpaew Hospital was a public hospital which joined the UC scheme like all other 
public hospitals. It was made autonomous in an experimental ordinance in order to 
circumvent bureaucratic restrictions and to improve efficiency in the provision of 
services. This experiment proved to be successful in this case and the flexibility turned 
out to be essential for responding to the financial and personnel pressures that were 
unleashed by the UC scheme. The achievement of greater efficiency with reasonable 
levels of equity in the operation of the hospital can be traced to the following three 
factors: 
1. The management of the hospital was in the hands of an executive board that 
included representatives of the local community and this promoted public 
participation by local people. The users of the hospital’s services felt that the 
hospital belongs to them. As a result, they contributed donations to the hospital’s 
finances that added up to significant sums, allowing the construction of new 
buildings and the purchase of machinery. This also contributed to consumers of 
services having higher levels of patience in receiving scarce care services.  
2. The human resource management of the hospital was radically adapted so that it 
became more flexible in setting salary levels and a training system was set up to 
change the mind-set of staff and adapt their behaviour so that they could perform 
multiple tasks. For example, the training of nurses who were to work in primary 
units were carried out by existing staff in the hospital and staff were re-trained to 
carry out operations in new ‘Fordist’ style operations that were new innovations 
in the context of Thailand.  
3. The financial management of the hospital was also radically changed from the 
norm observed in Thai public hospitals. The hospital looked for flexible funding 
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opportunities for particular projects and activities, relying on a variety of funds 
ranging from donations to partnerships with private companies, but always 
subject to scrutiny and inspection. 
Baanpaew Hospital is the first public hospital to switch from bureaucratic 
administration to administration as an autonomous public organisation, which is 
characterised by the presence of an executive board supervising the administration of 
the hospital. This is composed of the chairman who is a qualified person but not a 
bureaucrat, representatives from the MoPH, the provincial governor, the provincial 
public health officer, three representatives from the community, three qualified persons, 
and the hospital director who acts as the secretary. The hospital has been successful in 
terms of both profits and customer satisfaction, and has also established nine additional 
branches. This model of autonomous public hospitals can be seriously considered as an 
attractive one for planned expansions of the public health system, though it may be too 
disruptive to attempt a transformation of most public hospitals to this institutional 
arrangement at this stage. 
A clear policy guideline to expand and enhance the provision of some healthcare 
services by autonomous public sector hospitals would therefore be a useful policy 
position that could be released for further consultation and discussion within the sector 
and in the broader public domain. 
Baanpaew Hospital, with its specific form of administration, represents one way to 
promote access to healthcare services for the poor and to achieve sustainability through 
the UC scheme. This became possible due to it being granted autonomy with greater 
public participation in its administration. Its autonomy was used very effectively in the 
flexibility exhibited when recruiting full time and part time employees, and in acquiring 
medical equipment. This flexibility contributed to the efficiency of its operation, and as 
its location was in a city with a larger population than that of many districts, economies 
of scale were not hard to achieve to reduce costs through changing procedures of 
operations and treatments, and it was also successful in mobilising local resources 
through charities and donations. 
The hospital’s objectives as featured in the royal decree legalising its establishment 
include: 
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1. Providing medical treatments, disease prevention, healthcare promotion, and 
rehabilitation services. 
2. Supporting the state’s healthcare policy. 
3. Engaging in other activities consistent with the state’s policy and the needs of 
the community. 
The principles of its operation were set out as follows:  
2. Provision of services based on public participation. 
2.   Responsiveness to the needs of the community.  
3.   Equality in access to services.  
4.   Improvements to services without any profit motive.  
5.   Efficiency in resource allocation. 
The hospital regularly conducts satisfaction surveys on various issues including the 
services provided, personnel, facilities, and quality of services, in order to formulate 
appropriate operational plans. Personnel are encouraged to develop a service mind-set 
and to be aware of public interests. They are also encouraged to further their education. 
The cost accountancy adopted by the hospital is marked by its effectiveness, and is 
successful in tracking its financial situation in real time, and this is a vital tool in the 
effective management of the hospital. 
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Chapter 8. Concluding discussion 
This chapter features the results of data analysis based on the conceptual framework 
presented in chapter 2. The conceptual framework is derived from the review of 
literature relevant to political economy and public policy. It helps elucidate political 
pressure shaping policies, the economic explanation of ‘efficiency’, ‘equity’, ‘viability’, 
and policy evaluation. The conceptual framework is based on the assumption that the 
UC scheme is the result of the complex interplay of political, economic, social, and 
personal factors comprehensible only through a multidisciplinary approach. 
In this chapter, the 30 baht scheme initiated by the Thai Rak Thai Party is subject to 
analysis. The conceptual framework from chapter 2 is used to analyse political 
motivation, economic factors leading to success or failure of the scheme, and the 
viability of the scheme assessed by the conduct of two case studies. As set out above, 
the objectives of the research are as follows: 
1. To study the political economy of the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme 
and the impact on policy implementation 
2. To study the access to the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme  in Thailand 
3. To study the financial management of the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme  in Thailand 
4. To study the implementation of the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme  
through case studies of particular hospitals 
8.1 The political economy of the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme  
The political economy both of the 30 baht scheme and Thai politics in general have 
undergone great changes since 1992 when a military junta came to power. The growing 
domination of capital, rapid economic growth, and growing popular demands for more 
effective government responses to their needs led to the emergence of populist politics 
within a major party, the Thai Rak Thai. A new system of procuring votes for promises 
of formal service delivery, particularly in healthcare, began to supplant the traditional 
patronage system in the countryside created by local strongmen. This was a new and 
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more formal version of populism. The range of constituents that this populist political 
platform brought in proved to be an undefeatable one for other parties that were still 
relying on the traditional systems of mobilisation and patronage. However, the price 
was the introduction of a system that, initially at least, led to rapidly growing strains on 
the healthcare service providers and the provision of inadequate funds to finance these 
programmes.  
The 30 baht scheme was an important part of the populist programme put forward by 
the increasingly dominant Thai Rak Thai Party and it contributed greatly to the 
popularity of Thaksin’s administration among the poor. However, the populist 
programmes initiated by the Thaksin administration were not acceptable to significant 
taxpayers, who were mostly from the upper and middle-classes. Taxpayers feared that 
the escalating spending on the risky populist programmes would impose heavy tax 
burdens on them, and have an adverse effect on the financial institutions providing 
credit to the public sector. However, the populist programmes helped the Thai Rak Thai 
Party led by Thaksin to win the support of the majority of the poor in the north and 
north-eastern regions of the country, and they in turn collectively added up to form the 
majority of voters. Their support for the Thai Rak Thai Party contributed to the Party’s 
victory in every election held over the past ten years. The only way in which the party 
has been removed has been through military intervention, which happened twice, once 
in 2008 and again in 2014. 
Though the NHSO and the Ministry of Public Health are independent from each other, 
they remain engaged in co-dependency. The NHSO depends on the hospitals affiliated 
to the Ministry of Public Health, as the number of private hospital joining the UC 
scheme is still limited, whilst the hospitals affiliated to the Ministry of Public Health 
depend on the financial supply form the NHSO.  
However, the NHSO has no authority to impose reform on the Ministry of Public Health 
and the Ministry of Public Health has no authority to apply rules and regulations to the 
NHSO, nor does it have authority to make the suggestions based on scholarly research 
to the NHSO. 
The law requires the Minister of Public Health to preside over the executive board of 
the NHSO, but as the NHSO executive board comprises of people from diverse 
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backgrounds, the minister can take only limited control of the NHSO. However, in the 
unusual situation in which the permanent secretary of the ministry acts as minister, 
problems may arise if the ministry and the NHSO do not agree on policy.  
8.2 Process of the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme in Thailand 
The idea of universal healthcare coverage had been around in Thailand for 10 years 
before the introduction of the National Health Security Act 2002 which guarantees the 
right of all Thais to have access to necessary healthcare services. The act is consistent 
with the 1997 constitution and the WHO’s principle of “Health for All” adopted by 
Thailand as an objective for development.  
Civil societies, NGO, bureaucrats, and politicians were engaged in the campaign for the 
introduction of the National Health Security Act for years; and their effort became 
fruitful during Thaksin’s premiership. The National Health security Act stipulates that 
“the Thai population shall be entitled to a healthcare service with such standards and 
efficiency as prescribed in this Act”. Additionally, there shall be a fund in the National 
Health Security Office called the “National Health Security Fund”, aimed at 
expenditures to promote and encourage the arrangement of the healthcare service of 
healthcare units. The Minister of Public Health acts as the chairperson of the fund, 
which is managed by the National Health security office under the leadership of the 
secretary to the office. 
The management of the fund is in accordance with the rules contained in the National 
Health Security Acts. The fund comprises smaller funds concerning with outpatients, 
inpatients, health promotion, HIV AIDS, kidney disease, etc. The services are provided 
through both public sector and private sector service units. The act requires public 
sector service units (hospitals) to be included in the healthcare coverage scheme. The 
participation of the public sector outlets is on the voluntary basis. Service charges are 
based on per capita per head in the case of inpatients and DRG in the case of inpatients. 
The initiation of projects, such as disease prevention and healthcare promotion projects, 
are based on individual project. The presence of a universal healthcare coverage scheme 
enables Thailand, a lower-middle income country to achieve universal healthcare 
coverage for all Thais. All Thais can have access to healthcare services they require. 
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The number of people bankrupted by healthcare expenditures was greatly reduced. They 
have steadily been highly satisfied with services provided by the scheme. 
The scheme has always been positively viewed by the general public. As a result, 
politicians always reiterate to voters that they themselves initiated and implemented the 
scheme to contribute to the public welfare. 
8.2.1 Impact on the health security system in Thailand 
The scheme can be beneficial in one way but generate other problems. As a result of the 
introduction of the UC scheme, three quarters of the budget of the MoPH was allocated 
on a per capita basis to hospitals to cover the UC scheme population. This method of 
financial allocation increased the importance of hospitals with larger UC scheme 
populations under their responsibility, despite the fact that these hospitals were often 
less well-equipped and had lower costs of maintenance and depreciation of expensive 
medical machinery. However, at the same time, the significantly increased workloads in 
some public hospitals compelled some personnel to leave their jobs in the public sector 
and join private hospitals. 
People were generally satisfied with the UC scheme, and indeed at a popular level 
strongly supportive of universal healthcare, although there were many complaints made 
directly to service units. A number of problems still need to be addressed in terms of the 
administration of the scheme. Citizens without identity cards cannot access services, 
and there are still people in remote areas without identity cards. The scheme’s coverage 
in terms of available hospitals is still low as is the availability of information on 
participating hospitals and methods of enrolment. These problems mean that even after 
a decade of operation, the coverage of the targeted population has not been fully 
achieved. In addition to the problems of achieving a sustainable level of finance, 
maintaining a minimum level of services and the quality of the service, and achieving 
full or a high level of public participation are also important. Services, especially those 
related to primary care, need to be subject to improvement and development. Primary 
care, with its proximity to people and communities, is likely to induce links between 
service providers and communities, resulting not only in cost reductions but also the 
welfare of people and communities. The development of primary care is thus highly 
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important and depends upon a proper understanding of the critical role of primary 
healthcare care among service providers. 
Thus the issues that need to be addressed in the healthcare reform campaign are better 
quality services within the budgetary limitations, and public participation in the 
healthcare security system to improve the accountability and sustainability of the 
healthcare system. These changes have to be achieved in a technocratic and professional 
way, outside the imperatives of political promises and rhetoric. The rollout of the UC 
scheme was very rapid because of the political imperatives of the ruling party of that 
time, but this advantage was balanced by the disadvantage that the politics of populism 
meant that adequate arrangements were not made to ensure that the financing was 
feasible, that healthcare targets and institutional arrangements had been adequately set 
to achieve the highest level of healthcare feasible with equity and effectiveness. 
8.2.2 Conflict of interest 
The UC fund is managed by the committee comprising representatives of various 
groups and chaired by the Minister of Public Health. The representatives of local 
governments, high-ranking bureaucrats from several ministries and the comptroller 
general, the representatives of the non-governmental organisations, and the 
representatives of the associations of healthcare-related professions all have their seats 
in the committee. The management by board or committee represents an attempt to 
achieve balance of power that further contributes to efficiency. However, the board 
being comprised of many group having their stakes in more than 100,000 million baht 
budget gives rise to conflict of interests. Some of the types of problems include the 
following: 
1. The allocation of UC’s fund to the organisations in which committee members 
they have their positions, such as the allocation of the fund used in healthcare 
promotion and disease prevention to the non-governmental organisations in 
which they serve as chairpersons or board members. 
2. Board members have held positions in various sub-committees administering the 
scheme, further compounding conflicts of interest. 
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3. Local politicians on the board have used UC funds to promote their own 
interests, for instance by allocating funds for healthcare promotion and disease 
prevention in their local areas. This has sometimes been good pressure for 
accelerating delivery, but it can also distort priorities.  
8.3 Access to the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme in Thailand 
Outpatient use of UC scheme services increased from 66% in 2006 to 80% in 2009, 
with the north-east region population being more dependent on UC scheme services 
than their counterparts in other regions. The population in Bangkok was the least 
dependent on the UC scheme. The use of inpatient UC scheme services rose from 
18.4% in 2006 to 91% in 2009, and the population in the north and north-eastern 
regions were most dependent on these services, whilst those in Bangkok were the least 
dependent. In 2010 it was found that Thais whose healthcare needs were unmet were 
few in number. However, the UC population was more likely to face difficulty in 
accessing basic healthcare services than those individuals covered by the CSMBS and 
SSS. It was reported that the needs of 0.4% of outpatients and 1.4% of inpatients were 
not met due to the patients having no time to see doctors, not being confident about 
getting the treatment, or facing travelling difficulties. 
8.4 The budgetary allocation for the Universal Healthcare Coverage 
Scheme and the problems relating to budgetary allocations 
The right to freely access healthcare services is a basic right that Thailand has long 
sought to institutionalise and recognise. The campaign to achieve healthcare security for 
all was led by doctors, civil society and NGOs and enjoyed broad support in Thai 
society. The demands for healthcare reforms and healthcare security for all were derived 
from a growing awareness across society that the poor healthcare of many people was 
due to high healthcare-related costs, and an emphasis on curing diseases rather than 
preventing them, resulting in a non-holistic approach to healthcare, and an unacceptable 
level of inequality in the access to healthcare services.  
The introduction of the UC scheme in Thailand in 2002 represented the stepping stone 
to the establishment of healthcare services in Thailand marked by equity, efficiency, and 
social accountability. The Health Security Act of 2002 resulted in a large number of 
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changes, many of which are desirable and some of which are debatable. Nevertheless, 
the improvement in the equality of access to healthcare services has become a generally 
accepted and institutionalised fact, evident in the increasing number of people entitled 
to benefits under the UC scheme and the rise in the number of inpatients and 
outpatients, the number of referrals, and an increase in the number of cases involving 
costly treatments. 
The inequality problem has not yet been totally solved, especially where resource 
allocation and the provision of services are concerned. The National Health Security 
Act 2002 facilitated the establishment of universal healthcare coverage in Thailand, 
which has greatly contributed to facilitating access to healthcare services for the 
majority of Thais through three healthcare security schemes: the UC scheme, SSS and 
CSMBS. However, there remain some discrepancies in the entitlements to general 
healthcare care, emergency care, access to drugs, disease prevention, and transportation 
in the three schemes, and the UC scheme is the least well-funded. 
The UC scheme should therefore not be seen in a one-sided way. It is an important 
experiment and the idea of universal healthcare has become established in the political 
arena and institutionalised to a large extent. Many aspects of the UC scheme are also 
highly desirable based on the experiences of other countries. For instance, the principle 
that people should have the right to choose their hospitals is a very good one in terms of 
patient choice and also for ensuring that hospitals do not have a captive set of 
customers, which may result in lower levels of service. At the same time, as we know 
from the experiences of other countries, like the United Kingdom, choice assumes that 
patients also have clear and simple information on the basis of which they can make 
simple choices. Otherwise, some hospitals can become overburdened and others suffer a 
low level of income for no good reason.  
Subjects for future debate and consideration include the unification of the three 
healthcare systems. This would simplify the management and financing of healthcare 
and make it truly universal, but the short-term consequences may be to raise the overall 
average cost of public healthcare by increasing the standard of healthcare offered under 
the UC scheme to the level of the other better-financed schemes. Another issue for 
debate and consideration is the proper role of the public and private sectors in the 
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provision of healthcare services. The private sector is generally a higher cost service 
provider because it is increasingly specialising in higher cost treatments that the more 
affluent parts of the population in Thailand and the region can afford. This means that a 
simple integration of the public and private sectors as was initially attempted is not a 
sustainable model. On the other hand, dedicated private hospitals can emerge to service 
this sector as a distinct business model. The autonomous Baanpaew Hospital shows that 
the provision of high quality services based partly on government subsidies and partly 
on marketed revenue streams and donations can be an effective business model. How 
replicable this can be on a larger scale remains to be tested. Other issues include 
refining the funding model and making it simpler and easier to predict. For instance, the 
incorporation of personnel salaries into the capitation calculation may help to address 
the perpetual deficits that some public hospitals have been facing. The experiences of 
particular hospitals therefore need to be incorporated and studied further in better 
designing the funding model, to maintain the financial viability of hospitals whilst at the 
same time capping costs at acceptable levels and providing incentives to the care 
providers to provide high quality services.  
8.5 The role of political actors that affect ‘efficiency, equity, and 
viability’ 
As political actors became involved in initiating the UC scheme, the scheme was 
viewed as part of the political populism that is widespread in Thailand. However, the 
scheme enables the poor to get access to healthcare services which is their constitutional 
right, rescuing them from healthcare-related bankruptcy. Besides, allocation of 
healthcare-related resource is more efficient than ever before as a result of the 
implementation of the UC scheme. Assessment of the scheme in terms of the three 
components of successful policy – efficiency, equity, and viability – can be summarised 
as follows. 
8.5.1 Efficiency 
Efficiency is achieved through the separation of user and provider which are the NHSO 
and the Ministry of Public Health, respectively. Funds are allocated directly on a per 
capita basis to service units, with the state, service units, and patients sharing the costs 
of treatment.  
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To achieve efficiency, effort was made to: 
1. Improve the allocation of funds to meet the demand of users. Funds were 
allocated to service units according to the size of the population in the areas for 
which service units were responsible. 
2. Downsize the administrative structure of the Ministry of Public Health. Service 
units were allowed to be more autonomous. The service units with financial 
strength were promoted to the status of public organisation. 
3. Establish the network of service units to achieve co-operation in providing 
services including transfers of patients across hospitals to maximise the delivery 
of services within the given overall budget. 
8.5.2 Equity 
Equity has been the main objective of the healthcare reforms that followed the popular 
uprising of 1973. An important consequence of the popular uprising of 1973 was to shift 
the focus of fund allocation from large hospitals to community hospitals and local 
healthcare stations. The office of the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Public 
Health was established. A decentralisation effort was also made through the 
establishment of the provincial healthcare office. The popular uprising in 1992 led to the 
drafting of the 1997 constitution and the establishment of the National Health Security 
Office (NHSO) in 2002 to achieve the equity in the delivery of healthcare policy. Local 
healthcare funds in which local authorities were involved were set up in 2006. 
Health reform has always advocated a better distribution of healthcare services in the 
countryside. Health services in the countryside are usually not profitable and high levels 
of service delivery in these areas may be considered to be economically inefficient. 
Thus, equity can sometimes conflict with efficiency. 
8.5.3 Viability 
The first and ultimate objective of the UC scheme was to facilitate the exercise of the 
constitutional right of procuring access to healthcare services by all Thais. It is thus 
obligatory for the state, regardless of the political parties coming to power, to contribute 
to the financing of the UC scheme, but as financial allocations to the scheme kept rising 
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and growing even more burdensome with the ageing of the population, the scheme 
faced growing opposition from middle-class taxpayers. The latter prefer to use services 
provided by private hospitals on grounds of greater convenience and higher quality of 
services. Improving the quality of services under the UC scheme to a level that could 
draw the middle class into the scheme would certainly contribute to the political 
viability of the scheme in terms of middle class taxpayers being willing to fund it. In 
reality, such a level of improvement in service delivery quality is unlikely in the near 
future. Instead, efficiency is currently emphasised so that hospitals are expected to 
become self-sufficient and not be a financial burden. Clearly this can happen at the 
expense of equity, as hospitals in rural areas will not provide a full range of services if 
they have to be self-sufficient given their target locality. Moreover, efficiency is 
difficult to achieve because attempts to increase revenues whilst decreasing expenses 
usually face huge constraints in the healthcare sector. In reality, hospitals’ expenses do 
not decrease whilst revenues keep stable. Varying levels of subsidy are therefore a 
permanent feature of hospitals in a public healthcare system, and the levels of subsidy 
have to vary across hospitals and over time.  
8.5.4 Case studies 
• B-care Medical Centre – an unviable model of UCS participation  
Our case study of the private hospital, B-Care Medical Centre, shows some of the 
problems that emerged as a result of inadequate information about financing, expected 
service quality and patient expectations. This hospital joined the UC scheme during the 
early years of the scheme and then withdrew due to the problems of failing to achieve 
sufficient increases in the financial allocations and the conflict of falling standards with 
the brand marketing that was important for a private hospital. There were discrepancies 
in the expectation of the quality of services between the UC and SSS scheme patients 
and general patients. Whilst the UC scheme and SSS patients expected standardised 
services, the general patients expected premium services, and when the provision of 
premium services was perceived to be negatively affected by the queues and problems 
affecting the public patients, the general patients began to switch to other private 
hospitals. This resulted in a significant decrease in the revenue from general patients 
after the hospital began to admit increased numbers of UC scheme patients. In addition, 
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the hospital faced financial issues as the profits gained from providing services to each 
group of customers did not reflect the real costs, and the complex cross-subsidies 
affected financial planning and service quality within the hospital. 
The experience of this private hospital with the UC scheme provides some general 
lessons for the future overhaul and review of the scheme.  
• It is important to make transparent the categorisation of customers into general 
patients, UC scheme patients, and SSS patients. 
• To achieve a financially viable service delivery model, it is important to have a 
system for assessing the needs of each group of patients to and establish 
appropriate service plans for each. 
• As the premium private customers are in an entirely different type of category of 
healthcare consumption, it is important to separate the services provided to 
general patients demanding premium services from those provided to UC 
scheme and SSS patients who are satisfied with standardised services. Different 
groups of customers should therefore be given different service facilities, such as 
buildings, equipment, and drugs. This may appear to fly in the face of an 
equitable distribution of healthcare services, but in fact such a strategy may be 
essential for maintaining equity and viability within the full range of publicly 
financed healthcare services.  
• The interviews with management also suggested the importance of adopting 
effective cost accountancy because management in this hospital appeared not to 
be prepared for the managing the complexities in financing arrangements across 
different categories of customers. 
• The experience of this hospital also suggested the importance of management 
keeping on top of the financial and medical operational objectives of the 
hospital. One solution could be to institutionalise a regular analysis of 
costs/revenue at least every three months in hospitals within the scheme so that a 
regular evaluation of the achievement of objectives and the costs of achieving 
these objectives is available of management. 
Recruiting private hospitals with the objective of providing premium services to the UC 
scheme is inappropriate, as different private hospitals have different capabilities in the 
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services they provide to different levels of customers. However, some private hospitals 
have specialised in the provision of healthcare services to poorer customers, and these 
hospitals would be particularly relevant for inclusion in the UC scheme with the right 
incentives and disciplining rules.  
• Baanpaew Hospital – a viable model of adaptation  
A different set of insights emerge from the experience of Baanpaew Hospital. This 
public hospital achieved autonomous status and quickly set about undertaking a small 
revolution in the public provision of healthcare services. It established the principle that 
the promotion of the access to healthcare services by the poor could be achieved by 
improving and elevating local healthcare stations attached to local hospitals and then 
establishing a network of these hospitals. An active role for local healthcare volunteers 
was also established whereby these volunteers were vigilant in identifying outbreaks of 
diseases at an early stage and providing care to children, the elderly, and the disabled 
within their community. 
A greater number of public hospitals could move towards the operational principles of 
the Baanpaew Hospital to improve their performance under the UC scheme. In doing 
this, policy-makers should consider the following: 
1. It is easier to grant autonomous status to newly-established hospitals rather than 
to take an old hospital and change its status. Hospitals as organisations have 
many established routines that their personnel follow and trying to change 
established habits and routines once they have become part of the culture of an 
organisation can be a very difficult task indeed. 
2. The Baanpaew type of hospital strategy requires that communities and 
community leaders should be prepared to co-operate with these hospitals. 
3. It was probably important that the hospital was still publicly owned even if it 
had become more flexible in its operation. The public ownership part of the 
equation was important in enabling patients to feel some amount of ownership in 
the hospital, and this in turn was critical in terms of monitoring service delivery 
and raising funds locally. 
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4. The Baanpaew experiment also establishes the importance of hospital 
management moving from a role of passively using available funds to one where 
they raise and manage funds in a more active way. This is not the task of 
hospitals in many countries, but in Thailand given that the expectations from the 
UC far outstrip the tax resources available, hospitals have to be creative in 
raising and managing funds.  
5. Leadership and management skills were critical in the Baanpaew case and an 
important lesson for replication is that these skills should be recognised when 
recruiting the management leaderships of these types of hospitals. 
6. The importance of cooperation from society and the private sector was 
powerfully established in this case, and effective replication would require that 
public participation should be sought and organised in these types of hospitals. 
7. Networks of healthcare stations in districts around public hospitals with the 
status of public organisations should be established as these play a critically 
important role in providing primary healthcare, thereby reducing the overall 
costs of healthcare. 
8. An important aspect of Baanpaew’s success was to promote self-reliance and 
preventive attitudes among the general public and these aspects should also be 
promoted in any replication of this experience to other public hospitals. 
9. Baanpaew worked very closely with its network of service units at the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary levels and these units eventually adopted similar 
organisational cultures, making it even easier for the different units to cooperate. 
10. Achievements of targets should be measurable, as they were in Baanpaew. 
Baanpaew Hospital showed that it is possible to be financially viable and even to 
expand under the UC scheme by adopting a strategy that was exemplary in its autonomy 
and led and implemented by a flexible management. The result was the achievement of 
a significant expansion of service delivery under the UC scheme without sacrificing its 
efficiency in operation and the quality of its services. Autonomy and flexibility in its 
management combined with greater public participation made it easier for the hospital 
to neutralise the adverse impact of changes. Assessing the operation of the hospital 
indicated that its performance became even better as time passed. It can be thus be 
concluded from that the administrative structure of Baanpaew Hospital was ideal for 
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promoting public access to healthcare services, without sacrificing equity, quality, 
efficiency and social accountability. 
8.6 Conclusions for public policy 
The examination of the UC scheme in this thesis based on the available secondary data 
and the case studies provides a number of insights for initiating policy discussions about 
how to improve the scheme in terms of service delivery, equity, effectiveness, and 
financial viability. The following issues could be considered by policy-makers and 
hospitals involved with the delivery of services under this scheme.  
8.6.1 The National Health Security Office (NHSO) commission 
The NHSO commission is a public organisation established in accordance with the 
National Health Security Act, which acts as purchaser of public healthcare services for 
all Thais. The commission comprises of representatives from the public and private 
sectors, NGOs, and qualified persons from various fields. The commission is chaired by 
the Minister of Public Health, with the permanent secretary to the Ministry of Public 
Health (MoPH) acting as vice chairman, and the secretary to the NHSO acting as 
secretary. The outstanding achievement of the commission over the past ten years has 
been the reduction in the number of families bankrupted by the costs of medical 
treatment, and the growing satisfaction among people covered by the UC scheme. A 
large part of the success of the UC scheme can be attributed to the management of the 
commission. 
8.6.2 Good governance 
The principles of good governance relevant for the healthcare sector in Thailand are 
effective participation of different stakeholders, accountability in the decision-making 
process, and freedom from arbitrary political interventions. The management of the 
sector through the commission has made good progress in embodying many of these 
principles of good governance in its day to day operations by incorporating participation 
and decision-making by consensus. A broad level of stakeholder participation is ensured 
by the presence of representatives from many sectors; and a consensus among them has 
to be reached before a decision is made. The UC scheme cannot be entirely freed from 
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politics and political agendas as politicians played an important role in its establishment 
and political representatives are represented in the NHSO commission. However 
political capture has been prevented by ensuring a balance of power among the 
commission members as they come from many sectors of society, including civil 
society, and who arguably represent the interests of the general public. Consensus has to 
be reached before a decision is made on important matters. For important issues if even 
one commission member disagrees with the decision then a consensus is considered to 
be absent.  
Given the extremely fraught political disagreements in Thailand over the last 15 years 
between different versions of Thaksin’s Party and its opponents (the party was legally 
barred on more than one occasion and then reappeared under new names and ostensibly 
different leadership), a free and open public discussion about the design and future 
direction of the UC policy has not been possible. The institutional arrangements of the 
NHSO commission described above have therefore been very important for maintaining 
a level of professional and technical independence in the management of the scheme, 
even if its broad vision could not be openly discussed. 
A challenge for the future is to extend the discussion to these policy levels so that the 
design of the level and types of services that will be ensured through the UC scheme, 
and eventually through an integrated public healthcare system, can be transparently 
identified in the context of the available resource constraints and feasible increases in 
funding through increases in taxation and other levies. This policy-level discussion 
could involve the same types of stakeholders as appear on the commission, 
appropriately expanded, but without being limited to operational and allocative matters. 
The UC scheme is now sufficiently embedded in the political consciousness of the 
country as an established right and such a discussion should no longer appear to be 
threatening to the political project of establishing and maintaining such a scheme. 
The NHSO commission has already demonstrated significant success in achieving 
efficiency in the financial allocation of central funds across different service providers 
in accordance with performance in terms of outputs and outcomes achieved through the 
operation of the UC scheme. These objectives are determined annually and quarterly, 
 241 
 
the monitoring is fairly effective and the allocative functions are carried out in a 
professional manner without excessive political intervention. 
8.6.3 Fact-based management 
Strategic management of a complex sector like the healthcare sector requires an 
adequate knowledge base that is appropriate for the formulation of plans and policies. 
The classification of potential patients according to their ages and disease profiles is 
already being accurately carried out as a result of the availability of accurate and 
appropriate data. Customer satisfaction, an important factor in the formulation of 
operation and allocation plans, has also been frequently measured. However, much can 
be improved in the information systems servicing the healthcare sector, and 
coordinating information across hospitals, particularly the public hospitals servicing the 
bulk of the UCS patients. Successful preventive primary care healthcare interventions 
require information at the local level of the type that Baanpaew Hospital used, to engage 
primary service units to deliver primary healthcare. This type of information can be 
collected and made available to all hospitals in a centralised way so that hospitals in a 
locality can collectively engage with primary healthcare providers and other service 
providers to ensure a holistic approach to healthcare that would also be cost-saving at a 
collective level.  
8.6.4 Risk management 
Proper risk management within primary units and other service providers is crucial to 
ensure the sustainability of the UC scheme. The survival of primary units guarantees the 
wide coverage of the scheme, and ensures that access to the scheme is broad-based. To 
ensure that primary units survive financially, funds were set up to compensate for the 
costs of referral borne by primary units, when such costs exceeded set limits. This 
measure reduced the risk of financial losses of primary units but did not do away with 
the problem entirely. Inpatient referral to hospitals is funded by a fund transfer to 
primary units that helps reduce the risk of financial losses to these primary units, as the 
latter have to compensate the hospitals to which they send their patients. These funding 
calculations have not yet become accurate enough and this is another area in which 
technical and financial knowledge has to be coordinated to achieve a viable outcome 
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that is appropriate for achieving the equity and effectiveness goals of the healthcare 
system. 
8.6.5 Co-operation and coordination 
Co-operation has been established between service providers affiliated to the MoPH, 
including private service providers, local governments, and civil society groups 
involved in determining the objectives of services and financial allocations. Such co-
ordination is closely watched by regional inspectors from the MoPH. 
This study highlights the importance of fact-based risk management, aspects of good 
governance and cooperation and coordination, as shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.6.6 Contribution of the policy to Thailand’s healthcare system 
The introduction of the UC scheme produced a positive welfare effect and its presence 
has significantly reduced poverty within the poorer socio-economic classes in Thailand. 
Whilst the thinking and inspiration behind this scheme did not wholly originate in the 
Thai Rak Thai Party, its coming to power accelerated the enactment of the National 
Figure 8-1 - The sustainability of UC scheme
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Health Security Act which legislated the implementation of the UC scheme. The 
scheme was essentially one of free-at-the-point-of-delivery healthcare, but the addition 
of the nominal 30 baht fee to the UC scheme was publicised in a manner which gave the 
illusion of the scheme having being initiated by the Thai Rak Thai Party, who had 
magically reduced the cost of healthcare to an incredible extent. Politicians saw the 
implementation of the scheme as part of their election strategy and a strategy of building 
constituency support in a way that replaced the old strategy of personalised patronage 
through local networks. Their desire to win votes through this new patronage strategy 
meant that they suddenly pushed through the ongoing policy discussions within the Thai 
healthcare system to establish a universal public healthcare system, supported by rural 
doctors, civic groups, NGOs, and academics who longed for universal healthcare 
coverage.  
Whatever the history, the UC is now an established part of the rights of Thai citizens 
and the policy discussion and academic research is essentially focused on improving its 
financial viability, designing its priorities so that the most important social goals of 
healthcare are prioritised within the funds available and to set up systems that can 
ensure professional and participatory decision-making despite the intensely politicised 
and conflictual nature of contemporary Thai politics. This research will be successful if 
it can contribute to this important debate. I end by reiterating that I have not attempted a 
comprehensive assessment of the Thai healthcare system nor provided a comprehensive 
set of reform proposals. However, by identifying important characteristics of the Thai 
healthcare sector based on an assessment of the full range of secondary data and 
statistics, and building on primary research on the experiences of two hospitals in the 
private and public sectors, the study has contributed to the first step of an important and 
complex debate.  
8.6.7 Contribution to policy making 
The effectiveness of the implementation of the UC scheme can be improved to the point 
that the schemes became institutionalised as the sole healthcare security scheme in 
Thailand. The existence of a single healthcare security scheme will help eliminate the 
complexity of healthcare insurance systems that pose an obstacle to the public’s access 
to healthcare services. 
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The research provides guidelines for policy makers, whether they be politicians or 
technocrats, for developing a set of policies which may contribute to achieving 
maximum efficiency of the Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme in Thailand. 
Maximum efficiency is impossible without proper co-ordination between the purchaser 
(NHSO) and providers (service units) which can be achieved if proper measures are 
undertaken by policy-makers. 
The research points out the importance of efficient budgetary allocations in the context 
of a developing country like Thailand. 
It can be inferred from the research the importance of the extension of the scope of 
taxation to include informal sector, land, property, and inheritance tax to ensure a 
sufficient supply of finance for welfare programmes like the Universal Healthcare 
Coverage Scheme. 
8.7 Integration of three funds 
An important challenge for Thailand is the integration of the three main public 
healthcare funds – CSMBS, SSS, and UC. This is essential to reduce inequality in 
access to medical services, be it medical treatment, medical rehabilitation, or healthcare 
promotion and disease prevention. However, integrating the three funds is a big issue 
and hard to carry out, due to the huge implications for financing and the possible 
resistance from those fearing their interests will be threatened. The latter could include 
participants in CSMBS, doctors in some hospitals and drug companies. 
To reduce the impact of the resisting groups, it is necessary to make it clear that the 
integration of three funds will not result in the cancellation of the rights previously 
granted to some, and that the integration of the three funds will not result in a reduction 
of hospitals’ revenues. 
The integration of three funds could be achieved in the first instance by ensuring  
1. The management of the integrated fund by a committee comprising of the 
representatives of the various groups participating in the funds separately. 
2. Standardised disbursement procedures that are efficiently implemented by 
hospitals. 
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3. Achieving a universal standard of medical treatment, especially for complex and 
costly treatments, such as cancer treatment.  
4. A universal standard of drugs and drug prices. 
If these can be ensured, the integration of the three funds is likely to improve resource 
use and enhance the protection of the healthcare system against arbitrary political 
interventions. 
8.8 Suggestions for further research 
A number of important areas of further research are implicitly identified in this study. 
First, it would be useful to organise a study on the feasibility of applying the Baanpaew 
model in other areas or regions. This would involve looking at the full range of types of 
hospitals and identifying the number of hospitals with characteristics that could be 
adapted to this successful model. A second area for research would be to examine the 
effects of particular changes in government policy on the UC scheme. For instance, how 
might changes in the funding models affect the delivery and sustainability of the UC 
model? Third, we need to understand better the design of policy that might promote the 
participation of private hospitals in the UC scheme. Here a survey of the different types 
of hospitals in the private sector would be very useful to identify the significance of 
different types, and to identify the types of hospitals in terms of specialisation and 
commercial approach that are most likely to adapt to becoming service providers under 
the UC. A fourth area of research would be to study the political factors that may be 
preventing or supporting the integration of the three healthcare schemes (CSMBS, SSS 
and UC).  
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Appendix 1 – An outline for the interview of the 
management of the hospitals opting out of the 
Universal Healthcare Coverage Scheme  
 
 
Name...........................................Position…………………………………………… 
Date......................................Hour...............................Recording  
Equipment.............................. 
Hospital.............................................................................................................................. 
Size (no. of beds) ............................................................................................................... 
Level (Primary/Secondary/Tertiary) ................................................................................ 
Location.............................................................................................................................. 
Type of hospital in the U.C. scheme (regular service provider/referral unit)  
............................................................................................................................................ 
The time your hospital joined the UC scheme................................................................. 
The time your hospital opted out of the U.C. scheme....................................................... 
1. The reasons for your hospital’s participation in the U.C. scheme 
1................................................................................................................ 
2………………………………………………………………………… 
3………………………………………………………………………… 
2. What were the amounts of the U.C. funds allocated to your hospital, please 
specify the amounts of the funds your hospital received annually since 
participation until opting 
out………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….………………………………………………………… 
3. What was the process of acquiring funds 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
4. How was the fund allocation to your hospital segmented into OP, IP, PP, 
Replacement of values, Thai traditional medicine and others ……………........... 
The largest proportion of funds went to……………………………………..… 
The smallest proportion of funds went to …………………………………….. 
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5. Were the U.C funds sufficiently allocated to your hospital? 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
6. What were the problems relating to obtaining funds…………………………… 
7. What was the proportion of your hospital expenses on the U.C. scheme……… 
8. Please rank in order the U.C. costs you consider burdensome………………… 
9. What was the quality of service provided under the U.C. scheme provided by 
your hospital? How was it different from the quality of service provided under 
other schemes by your hospitals……………………………………………….... 
10. What were the UC related costs you had to bear and not covered by the fund 
allocation by the NHSO?………………………………………………………… 
11. In case of the inadequate fund allocation by the NHSO, how did you resolve the 
problem of the shortage of funds? Please give examples of problems and their 
solution 
Problems Solution 
1  
2  
3  
4  
 
12. What were the problems leading to opting out of the U.C. scheme, such as 
difficulty in quality control, losses, and problems with management and data 
base and other? Please rank them in order of their importance 
1.…………………………………………………………………………….. 
2……………………………………………………………………………… 
3……………………………………………………………………………… 
4……………………………………………………………………………… 
13. What was the disease which incurring the most burdensome U.C. related 
cost……………………….. 
14. Did you negotiate with the NHSO………………………and How? …………… 
15. What are the factors that will make you join the U.C. scheme again? 
………………………………………. 
16. Were their complaints about the quality of medical treatment provided by your 
hospital, and how did you deal with the complaints or the problems that gave 
rise to such complaints…………………………………………………………… 
17. In your opinion, what are the long-term problems of the UC scheme.………….. 
18. Do you think the UC scheme is sustainable and why? ………………………… 
19. In your opinion, what are the factors contributing to the survival of the hospitals 
joining the UC scheme ………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 2 – Interview outline 
An outline for the interview of the management of the hospitals joining the UC scheme 
Interviews were conducted on the subject of: 
1. The management. 
a. The management by the executive board. 
b. The effect of public participation in the management board on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the management in terms of: 
i. Cost reduction. 
ii. Reduction of workload and efficient use of available personnel. 
iii. Streamlined work procedure. 
2. The samples of projects carried out with efficiency and thus resulting in 
profitability. 
3. The management of the funds received from NHSO 
4. The revenues of hospitals those were higher than UC capitation and their trend, 
as well as the approach to financial management contributing to sound financial 
condition of hospitals. 
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Appendix 3 – Interview schedule 
 
 Interviewees Subject Date  
1 Politician- head of the 
political party 
Formulation of UC scheme  
Opinion on budget allocation of UC scheme 
The sustainability of the UC scheme  
The conflict of interest  
15 January 2014 
2 Politician – member of 
parliament 
20 January 2014 
3 B-Care- executive board The effect of public participation in the 
management board on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the management in terms of 
cost reduction, reduction of workload and 
efficient use of available personnel. 
Streamlined work procedure. 
The management of the funds received from 
NHSO 
The revenues of hospitals those were higher 
than UC capitation and their trend, as well as 
the approach to financial management 
contributing to sound financial condition of 
hospitals 
10 November 2013 
4 B-care-managing director  10 December 2013 
5 Banpeaw – Director The effect of public participation in the 
management board on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the management in terms of 
cost reduction, reduction of workload and 
efficient use of available personnel. 
Streamlined work procedure. 
The management of the funds received from 
NHSO 
25 January 2014 
6 Banpeaw – Deputy director 10 February 2014 
7 Baanpaew – medical 
doctor1 
opinion on UC scheme 
work load 
conflict of interest 
satisfaction on UC scheme  
12 February 2014 
8 Baanpaew – medical 
doctor2 
12 February 2014 
9 Baanpaew –nurse 1 March 2014 
10 NGO 1 conflict of interest 
impact on UC scheme,  
2 November 2013 
11 NGO 2 10 November 2013 
12 NGO 3 10 November 2013 
13 SCHOLARs conflict of interest 
impact on UC scheme, 
15 October 2014 
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